Notes from a Non-anniversary

I woke up this morning and took a short walk to a big square. As expected, it was pretty calm in the kind of jittery, strained, composed way one usually associates with a dinner party where one of the hosts is having an extramarital affair with one of the guests. The square looked relatively normal but with a beefed-up security detail that included a ring of young slack-jawed crew cut types in tracksuits and matching gray badges worn on unmatching t-shirts. Reports of visitors being asked to produce passports, to weed out foreign journalists, appear to be overstated. I walked into the square from two different directions today and wasn’t once asked for my passport. To read some of the other dispatches from this morning (Reuters/AP) you’d think the square was under martial law, and that’s not really the case. That said, don’t pull out a camera or try to film a dispatch unless you want an umbrella stuck in your face. (Yes, the latest in Chinese counter-surveillance equipment can be purchased at any subway kiosk for 5 RMB, or maybe 10 if it’s raining.) There are many reasons for the non-events of today’s anniversary. While the square is open, the extra security is clearly ready to pounce on anybody who looks like trouble. Launching a spontaneous protest today would be like robbing a casino in Vegas; sure you might get your hands on the money but you’re going to get your teeth knocked in before you set a single foot outside to spend it. Whatever you do better be worth it. And frankly, people in Beijing don’t really seem to care very much, or maybe just aren’t that interested in big public displays of dissent. The majority of urbanites in China’s capital long ago traded away their political pottage for the right to buy knock-off handbags and a decent compact car, and they are reasonably happy with the deal they’ve made. There are a few cracks in the facade. There will be a memorial service at Victoria Park in Hong Kong tonight. The new English-language edition of the Global Timeshas run two pieces this week, including a long article in today’s (June 4) edition looking at the Tiananmen crackdown in historical perspective. To be sure, the piece does so from the perspective of the CCP, but that the subject is broached at all, even in a relatively new English-language paper, is still noteworthy

Die p24-Proteinfamilie : Lokalisation, Oligomerisierung und Konzentration im frühen sekretorischen Weg

Die p24-Familie ist eine hochkonservierte Proteinfamilie von Typ I Transmembranproteinen, deren Mitglieder im frühen sekretorischen Weg zyklisieren. Obwohl allgemein anerkannt ist, daß diese Proteinfamilie eine Rolle bei den Transportprozessen zwischen ER, IC und Golgi spielt, ist eine genaue Funktion bis heute immer noch unklar. Sie werden als Coatrezeptoren und Transportrezeptoren oder –adaptoren gehandelt, aber es wird ihnen auch eine Funktion in der Qualitätskontrolle im ER und bei der Vesikelbiogenese zugeschrieben. Eine herausragende Eigenschaft der p24-Proteine ist die Ausbildung von Heterooligomeren. Da die p24-Mitglieder sowohl in der Lokalisation als auch der Biosynthese voneinander abhängig sind, muß auch der Schlüssel zu ihrer Funktion in der Ausbildung dieser Oligomere liegen. Daher wurde in dieser Arbeit die Ausbildung, und dabei vor allem die Komplexgröße der p24-Mitglieder in ER, IC und Golgi analysiert. Das Verhältnis von Monomer zu Dimer ist, je nach p24-Protein und Organell, unterschiedlich, und zwei Mitglieder der p26-Subfamilie (p26 und tp24) liegen immer nur als Dimer bzw. als Monomer vor. Durch eine Westernblotanalyse wurden die Konzentrationen der p24-Proteine in den Organellen des frühen sekretorischen Weges bestimmt. Überraschenderweise liegen sie jedoch in sehr unterschiedlichen Konzentrationen vor. Zwei Mitglieder der p26-Subfamilie, p26 und tp24, zeichnen sich zusätzlich durch eine ungleich höhere bzw. niedrigere Konzentration aus. Um das dynamische Zusammenspiel der p24-Proteine zu analysieren, wurde biochemisch und über Immunfluoreszenz die Umverteilung der p24-Mitglieder bei einem 15°C-Block und dessen Auflösung analysiert. Sowohl in der Immunfluoreszenz, als auch biochemisch, konnte gezeigt werden, daß ein p24-Protein in jeder Organelle mit einem anderen p24-Protein umverteilt wird, was auf einen ständigen Wechsel der Interaktionspartner bei jedem Transportschritt hindeutet

State Failure - A Rationale for EU Foreign Policy?

