how much more and how much better?

Funding Information: We thank two autonomous reviewers and the team of Climate Policy editors for their excellent comments and suggestions. We are thankful for the financial support of the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) for this research. The research was done independently, BMZ had no role in the preparation, analysis or writing of this article or its outcomes. Publisher Copyright: © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.Formal deliberations for the new collective quantified goal on climate finance began at COP26 in Glasgow. This Perspectives article aims to inform this process by discussing the potential size and nature of is post-2025 target. We argue that the climate finance system around the current target to mobilise US$100 billion per year to support developing countries has been fraught with difficulties, and that it would be ineffective to simply increase the climate finance target without addressing these difficulties. Therefore, we identify and discuss five priority elements for negotiations: the relation to Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement; the adaptation-mitigation balance; financial instruments; mobilising private finance; and ‘new and additional’ finance. To increase transparency, accountability, and trust in climate finance under the UNFCCC and to simultaneously allow for the mobilisation of finance at scale, we suggest setting a sub-target for grants. In combination with additional (sub)target(s), this could define an overall new collective quantified goal that is better suited to serve the challenging dual role of mobilising finance at scale and transferring resources to developing countries. Key policy insights: Ambiguous definitions of climate finance and the US$100 billion target allow for multiple interpretations, reducing transparency and trust between countries. Climate finance targets can be interpreted in a dual and sometimes contrasting way: mobilising investment at scale and transferring resources from developed to developing countries. Recognising this duality may help to find common ground for a post-2025 climate finance target. Increasing the climate finance target may prove ineffective without further clarity on private finance mobilisation, the relation to Art. 2.1(c), and other priority elements. More detailed assessments of needs, priorities, costs, and support are needed to inform the post-2025 target and assess climate finance provision effectiveness. A sub-target for grants could increase accountability, trust, and transparency, and target the needs of the most vulnerable developing countries. Negotiations on the post-2025 climate finance target could also consider additional aspects such as access to and prioritisation of finance, and loss and damage.publishersversionpublishe

Barriers to increasing energy efficiency: Evidence from small- and medium-sized enterprises in China

This paper analyzes financial, informational and organizational barriers to energy efficiency investments for small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China. Its findings are based on a survey of 480 SMEs in Zhejiang province, and complemented by semi-structured interviews with enterprises contained in the survey sample. Responses reveal that only a minority of SMEs in China actively perform energy saving activities at a significant level. The survey data suggest, further, that informational barriers are the core bottleneck inhibiting energy efficiency improvements in China's SME sector. Financial and organizational barriers also influence a company's energy saving activities, with interview-based evidence stronger than statistical evidence. The interviews point out three additional barriers to energy saving activities: the role of family ownership structures, lax enforcement of government regulations and the absence of government support as well as a lack of skilled labor. More than 40% of enterprises in the sample declared themselves unaware of energy saving equipment or practices in their respective business area, indicating that there are high transaction costs for SMEs to gather, assess, and apply information about energy saving potentials and relevant technologies. One policy implication of the study is that the Chinese government could play a more active role in fostering the dissemination of energy-efficiency related information in the SME sector

Post-2025 climate finance target: how much more and how much better?

Formal deliberations for the new collective quantified goal on climate finance began at COP26 in Glasgow. This Perspectives article aims to inform this process by discussing the potential size and nature of is post-2025 target. We argue that the climate finance system around the current target to mobilise US$100 billion per year to support developing countries has been fraught with difficulties, and that it would be ineffective to simply increase the climate finance target without addressing these difficulties. Therefore, we identify and discuss five priority elements for negotiations: the relation to Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement; the adaptation-mitigation balance; financial instruments; mobilising private finance; and ‘new and additional’ finance. To increase transparency, accountability, and trust in climate finance under the UNFCCC and to simultaneously allow for the mobilisation of finance at scale, we suggest setting a sub-target for grants. In combination with additional (sub)target(s), this could define an overall new collective quantified goal that is better suited to serve the challenging dual role of mobilising finance at scale and transferring resources to developing countries

Post-2025 climate finance target : how much more and how much better?

Formal deliberations for the new collective quantified goal on climate finance began at COP26 in Glasgow. This Perspectives article aims to inform this process by discussing the potential size and nature of is post-2025 target. We argue that the climate finance system around the current target to mobilise US$100 billion per year to support developing countries has been fraught with difficulties, and that it would be ineffective to simply increase the climate finance target without addressing these difficulties. Therefore, we identify and discuss five priority elements for negotiations: the relation to Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement; the adaptation-mitigation balance; financial instruments; mobilising private finance; and new and additional finance. To increase transparency, accountability, and trust in climate finance under the UNFCCC and to simultaneously allow for the mobilisation of finance at scale, we suggest setting a sub-target for grants. In combination with additional (sub)target(s), this could define an overall new collective quantified goal that is better suited to serve the challenging dual role of mobilising finance at scale and transferring resources to developing countries. Key policy insights Ambiguous definitions of climate finance and the US$100 billion target allow for multiple interpretations, reducing transparency and trust between countries. Climate finance targets can be interpreted in a dual and sometimes contrasting way: mobilising investment at scale and transferring resources from developed to developing countries. Recognising this duality may help to find common ground for a post-2025 climate finance target. Increasing the climate finance target may prove ineffective without further clarity on private finance mobilisation, the relation to Art. 2.1(c), and other priority elements. More detailed assessments of needs, priorities, costs, and support are needed to inform the post-2025 target and assess climate finance provision effectiveness. A sub-target for grants could increase accountability, trust, and transparency, and target the needs of the most vulnerable developing countries. Negotiations on the post-2025 climate finance target could also consider additional aspects such as access to and prioritisation of finance, and loss and damage.Funding Agencies|German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)</p