The Iowa Academy of Science Parish Farm: A Dream About Tomorrow

A gift may be given for many reasons and what the receiver does with it may depend on many things. The Iowa Academy of Science Parish Farm fits this situation and serves as an appropriate focal point to tell a story-a story with a beginning and a developing plot, but one whose ending is yet to be written, if ever. The Farm story represents a relatively small part of the Academy\u27s first hundred years, yet its potential is great for becoming a significant and unique part of the second hundred years. Just like those who may excitedly look back in the year 2075 and reflect on what has come to pass, we who have experienced the birth and early growth of the Iowa Academy of Science Parish Farm can excitedly look forward to what that future history may be

Pseudo-nitzschia blooms and physical oceanography off Washington State, USA

Blooms of harmful algal species occur along the Washington coast, usually as a fraction of the total phytoplankton population. Although more than 20 potentially harmful species have been identified along that coast,the most deleterious effects on public health and the economy are from Pseudo-nitzschia spp. and Alexandrium catenella. During three surveys conducted in early summer 1996, 1997 and 1998, high concentrations ofPseudo-nitzschia spp. (values of up to 106 cells.l-1, but generall

Creating a Culture for Leading and Performing in the Extreme

By early 2008 in the Iraq War, the positive effects of the U.S. surge had started to become visible in the streets of Baghdad, as shops began to reopen and people again filled the streets.1 Despite these outwardly positive appearances, a sinister undercurrent flowed through the population. Rumors ran rampant in Iraqi military and government circles that the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr\u27s Mahdi Army was about to launch an offensive against the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a fellow Shiite, because of Sadr\u27s unhappiness with his waning political influence. In the neighborhood of Zafaraniyah, in Baghdad\u27s southeastern quadrant, Sadrist fighters started to make trouble. The unit responsible for Zafaraniyah had been trained by its commander to act with a great deal of restraint in order to avoid unnecessary civilian deaths. This was in keeping with guidance issued by General David Petraeus, commanding general of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq. The success or failure of Petraeus\u27 strategy of limiting civilian deaths depended solely on the support of the Iraqi people and their perceptions of American and Iraqi forces. What Petraeus was attempting to do on a large scale was to change the organizational culture of both forces. The events of February and March 2008 would put Petraeus\u27 vision and strategy to the test and offer evidence of what happens when old ways of doing business compete with the new. On the second night of what would come to be called the uprising, a fight erupted between a dozen young Sadrist fighters and a platoon of American and Iraqi soldiers in the most troubled neighborhood in Zafaraniyah. The engaged platoon was well trained, had the situation well in hand, and acted with restraint. What unfolded was a textbook example of the tendency of higher headquarters to use available technological innovations regardless of the logic (or illogic) of doing so and in contravention of a subordinate commander\u27s wishes. The battalion watch officer, or battle captain, ran from the tactical operations center (TOC) to the battalion commander\u27s office to notify him of the firefight. The battle captain explained that the brigade headquarters wanted to drop a SOD-pound bomb from an F/A-18 Super Hornet onto the house where it was believed that twelve or so fighters had gone to make a last stand. The brigade TOC was watching the house from several miles away via a live camera feed from an aerial drone. Rushing to the TOC the battalion commander attempted to call off the strike. For God\u27s sake-our job here is to protect the Iraqi people! It\u27s the first sentence in our f--g mission statement! And you want to drop a damned bomb on someone\u27s house?! Every soldier in the TOC broke eye contact. They knew they were wrong. Their error: they got caught up in viewing the action as nothing more than a video game. They failed to assess whether dropping a bomb on an Iraqi house was consistent with the commander\u27s intent to exercise restraint and minimize civilian casualties. Within minutes, the battalion commander was on his way to the scene of the fighting to assess the situation. Almost immediately, he heard the boom of a Hellfire missile striking its target to the east of the commander\u27s location, followed by the staccato report of a string of 30mm shells from the helicopter\u27s main gun. Several minutes later, the commander found the platoon. The two small units and the Iraqi soldiers began fighting their way deep into the neighborhood to find the target house. It appeared that the missile strike had taken the spirit out of the enemy fighters, and friendly forces surrounded the house. They found surprisingly little damage. Fortunately, the Apache helicopter had fired a newly developed missile, specifically designed to limit destruction in urban terrain. Nonetheless, there was still collateral damage to other houses and pools of blood on the ground, along with bloody Iraqi National Police uniforms