'Estats fallits' ha arribat a ser un lema popular per als acadèmics i els polítics per igual. En opinió dels governs occidentals i les institucions internacionals, els estats fallits no compleixen amb les condicions necessàries per assolir el desenvolupament econòmic i social i alhora proporcionar un terreny fèrtil per als actors violents conflictes i no estatals que participen en la delinqüència internacional. La Unió Europea té una relació de llarga data amb els països de l'Àfrica subsahariana, molts dels quals es caracteritzen per ser fallat. En aquest treball es pretén analitzar si el compromís retòric de la UE per fer front a la insuficiència de l'Estat es tradueix en un enfocament coherent davant les causes profundes de la fragilitat de l'Estat i pregunta pels factors que expliquen el compromís de la UE amb els problemes que enfronten aquests estats. Mitjançant la comparació de les polítiques europees cap a la República Democràtica del Congo, Sierra Leone i la República Centreafricana, s'argumenta que la resposta de la UE als Estats fallits es desenvolupa d'una manera incoherent esbiaixada cap a les situacions de conflicte en lloc de ser guiat per una preocupació més general per fragilitat . L'anàlisi suggereix que la participació de la UE es deu principalment a interessos coincidents en els Estats membres i de la UE.'Failed states' have come to be a popular catchword for academics and policy-makers alike. In the view of Western governments and international institutions, failed states do not meet the conditions for achieving economic and social development and at the same time provide fertile grounds for violent conflict and non-state actors involved in international crime. The European Union has a long-standing relation with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, many of which are characterised as failed. This paper seeks to analyze whether the EU's rhetorical commitment to tackle state failure translates into a coherent approach dealing with the root causes of state fragility and asks for the factors explaining the EU's engagement with the problems facing such states. By comparison of European policies towards the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic, it is argued that the EU's response to state failure evolves in an incoherent manner biased towards conflict situations rather than being guided by a more general concern for fragility. The analysis suggests that EU involvement is mainly driven by coinciding interests at member state and EU level

Managing Territorial Disputes in Southeast Asia: Is There More than the South China Sea?

The conflicts in the South China Sea have come to dominate debates on Southeast Asian security and specifically on how boundary disputes have been managed within the region. Yet, the case is not necessarily exemplary for the way Southeast Asian countries have dealt with territorial disputes generally. The article gathers three common perceptions about conflict management that are strongly informed by the South China Sea case, but have lesser relevance when looking at other territorial conflicts in the region. I offer a critical reading of the who, why, and how of territorial conflict management and provide tentative guidelines on what to expect in the future

Notes from a Non-anniversary

I woke up this morning and took a short walk to a big square. As expected, it was pretty calm in the kind of jittery, strained, composed way one usually associates with a dinner party where one of the hosts is having an extramarital affair with one of the guests. The square looked relatively normal but with a beefed-up security detail that included a ring of young slack-jawed crew cut types in tracksuits and matching gray badges worn on unmatching t-shirts. Reports of visitors being asked to produce passports, to weed out foreign journalists, appear to be overstated. I walked into the square from two different directions today and wasn’t once asked for my passport. To read some of the other dispatches from this morning (Reuters/AP) you’d think the square was under martial law, and that’s not really the case. That said, don’t pull out a camera or try to film a dispatch unless you want an umbrella stuck in your face. (Yes, the latest in Chinese counter-surveillance equipment can be purchased at any subway kiosk for 5 RMB, or maybe 10 if it’s raining.) There are many reasons for the non-events of today’s anniversary. While the square is open, the extra security is clearly ready to pounce on anybody who looks like trouble. Launching a spontaneous protest today would be like robbing a casino in Vegas; sure you might get your hands on the money but you’re going to get your teeth knocked in before you set a single foot outside to spend it. Whatever you do better be worth it. And frankly, people in Beijing don’t really seem to care very much, or maybe just aren’t that interested in big public displays of dissent. The majority of urbanites in China’s capital long ago traded away their political pottage for the right to buy knock-off handbags and a decent compact car, and they are reasonably happy with the deal they’ve made. There are a few cracks in the facade. There will be a memorial service at Victoria Park in Hong Kong tonight. The new English-language edition of the Global Timeshas run two pieces this week, including a long article in today’s (June 4) edition looking at the Tiananmen crackdown in historical perspective. To be sure, the piece does so from the perspective of the CCP, but that the subject is broached at all, even in a relatively new English-language paper, is still noteworthy