Incentives in HMOs

We study the effect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician incentives are controversial because they may induce doctors to make treatment decisions that differ from those they would chose in the absence of incentives. We set out a theoretical framework for assessing the degree to which incentive contracts do in fact induce physicians to deviate from a standard guided only by patient interests and professional medical judgement. Our empirical evaluation of the model relies on details of the HMO's incentive contracts and access to the firm's internal expenditure records. We estimate that the HMO's incentive contract provides a typical physician an increase, at the margin, of $0.10 in income for each$1.00 reduction in medical utilization expenditures. The average response is a 5 percent reduction in medical expenditures. We also find suggestive evidence that financial incentives linked to commonly used quality measures may stimulate an improvement in measured quality.

Modelling single cell electroporation with bipolar pulse parameters and dynamic pore radii

We develop a model of single spherical cell electroporation and simulate spatial and temporal aspects of the transmembrane potential and pore radii as an effect of any form of applied electric field. The extent of electroporation in response to sinusoidal electric pulses of two different frequencies in a range of extracellular conductivity for two different cell radii are compared. Results show that pore radii tend to be more normalized for AC fields. The relative difference in fractional pore area is reduced by the use of a 1 MHz sinusoidal applied electric field over a 100 kHz field

"Incentives In HMOs"

We studied the effect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician incentives are controversial because they may induce doctors to make treatment decisions that differ from those they would choose in the absence of incentives. We set out a theoretical framework for assessing the degree to which incentive contracts do, in fact, induce physicians to deviate from a standard, guided only by patient interest and professional medical judgment. Our empirical evaluation of the model relies on details of the HMO's incentive contracts and access to the firms' internal expenditure records. We estimate that the HMO's incentive contract provides a typical physician an increase, at the margin, of $.10 in income for each$1.00 reduction in medial utilization expenditures. The average response is a 5-percent reduction in medical expenditures. We also find suggestive evidence that financial incentives linked to commonly used "quality" measures may stimulate an improvement in measured quality.

Incentives in HMO's

We study the effect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician incentives are controversial because they may induce doctors to make treatment decisions that differ from those they would chose in absence of incentives. We set out a theoretical framework for assessing the degree to which incentive contracts do in fact induce physicians to deviate from a standard guided only by patient interests and professional medical judgement. Our empirical evaluation of the model relies on details of the HMO's incentive contracts and access to the firm’s internal expenditure records. We estimate that the HMO's incentive contract provides a typical physician an increase, at the margin of $0.10 in income for each$1.00 reduction in medical utilisation expenditures. The average response is a 5% reduction in medical expenditures. We also find suggestive evidence that financial incentives linked to commonly used "quality" measure may stimulate an improvement in measured quality.analysis of health care markets

Incentives In HMOs

We studied the effect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician incentives are controversial because they may induce doctors to make treatment decisions that differ from those they would choose in the absence of incentives. We set out a theoretical framework for assessing the degree to which incentive contracts do, in fact, induce physicians to deviate from a standard, guided only by patient interest and professional medical judgment. Our empirical evaluation of the model relies on details of the HMO's incentive contracts and access to the firms' internal expenditure records. We estimate that the HMO's incentive contract provides a typical physician an increase, at the margin, of $.10 in income for each$1.00 reduction in medial utilization expenditures. The average response is a 5-percent reduction in medical expenditures. We also find suggestive evidence that financial incentives linked to commonly used "quality" measures may stimulate an improvement in measured quality.

Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Parens Patriae Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant

The Parens Patriae Act has been in effect for several years. Although there has been relatively little time in which to test the full measure of its effectiveness, it has gradually become apparent that much of the Act\u27s promise remains unfulfilled. Recent federal court decisions, when coupled with the problems of funding which are being encountered by many state attorneys general, might be endangering the Act\u27s continuing vitality and undercutting the legislature\u27s intent in enacting the measure. This Note will discuss some of the major issues which are emerging under the Act and will attempt to separate the promise from the realities of actual enforcement

Competition in Health Care Markets

This paper reviews the literature devoted to studying markets for health care services and health insurance. There has been tremendous growth and progress in this field. A tremendous amount of new research has been done in this area over the last 10 years. In addition, there has been increasing development and use of frontier industrial organization methods. We begin by examining research on the determinants of market structure, considering both static and dynamic models. We then model the strategic determination of prices between health insurers and providers where insurers market their products to consumers based, in part, on the quality and breadth of their provider network. We then review the large empirical literature on the strategic determination of hospital prices through the lens of this model. Variation in the quality of health care clearly can have large welfare consequences. We therefore also describe the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of market structure on quality of health care. The paper then moves on to consider competition in health insurance markets and physician services markets. We conclude by considering vertical restraints and monopsony power.

Theoretical damping in roll and rolling moment due to differential wing incidence for slender cruciform wings and wing-body combinations

A method of analysis based on slender-wing theory is developed to investigate the characteristics in roll of slender cruciform wings and wing-body combinations. The method makes use of the conformal mapping processes of classical hydrodynamics which transform the region outside a circle and the region outside an arbitrary arrangement of line segments intersecting at the origin. The method of analysis may be utilized to solve other slender cruciform wing-body problems involving arbitrarily assigned boundary conditions. (author