2,651 research outputs found
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
We show that any evolutionary dynamic that satisfies three mild requirements—
continuity, positive correlation, and innovation—does not eliminate strictly dominated
strategies in all games. Likewise, we demonstrate that existing elimination results
for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the
dynamics
Irrational behavior in the Brown - von Neuman - Nash dynamics
We present a class of games with a pure strategy being strictly dominated by an-
other pure strategy such that the former survives along solutions of the Brown - von Neumann - Nash dynamics from an open set of initial conditions
Robust permanence for interacting structured populations
The dynamics of interacting structured populations can be modeled by
where , , and
are matrices with non-negative off-diagonal entries. These models are
permanent if there exists a positive global attractor and are robustly
permanent if they remain permanent following perturbations of .
Necessary and sufficient conditions for robust permanence are derived using
dominant Lyapunov exponents of the with respect to
invariant measures . The necessary condition requires for all ergodic measures with support in the boundary of the
non-negative cone. The sufficient condition requires that the boundary admits a
Morse decomposition such that for all invariant
measures supported by a component of the Morse decomposition. When the
Morse components are Axiom A, uniquely ergodic, or support all but one
population, the necessary and sufficient conditions are equivalent.
Applications to spatial ecology, epidemiology, and gene networks are given
Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics
This paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games
based on perfect foresight dynamics. A normal form game is played
repeatedly in a large society of rational agents. There are frictions:
opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes.
Each agent forms his belief about the future evolution of action distribution
in the society to take an action that maximizes his expected
discounted payo�. A perfect foresight path is de�ned to be a feasible
path of the action distribution along which every agent with a revision
opportunity takes a best response to this path itself. A Nash
equilibrium is said to be absorbing if there exists no perfect foresight
path escaping from a neighborhood of this equilibrium; a Nash equilibrium
is said to be globally accessible if for each initial distribution,
there exists a perfect foresight path converging to this equilibrium.
By exploiting the monotone structure of the dynamics, a unique Nash
equilibrium that is absorbing and globally accessible for any small degree
of friction is identi�ed for certain classes of supermodular games.
For games with monotone potentials, the selection of the monotone
potential maximizer is obtained. Complete characterizations of absorbing
equilibrium and globally accessible equilibrium are given for
binary supermodular games. An example demonstrates that unanimity
games may have multiple globally accessible equilibria for a small
friction
Stochastic approximations and differential inclusions II: applications
We apply the theoretical results on "stochastic approximations and differential inclusions" developed in Benaim, Hofbauer and Sorin (2005) to several adaptive processes used in game theory including: classical
and generalized approachability, no-regret potential procedures (Hart and Mas-Colell), smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine
The Selection Mutation Equation
Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection is extended to the selection mutation model with mutation rates epsilon_ij=epsilon_i, i.e. depending only on the target gene, by constructing a simple Lyapunov function. For other mutation rates stable limit cycles are possible. A basic tool is the description of some of the dynamical models as gradients with respect to a non-Riemann metric
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