How similar are objects and events?

Semanticists often assume an ontology for natural language that includes not only ordinary objects, but also events, and other sorts of entities. We link this ontology to how speakers represent static and dynamic entities. Specifically, we test how speakers determine whether an entity counts as “atomic” by using count vs. mass (e.g., some gleebs, some gleeb) and distributive vs. non-distributive descriptions (e.g., gleeb every second or so, gleeb around a little). We then seek evidence for atomic representation in a non-linguistic task. Ultimately we suggest that natural language ontology reveals properties of language-independent conceptualization

Occlusion Is Hard: Comparing Predictive Reaching for Visible and Hidden Objects in Infants and Adults

Infants can anticipate the future location of a moving object and execute a predictive reach to intercept the object. When a moving object is temporarily hidden by darkness or occlusion, 6-month-old infants’ reaching is perturbed, but performance on darkness trials is significantly better than occlusion trials. How does this reaching behavior change over development? Experiment 1 tested predictive reaching of 6- and 9-month-old infants. While there was an increase in the overall number of reaches with increasing age, there were significantly fewer predictive reaches during the occlusion compared to visible trials and no age-related changes in this pattern. The decrease in performance found in Experiment 1 is likely to apply not only to the object representations formed by infants but also those formed by adults. In Experiment 2 we tested adults with a similar reaching task. Like infants, the adults were most accurate when the target was continuously visible and performance in darkness trials was significantly better than occlusion trials, providing evidence that there is something specific about occlusion that makes it more difficult than merely lack of visibility. Together, these findings suggest that infants’ and adults’ capacities to represent objects have similar signatures throughout development.Psycholog

Language: Life without Numbers

AbstractIf your language did not have words for numbers, would you be able to think about numeric quantities? An Amazonian culture where number words are limited to one, two and many has provided new insights to the interaction between thought and language

Language Acquisition: When Does the Learning Begin?

Language acquisition is quite sophisticated by four months of age. Two cues that babies use to discriminate their language from another are the stress patterns of words and visual cues inherent in language production

Core knowledge

Core knowledge is a psychological theory that addresses age-old questions of what capacities are present from birth (therefore a product of evolution) and what capacities are acquired through experience. The central focus of this approach is whether uniquely human capacities are evident early in development or whether the differences between human abilities and those of other species emerge later in development

Categorization in 3‐and 4‐month‐old infants:: an advantage of words over tones

Neonates prefer human speech to other non-linguistic auditory stimuli. However, it remains an open question whether there are any conceptual consequences of words on object categorization in infants younger than 6 months. The current study examined the influence of words and tones on object categorization in forty-six 3- to 4-month-old infants. Infants were familiarized to different exemplars of a category accompanied by either a labeling phrase or a tone sequence. In test, infants viewed novel and new within-category exemplars. Infants who heard labeling phrases provided evidence of categorization at test while infants who heard tone sequences did not, suggesting that infants as young as three months of age treat words and tones differently vis a vis object categorization

Mixed results testing categorization in infants using a preferential-looking paradigm on Zoom

The link between language and cognition is evident in the first months of life. As early as three months of age, a parent labeling an object that the infant is looking at influences the infants’ thoughts about those objects (Ferry et al., 2010). Prior research investigating this link between language and cognition has found successful categorization with 6- and 12-month-olds using face-to-face methodologies via preferential-looking paradigms (Fulkerson & Waxman, 2007). Due to COVID, we sought to validate an online counterpart of the categorization task. In Experiment 1, we found that language labels facilitated object categorization for 10- to 12-month-old infants. In contrast, a control condition that presented the same labeling phrases played in reverse did not facilitate categorization. In Experiment 2, we found that labels did not facilitate object categorization among 6-month-old infants. In sum, the advantage of online infant testing may be restricted to older ages

Nonhuman primate vocalizations support categorization in very young human infants

Language is a signature of our species and our primary conduit for conveying the contents of our minds. The power of language derives not only from the exquisite detail of the signal itself but also from its intricate link to human cognition. To acquire a language, infants must identify which signals are part of their language and discover how these signals are linked to meaning. At birth, infants prefer listening to vocalizations of human and nonhuman primates; within 3 mo, this initially broad listening preference is tuned specifically to human vocalizations. Moreover, even at this early developmental point, human vocalizations evoke more than listening preferences alone: they engender in infants a heightened focus on the objects in their visual environment and promote the formation of object categories, a fundamental cognitive capacity. Here, we illuminate the developmental origin of this early link between human vocalizations and cognition. We document that this link emerges from a broad biological template that initially encompasses vocalizations of human and nonhuman primates (but not backward speech) and that within 6 mo this link to cognition is tuned specifically to human vocalizations. At 3 and 4 mo, nonhuman primate vocalizations promote object categorization, mirroring precisely the advantages conferred by human vocalizations, but by 6 mo, nonhuman primate vocalizations no longer exert this advantageous effect. This striking developmental shift illuminates a path of specialization that supports infants as they forge the foundational links between human language and the core cognitive processes that will serve as the foundations of meaning