National Identification, Endorsement of Acculturation Ideologies and Prejudice: The Impact of the Perceived Threat of Immigration

This paper examines how the perceived threat of immigration affects the links between national identification, endorsement of assimilation or multiculturalism, and prejudice against immigrants in France. One hundred thirty-five French undergraduates completed a questionnaire measuring these factors. Path analysis showed that higher national identification increased perception of immigrants as a threat, which in turn predicted increased endorsement of assimilation for immigrants. The link between endorsement of assimilation and prejudice was not significant. In contrast, lower national identification decreased perception of immigrants as a threat and, in turn, increased endorsement of multiculturalism and reduced levels of prejudice. An alternative model specifying perception of threat as an outcome of preferences for multiculturalism or assimilation did not fit the data well. Results suggest that perceived threat from immigration is the key factor that guides the preferences of the majority group for acculturation ideologies and, through these preferences, shapes intergroup attitudes

The difficulty of recognising less obvious forms of group-based discrimination

Research on perceptions of discrimination has focused on group-based differential treatment that is widely accepted as being illegitimate (e.g., based on race or gender). The present research investigates how individuals interpret less obvious forms of group-based exclusion based on age (Study 1) and vision correction status (Study 2). We propose that individuals will not question the legitimacy of such treatment, unless they are provided with explicit cues to do so. Participants who merely encountered exclusion (baseline control) did not differ from those who were directed to consider the legitimate reasons for this treatment, with respect to perceived legitimacy, felt anger, and collective action intentions. In contrast, individuals who were directed to consider the illegitimate reasons for the exclusion perceived it to be less legitimate, felt more anger, and reported higher collective action intentions. Participants’ own status as potential victims or mere observers of the exclusion criterion did not influence their legitimacy perceptions or felt anger. Results suggest that when confronted with forms of group-based exclusion that are not commonly defined as discrimination, people do not perceive an injustice unless explicitly directed to seek it out

Angry opposition to government redress: when the structurally advantaged perceive themselves as relatively deprived

We examined (structurally advantaged) non-Aborigines' willingness for political action against government redress to (structurally disadvantaged) Aborigines in Australia. We found non-Aborigines opposed to government redress to be high in symbolic racism and to perceive their ingroup as deprived relative to Aborigines. However, only perceived relative deprivation was associated with feelings of group-based anger. In addition, consistent with relative deprivation and emotion theory, it was group-based anger that fully mediated a willingness for political action against government redress. Thus, the specific group-based emotion of anger explained why symbolic racism and relative deprivation promoted a willingness for political action against government redress to a structurally disadvantaged out-group. Theoretical and political implications are discussed

Facilitative parenting and children's social, emotional and behavioural adjustment

Facilitative parenting (FP) supports the development of children’s social and emotional competence and effective peer relationships. Previous research has shown that FP discriminates between children bullied by peers from children who are not bullied, according to reports of teachers. This study investigates the association between FP and children’s social, emotional and behavioral problems, over and above the association with dysfunctional parenting (DP). 215 parents of children aged 5–11 years completed questionnaires about parenting and child behavior, and children and teachers completed measures of child bullying victimization. As predicted, FP accounted for variance in teacher reports of children’s bullying victimization as well as parent reports of children’s social and emotional problems and prosocial behavior better than that accounted for by DP. However for children’s reports of peer victimization the whole-scale DP was a better predictor than FP. Contrary to predictions, FP accounted for variance in conduct problems and hyperactivity better than DP. When analyses were replicated substituting subscales of dysfunctional and FP, a sub-set of FP subscales including Warmth, Supports Friendships, Not Conflicting, Child Communicates and Coaches were correlated with low levels of problems on a broad range of children’s adjustment problems. Parent–child conflict accounted for unique variance in children’s peer victimization (teacher report), peer problems, depression, emotional problems, conduct problems and hyperactivity. The potential relevance of FP as a protective factor for children against a wide range of adjustment problems is discussed

