The United Kingdoms Eurosceptic political economy

This article explores how a political economy approach can explicate recent events in the United Kingdom’s relation to the European Union. The proposition is that neither critical nor comparative approaches do justice to the extent to which British elites have sought to differentiate the UK from the EU. The UK is here understood as a Eurosceptic political economy, constructed in opposition to European integration and, in particular, Economic and Monetary. The article explores how we have witnessed a hardening of this Eurosceptic political economy in the context of the Eurozone crisis. The most distinctive feature of which, as seen in the referendum campaign, is the extent to which the economic case for withdrawal has been established as part of the mainstream of British political debate

Cajoling or coercing: would electoral engineering resolve the young citizen–state disconnect?

The relationships between citizens and their states are undergoing significant stresses across advanced liberal democracies. In Britain, this disconnect is particularly evident amongst young citizens. This article considers whether different electoral engineering methods - designed either to cajole or compel youth to vote - might arrest the decline in their political engagement. Data collected in 2011 from a national survey of 1,025 British 18 year olds and from focus groups involving 86 young people, reveal that many young people claim that they would be more likely to vote in future elections if such electoral reforms were implemented. However, it is questionable whether or not such increased electoral participation would mean that they would feel truly connected to the democratic process. In particular, forcing young people to vote through the introduction of compulsory voting may actually serve to reinforce deepening resentments, rather than engage them in a positive manner

Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq

Research Highlights and Abstract: Precedents set in debates over Iraq, Libya and Syria established a new parliamentary prerogative, that MPs must vote before military action can legitimately be launched. Tony Blair conceded the Iraq vote to shore up Labour back-bench support, because he was convinced he would win, and because he was unwilling to change course regardless. David Cameron allowed a vote on Libya because he believed parliament should have a say, because UN support meant he was certain to win, and to gain plaudits for not being Blair. Cameron then had to allow a vote on Syria despite its greater political sensitivity. He mishandled the vote, and lost, and felt constrained to pull out of mooted military action. Collectively these three precedents comprise a new constitutional convention, which will constrain the executive in future whether the law is formally changed or not. Parliament now decides when Britain goes to war. The vote against military intervention in Syria on 29 August 2013 upheld a new parliamentary prerogative that gradually developed through debates over earlier actions in Iraq and Libya. While the academic community and much of the British political elite continue to focus on the free rein granted to prime ministers by the historic royal prerogative, this article argues it is critically constrained by its parliamentary counterpart. It traces the way political conditions, individual policymaker preferences, and the conventional nature of the unwritten British constitution allowed parliament to insert itself into the policymaking process without the consent of successive governments. It concludes that MPs will in future expect the right to vote on proposals to deploy the armed forces overseas, and that the legitimacy of military action will depend on the government winning such a vote