Better Environment, Better Staff

The article discusses result of a survey addressing the quality of work life among audit personnel in the U.S. The result shows that dissatisfaction in the work environment affects staff\u27s performance. Creating customer value is one of the issues in business establishment. As stated, clients are demanding the expertise that comes with experiences. The quality of work environment may persuade outstanding staff members to pursue other career options. Financial rewards of public accounting are not the basis for changes in the rating of staff

Earnings management and audit quality:stakeholders’ perceptions

This paper examines the perceptions of Libyan Commercial Banks’ (LCBs) stakeholders regarding the role of the external auditor in relation to earnings management (EM). A total of 28 semi-structured interviews were carried out with a range of LCB stakeholders comprising preparers of financial statements, users, regulators and academics. A questionnaire survey of stakeholders which yielded 102 Responses (response rate 53%) was also carried out. A variety of views were held which varied to some extent according to stakeholder group. A widely held perception amongst interviewees was that the auditor has the ability to detect EM practices but may not be able to prevent it. However questionnaire respondents were, in aggregate, more confident of the auditor’s ability to deter EM due to the influence of the audit report. The paper provides insights into stakeholders’ perceptions of the quality of bank audits. The findings are of particular relevance to regulators, and specifically, the Central Bank of Libya. Perceptions of audit quality raise questions about its guidance and regulations especially in connection with audit firm rotation. Perceptions of audit quality, and therefore, of the credibility of financial statements should be of interest to all stakeholders. The importance of the banking sector for society has been amply demonstrated in recent years. A well-functioning audit function is a key component of its regulation. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine issues related to banks’ audit quality and audit firm rotation in Libya

Can auditors be independent? – Experimental evidence on the effects of client type

Recent regulatory initiatives stress that an independent oversight board, rather than the management board, should be the client of the auditor. In an experiment, we test whether the type of client affects auditors’ independence. Unique features of the German institutional setting enable us to realistically vary the type of auditors’ client as our treatment variable: we portray the client either as the management preferring aggressive accounting or the oversight board preferring conservative accounting. We measure auditors’ perceived client retention incentives and accountability pressure in a post-experiment questionnaire to capture potential threats to independence. We find that the type of auditors’ client affects auditors’ behaviour contingent on the degree of the perceived threats to independence. Our findings imply that both client retention incentives and accountability pressure represent distinctive threats to auditors’ independence and that the effectiveness of an oversight board in enhancing auditors’ independence depends on the underlying threat

The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting

We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for future research. Key themes include the endogenous nature of debt contracts and governance mechanisms with respect to information asymmetry between contracting parties, the heterogeneous nature of the informational demands of contracting parties, and the heterogeneous nature of the resulting governance and debt contracts. We also emphasize the role of a commitment to financial reporting transparency in facilitating informal multiperiod contracts among managers, directors, shareholders, and creditors

Female Audit Partners and Extended Audit Reporting: UK Evidence

This study investigates whether audit partner gender is associated with the extent of auditor disclosure and the communication style regarding risks of material misstatements that are classified as key audit matters (KAMs). Using a sample of UK firms during the 2013–2017 period, our results suggest that female audit partners are more likely than male audit partners to disclose more KAMs with more details after controlling for both client and audit firm attributes. Furthermore, female audit partners are found to use a less optimistic tone and provide less readable audit reports, compared to their male counterparts, suggesting that behavioural variances between female and male audit partners may have significant implications on their writing style. Therefore, this study offers new insights on the role of audit partner gender in extended audit reporting. Our findings have important implications for audit firms, investors, policymakers and governments in relation to the development, implementation and enforcement of gender diversity

Custos de auditoria e governança corporativa

O serviço prestado pela auditoria independente é fundamental para uma maior transparência e confiabilidade dos relatórios financeiros das empresas de capital aberto. As possíveis ameaças à independência e qualidade das suas análises, os custos dos serviços e a relação com os mecanismos de governança corporativa são temas explorados internacionalmente. Esta pesquisa investiga o tema no ambiente brasileiro, possível a partir da Instrução CVM 480, que tornou obrigatória a divulgação dos valores dos serviços de auditoria e serviços extras contratados junto às empresas de auditoria independente. Com o objetivo de analisar a relação entre governança corporativa, custos de auditoria e de serviços extra-auditoria, foram analisadas as informações disponibilizadas por 131 empresas no primeiro semestre de 2010. As proxies de governança utilizadas foram: desvio de direitos dos cinco maiores acionistas, participação em segmentos diferenciados de governança da Bolsa de Mercadoria e Futuros & Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BM&FBovespa), existência de comitê de auditoria e de departamento de auditoria interna. Os resultados apontam para uma relação negativa entre governança e custos de auditoria, sugerindo que, no mercado brasileiro, predomina o efeito risco. Ou seja, melhores práticas de governança reduzem os riscos (judiciais e de perda da reputação) da auditoria externa permitindo a cobrança de valores menores. A literatura internacional não é unânime quanto ao sinal, embora a maioria dos estudos apresente uma relação positiva, a favor do efeito demanda. De acordo com este efeito, melhor governança implica em maiores exigências junto ao serviço da auditoria acarretando elevação dos valores cobrados. A relação encontrada também é negativa entre os valores dos serviços extras e as boas práticas de governança. Apesar de as pesquisas não comprovarem a influência destes custos sobre a perda da independência da auditoria externa, a limitação desta prática é uma tendência entre legisladores e reguladores

Female Institutional Directors on Boards and Firm Value

The aim of this research is to examine what impact female institutional directors on boards have on corporate performance. Previous research shows that institutional female directors cannot be considered as a homogeneous group since they represent investors who may or may not maintain business relations with the companies on whose corporate boards they sit. Thus, it is not only the effect of female institutional directors as a whole on firm value that has been analysed, but also the impact of pressure-resistant female directors, who represent institutional investors (investment, pension and mutual funds) that only invest in the company, and do not maintain a business relation with the firm. We hypothesize that there is a non-linear association, specifically quadratic, between institutional and pressure-resistant female directors on boards and corporate performance. Our results report that female institutional directors on boards enhance corporate performance, but when they reach a certain threshold on boards (11.72 %), firm value decreases. In line with female institutional directors, pressure-resistant female directors on boards also increase firm value, but only up to a certain figure (12.71 % on boards), above which they have a negative impact on firm performance. These findings are consistent with an inverted U-shaped relationship between female institutional directors and pressure-resistant female directors and firm performance