Apology and reparation

Apology and reparations can facilitate the transition from conflict to peace, but the processes of deciding to offer them, determining their content, and deciding whether to accept their terms can themselves give rise to additional conflict. We examine these processes in this chapter, starting with a discussion of the parties involved: victims, perpetrators, group representatives, and third parties. Next, we consider the steps needed to bring about offers of apology and reparations: acknowledgment of illegitimate harm by a perpetrator group, and acknowledgment that restitution is feasible. In the third section we outline the various forms that apology and reparation have taken in intergroup conflict. We then focus on the aftermath of apology and reparation: when are victims and perpetrators likely to support such offers? We conclude that apology and reparation can help resolve conflict, but that they also require careful negotiation. We outline some unanswered questions and directions for future research

What's left behind: Identity continuity moderates the effect of nostalgia on well-being and life choices

Previous research has demonstrated that nostalgia for the past can have positive consequences for individuals’ psychological well-being and their perceived ability to cope with challenges in the present (Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006). We propose that this effect is limited to circumstances in which individuals have maintained identity continuity between the past and the present. Support for this moderation hypothesis is obtained in a longitudinal survey (Study 1) and two experiments (Studies 2 and 3) among students entering university. Whereas previously observed positive effects of nostalgia were confirmed when identity continuity had been maintained, feeling nostalgic about the past in the context of lower identity continuity had negative consequences for well-being (Studies 1 and 3), perceived ability to cope with challenges (Studies 1 and 2), and interest in new opportunities (Studies 2 and 3) rather than focusing on familiar experiences (Study 3). Taken together, results indicate that the extent to which individuals view the present as linked to the past has important implications for the outcome of their nostalgia

IMPACT OF JUSTICE EFFORTS LED BY HIGH-STATUS GROUPS

Members of high-status groups (e.g., men) often lead social justice efforts that seek to benefit low-status groups (e.g., women), but little is known about how observers respond to such instances of visible and influential solidarity. We presented information about a non-profit organization seeking to address gender (Study 1, N = 198) or racial (Study 2, N = 216) inequality, in which the leadership team was manipulated to include a numerical majority of either high-status group members or low-status group members. Members of low-status groups who read about the majority high-status leadership team reported lower levels of collective action intentions, compared to those who read about the majority low-status leadership team. Mediation analyses (Studies 1 and 2) and an experimental-causal-chain design (Study 3, N = 405) showed that lower collective action intentions in response to the majority high-status leadership team were mediated by participants’ perception of a specific problem presented by high-status group leaders (lower awareness of inequality) and lower levels of hope. Study 4 (N = 555) demonstrated that low-status group members responded more negatively to a majority high-status leadership team in an organization seeking to benefit their low-status ingroup (solidarity context), compared to organizations seeking to benefit other groups (non-solidarity contexts). Results provide the first evidence that the presence of influential high-status group leaders can discourage members of low-status groups from joining a social justice effort that seeks to benefit their ingroup, and that these negative responses extend beyond preferences predicted by frameworks of ingroup bias and role congruity

Qualified support for normative vs. non-normative protest:Less invested members of advantaged groups are most supportive when the protest fits the opportunity for status improvement

Disadvantaged groups use different means to protest inequality. Normative protest is more likely when the societal context of inter-group inequality signals that there is opportunity for status improvement. Non-normative protest is more likely to occur in systems in which status improvement is unlikely. However, little is known about how advantaged groups react to (normative vs. non-normative) protest as a function of the likelihood for status improvement of the disadvantaged offered by the context (high vs. low). Four experiments (N = 1092) assessed endorsement of protest among advantaged group members using different operationalizations of likelihood for status improvement and type of protest in four different intergroup contexts. Advantaged group members scoring lower in self-investment in their group identity endorsed protest more when the form of protest matched likelihood for status improvement than when it did not. Specifically, less invested members most supported normative protest (i.e., marches, petitions) when likelihood for status improvement was high and non-normative protest (i.e., hacking, destruction of property) occurring in contexts in which status improvement was unlikely. Highly self-invested individuals tended to be unaffected by the form of protest or type of inequality. Mediated moderation analyses suggested that increased appraisals of illegitimacy of inequality explained why support (i.e. among the less invested) was higher when the form of protest fitted opportunity for societal improvement. Results suggest that those less committed to their advantaged position jointly consider type of protest and its context of occurrence when forming opinions on acceptability of disadvantaged protest.</p