Creating a Culture for Leading and Performing in the Extreme

By early 2008 in the Iraq War, the positive effects of the U.S. surge had started to become visible in the streets of Baghdad, as shops began to reopen and people again filled the streets.1 Despite these outwardly positive appearances, a sinister undercurrent flowed through the population. Rumors ran rampant in Iraqi military and government circles that the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr\u27s Mahdi Army was about to launch an offensive against the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a fellow Shiite, because of Sadr\u27s unhappiness with his waning political influence. In the neighborhood of Zafaraniyah, in Baghdad\u27s southeastern quadrant, Sadrist fighters started to make trouble. The unit responsible for Zafaraniyah had been trained by its commander to act with a great deal of restraint in order to avoid unnecessary civilian deaths. This was in keeping with guidance issued by General David Petraeus, commanding general of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq. The success or failure of Petraeus\u27 strategy of limiting civilian deaths depended solely on the support of the Iraqi people and their perceptions of American and Iraqi forces. What Petraeus was attempting to do on a large scale was to change the organizational culture of both forces. The events of February and March 2008 would put Petraeus\u27 vision and strategy to the test and offer evidence of what happens when old ways of doing business compete with the new. On the second night of what would come to be called the uprising, a fight erupted between a dozen young Sadrist fighters and a platoon of American and Iraqi soldiers in the most troubled neighborhood in Zafaraniyah. The engaged platoon was well trained, had the situation well in hand, and acted with restraint. What unfolded was a textbook example of the tendency of higher headquarters to use available technological innovations regardless of the logic (or illogic) of doing so and in contravention of a subordinate commander\u27s wishes. The battalion watch officer, or battle captain, ran from the tactical operations center (TOC) to the battalion commander\u27s office to notify him of the firefight. The battle captain explained that the brigade headquarters wanted to drop a SOD-pound bomb from an F/A-18 Super Hornet onto the house where it was believed that twelve or so fighters had gone to make a last stand. The brigade TOC was watching the house from several miles away via a live camera feed from an aerial drone. Rushing to the TOC the battalion commander attempted to call off the strike. For God\u27s sake-our job here is to protect the Iraqi people! It\u27s the first sentence in our f--g mission statement! And you want to drop a damned bomb on someone\u27s house?! Every soldier in the TOC broke eye contact. They knew they were wrong. Their error: they got caught up in viewing the action as nothing more than a video game. They failed to assess whether dropping a bomb on an Iraqi house was consistent with the commander\u27s intent to exercise restraint and minimize civilian casualties. Within minutes, the battalion commander was on his way to the scene of the fighting to assess the situation. Almost immediately, he heard the boom of a Hellfire missile striking its target to the east of the commander\u27s location, followed by the staccato report of a string of 30mm shells from the helicopter\u27s main gun. Several minutes later, the commander found the platoon. The two small units and the Iraqi soldiers began fighting their way deep into the neighborhood to find the target house. It appeared that the missile strike had taken the spirit out of the enemy fighters, and friendly forces surrounded the house. They found surprisingly little damage. Fortunately, the Apache helicopter had fired a newly developed missile, specifically designed to limit destruction in urban terrain. Nonetheless, there was still collateral damage to other houses and pools of blood on the ground, along with bloody Iraqi National Police uniforms

Towards A Theoretical Integration Of Sustainability: A Literature Review And Suggested Way Forward

Organizations worldwide have adopted sustainability strategies to enhance their productivity and develop a competitive advantage. More often than not, organizations and their leaders develop a narrow view of sustainability and consider only the aspects of sustainability that are directly related to their sphere of performance (internal sustainability). Yet, sustainability issues impact all business and non-business organizations, as well as the long-term sustainability of international business relations and quality of life issues worldwide (external sustainability). An increase of appropriate sustainability efforts often requires expanding beyond conventional thinking. Economic necessity can drive both internal and external sustainability measures. Leadership effort is essential to enable shifts in organizational culture that enable sustainability efforts to succeed. This article discusses the sustainability movement. After defining internal and external sustainability, this paper discusses the philosophy of sustainability, internal and external sustainability, measurements, leadership, and best practices

A survey of experiments and experimental facilities for active control of flexible structures

A brief survey of large space structure control related experiments and facilities was presented. This survey covered experiments performed before and up to 1982, and those of the present period (1982-...). Finally, the future planned experiments and facilities in support of the control-structure interaction (CSI) program were reported. It was stated that new, improved ground test facilities are needed to verify the new CSI design techniques that will allow future space structures to perform planned NASA missions