Justifying the Special Theory of Relativity with Unconceived Methods

Many realists argue that present scientific theories will not follow the fate of past scientific theories because the former are more successful than the latter. Critics object that realists need to show that present theories have reached the level of success that warrants their truth. I reply that the special theory of relativity has been repeatedly reinforced by unconceived scientific methods, so it will be reinforced by infinitely many unconceived scientific methods. This argument for the special theory of relativity overcomes the critics’ objection, and has advantages over the no-miracle argument and the selective induction for it

What is theoretical progress of science?

The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress is particularly significant for understanding scientific realism, since realism is naturally construed as the claim that science makes theoretical progress. Some prominent realist positions (regarding fundamental physics, in particular) are best understood in terms of commitment to theoretical progress that cannot be equated with accumulation of scientific knowledge

Can metaphysical structuralism solve the plurality problem?

Metaphysics has a problem with plurality: in many areas of discourse, there are too many good theories, rather than just one. This embarrassment of riches is a particular problem for metaphysical realists who want metaphysics to tell us the way the world is and for whom one theory is the correct one. A recent suggestion is that we can treat the different theories as being functionally or explanatorily equivalent to each other, even though they differ in content. The aim of this paper is to explore whether the notion of functionally equivalent theories can be extended and utilized in the defence of metaphysical realism, drawing upon themes from structuralism in the philosophies of mathematics and science in which the specifics of theories do not matter as long as the relations in which they stand to other theories are maintained. I argue that despite its initial attractiveness, there are significant difficulties with this proposal. Discovering these obstacles (most probably) thwarts the realist structuralist project, but reveals interesting features of metaphysical systems

Acute phase response in two consecutive experimentally induced E. coli intramammary infections in dairy cows

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Acute phase proteins haptoglobin (Hp), serum amyloid A (SAA) and lipopolysaccharide binding protein (LBP) have suggested to be suitable inflammatory markers for bovine mastitis. The aim of the study was to investigate acute phase markers along with clinical parameters in two consecutive intramammary challenges with <it>Escherichia coli </it>and to evaluate the possible carry-over effect when same animals are used in an experimental model.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Mastitis was induced with a dose of 1500 cfu of <it>E. coli </it>in one quarter of six cows and inoculation repeated in another quarter after an interval of 14 days. Concentrations of acute phase proteins haptoglobin (Hp), serum amyloid A (SAA) and lipopolysaccharide binding protein (LBP) were determined in serum and milk.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>In both challenges all cows became infected and developed clinical mastitis within 12 hours of inoculation. Clinical disease and acute phase response was generally milder in the second challenge. Concentrations of SAA in milk started to increase 12 hours after inoculation and peaked at 60 hours after the first challenge and at 44 hours after the second challenge. Concentrations of SAA in serum increased more slowly and peaked at the same times as in milk; concentrations in serum were about one third of those in milk. Hp started to increase in milk similarly and peaked at 36–44 hours. In serum, the concentration of Hp peaked at 60–68 hours and was twice as high as in milk. LBP concentrations in milk and serum started to increase after 12 hours and peaked at 36 hours, being higher in milk. The concentrations of acute phase proteins in serum and milk in the <it>E. coli </it>infection model were much higher than those recorded in experiments using Gram-positive pathogens, indicating the severe inflammation induced by <it>E. coli</it>.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Acute phase proteins would be useful parameters as mastitis indicators and to assess the severity of mastitis. If repeated experimental intramammary induction of the same animals with <it>E. coli </it>is used in cross-over studies, the interval between challenges should be longer than 2 weeks, due to the carry-over effect from the first infection.</p

Historical Magic in Old Quantum Theory?

Two successes of old quantum theory are particularly notable: Bohr’s prediction of the spectral lines of ionised helium, and Sommerfeld’s prediction of the fine-structure of the hydrogen spectral lines. Many scientific realists would like to be able to explain these successes in terms of the truth or approximate truth of the assumptions which fuelled the relevant derivations. In this paper I argue that this will be difficult for the ionised helium success, and is almost certainly impossible for the fine-structure success. Thus I submit that the case against the realist’s thesis that success is indicative of truth is marginally strengthened

Mathematical Explanation In Biology

Biology has proved to be a rich source of examples in which mathematics plays a role in explaining some physical phenomena. In this paper, two examples from evolutionary biology, one involving periodical cicadas and one involving bee honeycomb, are examined in detail. I discuss the use of such examples to defend platonism about mathematical objects, and then go on to distinguish several different varieties of mathematical explanation in biology. I also connect these discussions to issues concerning generality in biological explanation, and to the question of how to pick out which mathematical properties are explanatorily relevant