136 research outputs found
Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment
I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated âepistemic temptationsâ. The first way is through the avowal of belief, and the second is through the establishment of collective belief. I argue that both of these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment can function as effective tools for doxastic self-control, and, moreover, that the control they facilitate should not be dismissed as irrational from an epistemic perspective
Introduction: Examined Live â An Epistemological Exchange Between Philosophy and Cultural Psychology on Reflection
Besides the general agreement about the human capability of reflection, there is a large area of disagreement and debate about the nature and value of âreflective scrutinyâ and the role of âsecond-order statesâ in everyday life. This problem has been discussed in a vast and heterogeneous literature about topics such as epistemic injustice, epistemic norms, agency, understanding, meta-cognition etc. However, there is not yet any extensive and interdisciplinary work, specifically focused on the topic of the epistemic value of reflection. This volume is one of the first attempts aimed at providing an innovative contribution, an exchange between philosophy, epistemology and psychology about the place and value of reflection in everyday life.
Our goal in the next sections is not to offer an exhaustive overview of recent work on epistemic reflection, nor to mimic all of the contributions made by the chapters in this volume. We will try to highlight some topics that have motivated a new resumption of this field and, with that, drawing on chapters from this volume where relevant.
Two elements defined the scope and content of this volume, on the one hand, the crucial contribution of Ernest Sosa, whose works provide original and thought-provoking contributions to contemporary epistemology in setting a new direction for old dilemmas about the nature and value of knowledge, giving a central place to reflection. On the other hand, the recent developments of cultural psychology, in the version of the âAalborg approachâ, reconsider the object and scope of psychological sciences, stressing that â[h]uman conduct is purposefulâ
Does ought imply can?
Most philosophers believe that a person can have an obligation only insofar as she is able to fulfil it, a principle generally referred to as âOught Implies Canâ. Arguably, this principle
reflects something basic about the ordinary concept of obligation. However, in a paper published recently in this journal, Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri presented evidence for the conclusion that ordinary people in fact reject that principle. With a series of studies, they claimed to have demonstrated that, in peopleâs judgements, obligations persist irrespective of whether those who hold them have the ability to fulfil them. We argue in this paper that due to some problems in their design, Buckwalter & Turriâs conclusions may not be warranted. We present the results of a series of studies demonstrating the problems with their design and showing that, with an improved design, people judge that obligation depends on ability after all
Practicing Imperfect Forgiveness
Forgiveness is typically regarded as a good thing - even a virtue - but acts of forgiveness can vary widely in value, depending on their context and motivation. Faced with this variation, philosophers have tended to reinforce everyday concepts of forgiveness with strict sets of conditions, creating ideals or paradigms of forgiveness. These are meant to distinguish good or praiseworthy instances of forgiveness from problematic instances and, in particular, to protect the self-respect of would-be forgivers. But paradigmatic forgiveness is problematic for a number of reasons, including its inattention to forgiveness as a gendered trait. We can account for the values and the risks associated with forgiving far better if we treat it as a moral practice and not an ideal
Trust and commitment in collective testimony
In this paper I critically discuss Miranda Frickerâs âtrust-basedâ view of collective testimonyâthat is, testimony that comes from a group speaker. At the heart of Frickerâs account is the idea that testimony involves an âinterpersonal deal of trustâ, to which the speaker contributes a commitment to âsecond-personal epistemic trustworthinessâ. Appropriating Margaret Gilbertâs concept of joint commitment, Fricker suggests that groups too can make such commitments, and hence that they, like individuals, can âenter into the second-personal relations of trust that characterise testimonyâ (Fricker 2012: 272). I argue that this choice to appropriate Gilbertâs concept of joint commitment betrays a deep problem in Frickerâs accountâa misconstrual of both the object and the subject(s) of the commitment a speaker makes in testifying. After developing this criticism, I outline an alternative way of construing the speakerâs commitment, which can be applied to both collective and individual testimony
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