Formalizing Size-Optimal Sorting Networks: Extracting a Certified Proof Checker

Since the proof of the four color theorem in 1976, computer-generated proofs have become a reality in mathematics and computer science. During the last decade, we have seen formal proofs using verified proof assistants being used to verify the validity of such proofs. In this paper, we describe a formalized theory of size-optimal sorting networks. From this formalization we extract a certified checker that successfully verifies computer-generated proofs of optimality on up to 8 inputs. The checker relies on an untrusted oracle to shortcut the search for witnesses on more than 1.6 million NP-complete subproblems.Comment: IMADA-preprint-c

Non-deterministic Boolean Proof Nets

16 pagesInternational audienceWe introduce Non-deterministic Boolean proof nets to study the correspondence with Boolean circuits, a parallel model of computation. We extend the cut elimination of Non-deterministic Multiplicative Linear logic to a parallel procedure in proof nets. With the restriction of proof nets to Boolean types, we prove that the cut-elimination procedure corresponds to Non-deterministic Boolean circuit evaluation and reciprocally. We obtain implicit characterization of the complexity classes NP and NC (the efficiently parallelizable functions)

On Second-Order Monadic Monoidal and Groupoidal Quantifiers

We study logics defined in terms of second-order monadic monoidal and groupoidal quantifiers. These are generalized quantifiers defined by monoid and groupoid word-problems, equivalently, by regular and context-free languages. We give a computational classification of the expressive power of these logics over strings with varying built-in predicates. In particular, we show that ATIME(n) can be logically characterized in terms of second-order monadic monoidal quantifiers

Full vs Partial Market Coverage with Minimum Quality Standards

The consequences of the adoption of quality standards on the extent of market coverage is investigated by modelling a game between regulator and low-quality firm in a vertically differentiated duopoly. The game has a unique equilibrium in the most part of the parameter range. There exists a non-negligible range where the game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. This result questions the feasibility of MQS regulation when firms endogenously determine market coverage