Lexicographic Compositions of Multiple Criteria for Decision Making

This paper considers two distinct procedures to lexicographically compose multiple criteria for social or individual decision making. The first procedure composes M binary relations into one, and then selects its maximal elements. The second procedure first selects the set of maximal elements of the first binary relation, and then within that set, chooses the maximal elements of the second binary relation, and iterates the procedure until the M th binary relation. We show several distinct sets of conditions for the choice functions representing these two procedures to satisfy non-emptiness and choice-consistency conditions such as contraction consistency (Chernoff, 1954) and path independence (Arrow, 1963). We also examine the relationships between the outcomes of the two procedures. Then, we investigate under what conditions the outcomes of each procedure are independent of the order of lexicographic application of the criteria. Examples for applications of the results in the economic environments are also presented.multiple criteria for choice, lexicographic application, choice consistency, path independence, order independence

Optimal Assignment of Durable Objects to Successive Agents

This paper analyzes the assignment of durable objects to successive generations of agents who live for two periods. The optimal assignment rule is stationary, favors old agents and is determined by a selectivity function which satisfies an iterative functional differential equation. More patient social planners are more selective, as are social planners facing distributions of types with higher probabilities for higher types. The paper also characterizes optimal assignment rules when monetary transfers are allowed and agents face a recovery cost, when agents' types are private information and when agents can invest to improve their types.Dynamic Assignment ; Durable Objects ; Revenue Management ; Dynamic Mechanism Design ; Overlapping Generations ; Promotions and Intertemporal Assignments

ICT and Lean Management: Will They Ever Get Along?

In companies, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) accelerate the speed with which information is exchanged between employees, facilitate the processing of data and improve the quality of intra-company communication. As such, ICTs are powerful management support tools and can help to boost firms' performance. However, there is no consensus as to the way in which they should be used. The aim of this article is to contribute to the discussion on the various ways that ICTs are used in companies. Its empirical analysis is based on observations of the paradoxical practices and reasoning that dominate the lean manufacturing approach. Although the lean manufacturing approach considers that ICTs are useful to a degree for carrying out certain tasks, it emphasises the inefficiencies that can result from an inappropriate use of these technologies.Use; Information and Communication Technology; Lean Management; Information Systems; Toyota Production System

A refinement of prudent choices

We charaterize the choice correspondences that can be rationalized by a procedure that is a refinement of the prudent choices exposed in [Houy, 2008]. Our characterization is made by means of the usual expansion axiom and by a weakening of the usual contraction axiom α.Prudent choices, multi-criteria decision making.

A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting

We show that the class of absolute qualified majority voting rules are the only ones to satisfy Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity, Weak Pareto and Decisiveness Non-Equivalence. When there are two alternatives x and y, the latter axiom states that if an individual voting for y can improve the result of x by abstaining, then it is not the case that an individual abstaining can improve the result of x by voting for x.Absolute Qualified Majority Voting.

He said that he said that I am a J

We axiomatize the collective identity function selecting the agents that are indirectly designated by all the individuals in the society.Collective Identity

Progressive knowledge revealed preferences and sequential rationalizability

In this paper, we study the link between choices derived from monotonous set-dependent preferences and sequential rationalizability. This link is quite natural since choices derived from monotonous set-dependent preferences (introduced in [Houy, 2008b]) are characterized by a strong axiom of revealed preferences whereas sequentially rationalizable choice functions (introduced in [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007]) are characterized by a weak axiom of revealed preferences

The economics of Bitcoin transaction fees

We study the economics of Bitcoin transaction fees in a simple static partial equilibrium model with the specificity that the system security is directly linked to the total computational power of miners. We show that any situation with a fixed fee is equivalent to another situation with a limited block size. In both cases, we give the optimal value of the transaction fee or of the block size. We also show that making the block size a non binding constraint and, in the same time, letting the fee be fixed as the outcome of a decentralized competitive market cannot guarantee the very existence of Bitcoin in the long-term

Drug launch timing and international reference pricing

This paper analyzes the timing decisions of pharmaceutical firms to launch a new drug in countries involved in international reference pricing. We show three important features of launch timing when all countries reference the prices in all other countries and in all previous periods of time. First, there is no withdrawal of drugs in any country and in any period of time. Second, there is no strict incentive to delay the launch of a drug in any country. Third, whenever the drug is sold in a country, it is also sold in all countries with larger willingness to pay. We then show that the three results do not hold when the countries only reference a subset of all countries. The first two results do not hold when the reference is on the last period prices only