Taste and Quality Perception of Attributes in Product Differentiation: An Econometric Model with Latent Variables

We study the consumers' preferences for the various attributes of a product. We consider that the consumers'choices are not guided by observed characteristics of a product, but by the quality perception consumers have on these attributes. Our model integrates this issue by means of latent variables, and is interested in the influence of the information received by the consumer on this perception. It also includes consumers' attitudes by supposing that the weight consumers put on attributes describes their tastes. An econometric application on material choices (wood vs. PVC) in the French window market valid these assumptions.quality perception, information, taste, latent variable model, wood

Does aversion to the sucker's payoff matter in public goods games?

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an assurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.Experiments, Public good, Sucker’s payoff, Assurance

Dealing with the aversion to the sucker’s payoff in public goods game

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.

Can Positional Concerns Enhance the Private provision of Public Goods?

The social welfare effect of positional concerns over public goods is composed of two parts, a positional outcome and an outcome in terms of public goods provision. When agents have homogenous positional preferences over the public good, they overinvest in the positional public good, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher provision of the public good. When agents differ in their positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogenous and uncertain when endowments are heterogeneous. Given that the social loss from position-seeking is lower than the social gain from rank seeking, there is an increase of social welfare. If agents have different initial endowments, positional preferences might still be welfare enhancing as long as the positional loss does not exceed the gain in terms of public good provision.

Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker's payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective' design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.Experiments, Public good, Sucker's payoff, Assurance

Moral self-licencing and social dilemmas: an experimental analysis from a taking game in Madagascar

This article explores whether previous good deeds may license antisocial behaviour, such as appropriating a social surplus for private benefits, in a developing country context, namely Madagascar. We design a two-step framed experiment, with one control treatment (a neutral task) and three test treatments (tasks enabling subjects to earn moral credits in three different ways), followed by a taking game in which subjects are given the opportunity to take an amount from a fund allocated to their University. On average, we find that participants in the three licencing conditions appropriate more than those in the control group and that further differences emerge according to the way the moral credits have been earned

Les programmes d’écolabellisation face aux motivations égoïstes ou altruistes des consommateurs et à la nature publique ou privée des attributs environnementaux

La réussite des écolabels tient dans la combinaison des deux principaux facteurs que constituent, d’un côté, les interactions entre la nature privée ou publique des attributs environnementaux (c’est-à-dire le type de bénéfices individuels ou collectifs qu’ils procurent) et, de l’autre, la part des consommateurs ayant une attitude sociale égoïste ou altruiste. Ce second facteur permet notamment de comprendre pourquoi certains écolabels appliqués au même type de produits et ayant un niveau fixe d’attributs privés et publics, fonctionnent de manière différente selon les pays. On montre ainsi que, si le degré d’altruisme de certains consommateurs est élevé, le comportement d’achat de ces consommateurs altruistes peut empêcher les consommateurs plus « égoïstes » d’accéder au bien écolabellisé et, de ce fait, réduire le bénéfice environnemental global recherché. Il apparaît en outre important d’éviter une politique uniforme en mettant en place des stratégies de marketing adaptées à différents segments de consommateurs.

Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games

Egalement publié dans DR LAMETA ; 2009-27; Egalement publié dans WP SMART – LERECO ; 09-08;A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker's payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective' design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested

Effect of remote ischaemic conditioning on clinical outcomes in patients with acute myocardial infarction (CONDI-2/ERIC-PPCI): a single-blind randomised controlled trial.

BACKGROUND: Remote ischaemic conditioning with transient ischaemia and reperfusion applied to the arm has been shown to reduce myocardial infarct size in patients with ST-elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI) undergoing primary percutaneous coronary intervention (PPCI). We investigated whether remote ischaemic conditioning could reduce the incidence of cardiac death and hospitalisation for heart failure at 12 months. METHODS: We did an international investigator-initiated, prospective, single-blind, randomised controlled trial (CONDI-2/ERIC-PPCI) at 33 centres across the UK, Denmark, Spain, and Serbia. Patients (age >18 years) with suspected STEMI and who were eligible for PPCI were randomly allocated (1:1, stratified by centre with a permuted block method) to receive standard treatment (including a sham simulated remote ischaemic conditioning intervention at UK sites only) or remote ischaemic conditioning treatment (intermittent ischaemia and reperfusion applied to the arm through four cycles of 5-min inflation and 5-min deflation of an automated cuff device) before PPCI. Investigators responsible for data collection and outcome assessment were masked to treatment allocation. The primary combined endpoint was cardiac death or hospitalisation for heart failure at 12 months in the intention-to-treat population. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT02342522) and is completed. FINDINGS: Between Nov 6, 2013, and March 31, 2018, 5401 patients were randomly allocated to either the control group (n=2701) or the remote ischaemic conditioning group (n=2700). After exclusion of patients upon hospital arrival or loss to follow-up, 2569 patients in the control group and 2546 in the intervention group were included in the intention-to-treat analysis. At 12 months post-PPCI, the Kaplan-Meier-estimated frequencies of cardiac death or hospitalisation for heart failure (the primary endpoint) were 220 (8·6%) patients in the control group and 239 (9·4%) in the remote ischaemic conditioning group (hazard ratio 1·10 [95% CI 0·91-1·32], p=0·32 for intervention versus control). No important unexpected adverse events or side effects of remote ischaemic conditioning were observed. INTERPRETATION: Remote ischaemic conditioning does not improve clinical outcomes (cardiac death or hospitalisation for heart failure) at 12 months in patients with STEMI undergoing PPCI. FUNDING: British Heart Foundation, University College London Hospitals/University College London Biomedical Research Centre, Danish Innovation Foundation, Novo Nordisk Foundation, TrygFonden

Pros and Cons of Environmental Certification: The view point of behavioral economics

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