11 research outputs found
Vom âGeöfneten Ritter-Platzâ (1702) zum postmodernen Jugendroman â Ritterdarstellungen aus vier Jahrhunderten Kinder- und Jugendliteratur
Schmideler S. Vom âGeöfneten Ritter-Platzâ (1702) zum postmodernen Jugendroman â Ritterdarstellungen aus vier Jahrhunderten Kinder- und Jugendliteratur. In: Herweg M, Keppler-Tasaki S, eds. Rezeptionskulturen. FĂŒnfhundert Jahre literarischer Mittelalterrezeption zwischen Kanon und PopulĂ€rkultur. Trends in Medieval Philology. Vol 27. Berlin; Boston: de Gruyter; 2012: 383-410
Charlemagne
Cet atelier destineÌ aux jeunes chercheur·ses a pour objet la geneÌse et la dynamique des images meÌdieÌvales de Charlemagne, figure-clef des relations franco-allemandes. Des textes litteÌraires et historiographiques dâexpression latine, française et allemande seront analyseÌs pour la premieÌre fois de façon commune par de jeunes chercheur·ses francophones et germanophones : aÌ la lumieÌre de leurs « regards croiseÌs », ils eÌtudieront la pertinence et la persistance de ces images preÌ-nationales dans le contexte de lâEurope post-nationale
Himmel, Hölle
Benz M. Himmel, Hölle. In: Renz T, Hanauska M, Herweg M, eds. Literarische Orte in deutschsprachigen ErzÀhlungen des Mittelalters. Ein Handbuch. Berlin ; Boston: De Gruyter; 2018: 271-285
Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely to reject given markups in renegotiations than in negotiations. We do not find that these effects are stronger when the initial contract is concluded under competitive rather than monopolistic conditions