154 research outputs found
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on hierarchical lattices
An evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is studied with players located
on a hierarchical structure of layered square lattices. The players can follow
two strategies [D (defector) and C (cooperator)] and their income comes from PD
games with the ``neighbors.'' The adoption of one of the neighboring strategies
is allowed with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. Monte Carlo
simulations are performed to study how the measure of cooperation is affected
by the number of hierarchical levels (Q) and by the temptation to defect.
According to the simulations the highest frequency of cooperation can be
observed at the top level if the number of hierarchical levels is low (Q<4).
For larger Q, however, the highest frequency of cooperators occurs in the
middle layers. The four-level hierarchical structure provides the highest
average (total) income for the whole community.Comment: appendix adde
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Newman-Watts networks
Maintenance of cooperation was studied for a two-strategy evolutionary
Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players are located on a one-dimensional
chain and their payoff comes from games with the nearest and next-nearest
neighbor interactions. The applied host geometry makes possible to study the
impacts of two conflicting topological features. The evolutionary rule involves
some noise affecting the strategy adoptions between the interacting players.
Using Monte Carlo simulations and the extended versions of dynamical mean-field
theory we determined the phase diagram as a function of noise level and a
payoff parameter. The peculiar feature of the diagram is changed significantly
when the connectivity structure is extended by extra links as suggested by
Newman and Watts.Comment: 4 figure
Distribution and composition of the lysis cassette of Lactococcus lactis phages and functional analysis of bacteriophage ul36 holin
The bacteriophage lysis cassette, which comprises a lysin and a holin gene, was analyzed in 18 Lactococcus lactis phages. A muramidase motif was found in the lysins of c2-like phages, while an amidase motif was observed in the lysins of 936-like phages. Both amidase and muramidase types were detected among the P335 phages. The P335 lysins were separated into three groups based on amino acid sequence identity. A class I holin was recognized in 936-like and c2-like phages, whereas P335-like phages possess class II holins. The P335 holins were further divided into four groups based on sequence identity. Only the holins of 936-like phages contained putative dual-start motifs. The unusual lysis cassette of the highly virulent P335-like phage ul36 contains a unique holin (orf74B) upstream of a lysin which is present in several other P335-like phages. Using the λΔSthf system, we demonstrated that gpORF74B induces cell lysis at the same time as λΔSthf::S105, the effector of λ lysis. Transcriptional analysis of ul36 lysis cassette showed that first transcripts are detected 35 min after infection of L. lactis cells. The lysis clock of phage ul36 appears to be controlled by the late expression of the holin and lysin gene
Selection of noise level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas
We studied spatial Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt games where both the
strategy distribution and the players' individual noise level could evolve to
reach higher individual payoff. Players are located on the sites of different
two-dimensional lattices and gain their payoff from games with their neighbors
by choosing unconditional cooperation or defection. The way of strategy
adoption can be characterized by a single (temperature-like) parameter
describing how strongly adoptions depend on the payoff-difference. If we start
the system from a random strategy distribution with many different player
specific parameters, the simultaneous evolution of strategies and
parameters drives the system to a final stationary state where only one
value remains. In the coexistence phase of cooperator and defector strategies
the surviving parameter is in good agreement with the noise level that
ensures the highest cooperation level if uniform is supposed for all
players. In this paper we give a thorough overview about the properties of this
evolutionary process.Comment: 10 two-column pages, 10 figures; accepted for publication in Physical
Review
Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games
We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can
imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor
with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income
is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites
of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and
use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system
is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule
drives the system towards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains
alive even in the coexistence of cooperative and defective behaviors. The final
rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of cooperation and
affected by the topology of the connectivity structure.Comment: 5 two-column pages, 3 figure
Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding
Our wellbeing depends as much on our personal success, as it does on the
success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation a very
much needed trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our
readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a
cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remain elusive. Here
we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence
on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that
instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from
indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of
coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal
fascinatingly reach social dynamics that explains why this costly behavior has
evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover
an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding that is due to over-aggression, which in
turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why,
despite of its success, rewarding is not as firmly weaved into our societal
organization as punishment.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of
Physic
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