Power Sharing and the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Civil War

What effect do power-sharing institutions agreed to as part of civil war settlements have on the development of the rule of law in post–civil war states? We contend that power-sharing measures facilitate the emergence of the rule of law in two ways. First, they establish a form of institutional constraint that promotes judicial autonomy and independence. Second, they foster a sense of security among judges and other political actors that bolsters commitment to the law. We demonstrate the plausibility of a positive relationship between power sharing and the rule of law through an analysis of post–civil war states between the years 1948 and 2006. Our findings suggest that civil war settlements can help to establish the rule of law when they include mechanisms aimed at allaying the insecurities of political actors in the postconflict environment

Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States: The Art of the Possible

Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States examines the challenge of promoting democracy in the aftermath of civil war. Hartzell and Hoddie argue that minimalist democracy is the most realistic form of democracy to which states emerging from civil war violence can aspire. The adoption of power-sharing institutions within civil war settlements helps mitigate insecurity and facilitate democracy\u27s emergence. Power sharing promotes \u27democratization from above\u27 by limiting the capacity of the state to engage in predatory behavior, and \u27democratization from below\u27 by empowering citizens to participate in politics. Drawing on cross-national and case study evidence, Hartzell and Hoddie find that post-civil war countries that adopt extensive power sharing are ultimately more successful in transitioning to minimalist democracy than countries that do not. Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States presents a new and hopeful understanding of what democracy can look like and how it can be fostered.https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/books/1171/thumbnail.jp

The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED): a new dataset on the promises and practices of power-sharing in post-conflict countries

Past research on the relationship between power-sharing arrangements and the recurrence of civil conflict has primarily analyzed the promises of power-sharing stipulated in peace agreements. What happens afterwards, however, has not yet been sufficiently explored. This represents a major research gap, as the actual practices of power-sharing in post-conflict countries are likely to be influential in the possibility of civil conflict recurring. To address this shortcoming, we present a new global dataset on the promises and practices of power-sharing between the government of a state and former rebels in post-conflict countries. The collected data captures if, when and how power-sharing institutions have been promised and/or put into place, and whether they have subsequently been modified or abolished. The dataset encompasses every peace agreement signed after the cessation of a civil conflict in the years between 1989 and 2006, and covers a five-year period after the signature of each of these agreements (unless violence recurred earlier). The unit of analysis is the government–rebel dyad during the post-conflict period and data is recorded in an event data format. A first analysis of the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) reveals that the effects of the promises of power-sharing on civil conflict recurrence follow a different logic than the effects of their practices. This finding emphasizes the necessity for in-depth analyses of post-conflict situations for which the PSED provides the necessary data

Power-sharing in Africa's war zones: how important is the local level?

Research on power-sharing in Africa remains silent on the effects of national peace agreements on the sub-national level. Conversely, most armed conflicts originate and are fought in (or over) specific areas. A plausible hypothesis would be that for power-sharing to have the desired pacifying effect throughout the national territory, it needs to be extended to the local level. Based on fieldwork in six former hotspots in Liberia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) we find that there is hardly any local content, including local power-sharing, in national agreements. However, contrary to our hypothesis, neither local content (inclusion of actors or interest) nor local-power-sharing (either introducing a local power balance or monopoly) are indispensable to effectively bring about local peace, at least in the short-term. On the contrary, it might even endanger the peace process. The importance of the sub-national level is overestimated in some cases and romanticised in others. However, the history of spatial-political links, centralised policies, and the establishment of local balances or monopolies of power ultimately play an important role

Elections and Ethnic Civil War

Existing research on how democratization may influence the risk of civil war tends to consider only changes in the overall level of democracy and rarely examines explicitly the postulated mechanisms relating democratization to incentives for violence. The authors argue that typically highlighted key mechanisms imply that elections should be especially likely to affect ethnic groups’ inclination to resort to violence. Distinguishing between types of conflict and the order of competitive elections, the authors find that ethnic civil wars are more likely to erupt after competitive elections, especially after first and second elections following periods of no polling. When disaggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups and conflicts over territory or government, the authors find some support for the notion that ethno-nationalist mobilization and sore-loser effects provoke postelectoral violence. More specifically, although large groups in general are more likely to engage in governmental conflicts, they are especially likely to do so after noncompetitive elections. Competitive elections, however, strongly reduce the risk of conflict. </jats:p

En torno a cuatro prólogos « desaparecidos » de Gregorio Marañón

Cet article étudie quatre prologues qui ne figurent pas dans le tome Ier des Obras completas de Gregorio Marañón (1966) — prologues à des livres de Marcelino Domingo, Eduardo Benzo, Fernando Valera et José de la Luz León — et rectifie les erreurs d'interprétation auxquelles ont donné lieu, dans la Introducción de D. Pedro Lain Entralgo les allusions faites à deux d'entre eux. On a ajouté un résumé détaillé du contenu de ces quatre prologues, afin de mettre en lumière les relations qui les unissent à d'autres œuvres de Marañón, et la place qu'ils occupent dans l'évolution de sa pensée.— B. III, LXXIV, nos 1-2, p. 43-60. Se estudian cuatro prólogos omitidos al publicarse el Tomo Primero de las Obras completas (1966), los prólogos a libros de Marcelino Domingo, Eduardo Benzo, Fernando Valera y José de la Luz León, a fin de destacar las incomprensiones a las cuales dan lugar algunas alusiones a dos de ellos en la Introducción de D. Pedro Laín Entralgo. Y, también, se incluye un resumen detallado del contenido de los cuatro, de modo que se pone de manifiesto la relación que guardan estos prólogos con otras obras marañonianas y su lugar en la evolución de su pensamiento.Hoddie . En torno a cuatro prólogos « desaparecidos » de Gregorio Marañón. In: Bulletin Hispanique, tome 74, n°1-2, 1972. pp. 43-60