Age differences in deliberate ignorance.

People sometimes choose to remain ignorant, even when information comes at low marginal costs and promises high utility. To investigate whether older adults enlist deliberate ignorance more than younger adults, potentially as an emotion-regulation tool, we presented a representative sample of 1,910 residents of Germany with 13 scenarios in which knowledge could result in substantial gains or losses. The strongest correlate of deliberate ignorance was indeed age. Openness to experience was negatively correlated with deliberate ignorance; risk preference did not and neuroticism did not consistently predict it. Findings suggest a possible positivity effect in the decision to access new but ambiguous information. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved)

Age-related differences in strategic competition

Abstract Understanding how people of different ages decide in competition is a question of theoretical and practical importance. Using an experimental laboratory approach, this research investigates the ability of younger and older adults to think and act strategically with equal or unequal resources. In zero-sum games of resource allocation, younger adults (19–35 years) and older adults (65–81 years) made strategic decisions in competition against opponents of a similar age (Study 1; N = 120) or different age (Study 2; N = 120). The findings highlight people’s ability to make good interpersonal decisions in complex scenarios: Both younger and older adults were aware of their relative strength (in terms of material resources) and allocated their resources adaptively. When competing against opponents of a similar age, people’s gains were in line with game-theoretic predictions. However, younger adults made superior strategic allocations and won more frequently when competing against older adults. Measures of fluid cognitive and numerical abilities correlated with strategic behavior in interpersonal competition

When money talks: Judging risk and coercion in high-paying clinical trials

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.Millions of volunteers take part in clinical trials every year. This is unsurprising, given that clinical trials are often much more lucrative than other types of unskilled work. When clinical trials offer very high pay, however, some people consider them repugnant. To understand why, we asked 1,428 respondents to evaluate a hypothetical medical trial for a new Ebola vaccine offering three different payment amounts. Some respondents (27%) used very high pay (£10,000) as a cue to infer the potential risks the clinical trial posed. These respondents were also concerned that offering £10,000 was coercive— simply too profitable to pass up. Both perceived risk and coercion in high-paying clinical trials shape how people evaluate these trials. This result was robust within and between respondents. The link between risk and repugnance may generalize to other markets in which parties are partially remunerated for the risk they take and contributes to a more complete understanding of why some market transactions appear repugnant

Studies in Ecological Rationality

Ecological rationality represents an alternative to classic frameworks of rationality. Extending on Herbert Simon's concept of bounded rationality, it holds that cognitive processes, including simple heuristics, are not per se rational or irrational, but that their success rests on their degree of fit to relevant environmental structures. The key is therefore to understand how cognitive and environmental structures slot together. In recent years, a growing set of analyses of heuristic–environment systems has deepened the understanding of the human mind and how boundedly rational heuristics can result in successful decision making. This article is concerned with three conceptual challenges in the study of ecological rationality. First, do heuristics also succeed in dynamic contexts involving competitive agents? Second, can the mind adapt to environmental structures via an unsupervised learning process? Third, how can research go beyond mere descriptions of environmental structures to develop theories of the mechanisms that give rise to those structures? In addressing these questions, we illustrate that a successful theory of rationality will focus on the adaptive aspects of the mind and will need to account for three components: the mind's information processing, the environment to which the mind adapts, and the intersection between the environment and the mind.Peer Reviewe

A statistical model for the prediction of wind-speed probabilities in the atmospheric surface layer

Wind fields in the atmospheric surface layer (ASL) are highly three-dimensional and characterized by strong spatial and temporal variability. For various applications such as wind comfort assessments and structural design, an understanding of potentially hazardous wind extremes is important. Statistical models are designed to facilitate conclusions about the occurrence probability of wind speeds based on the knowledge of low-order flow statistics. Being particularly interested in the upper tail regions we show that the statistical behavior of near-surface wind speeds is adequately represented by the Beta distribution. By using the properties of the Beta probability density function in combination with a model for estimating extreme values based on readily available turbulence statistics, it is demonstrated that this novel modelling approach reliably predicts the upper margins of encountered wind speeds. The model’s basic parameter is derived from three substantially different calibrating datasets of flow in the ASL originating from boundary-layer wind-tunnel measurements and direct numerical simulation. Evaluating the model based on independent field observations of near-surface wind speeds showed a high level of agreement between the statistically modelled horizontal wind speeds and measurements. The results show that, based on the knowledge of only a few simple flow statistics (mean wind speed, wind speed fluctuations and integral time scales), the occurrence probability of velocity magnitudes at arbitrary flow locations in the ASL can be estimated with a high degree of confidence

The Molecular Switch of Telomere Phages: High Binding Specificity of the PY54 Cro Lytic Repressor to a Single Operator Site

Temperate bacteriophages possess a molecular switch, which regulates the lytic and lysogenic growth. The genomes of the temperate telomere phages N15, PY54 and ɸKO2 harbor a primary immunity region (immB) comprising genes for the prophage repressor, the lytic repressor and a putative antiterminator. The roles of these products are thought to be similar to those of the lambda proteins CI, Cro and Q, respectively. Moreover, the gene order and the location of several operator sites in the prototype telomere phage N15 and in ɸKO2 are also reminiscent of lambda-like phages. By contrast, in silico analyses revealed the presence of only one operator (O$_{\rm{R}}$3) in PY54. The purified PY54 Cro protein was used for EMSA studies demonstrating that it exclusively binds to a 16-bp palindromic site (O$_{\rm{R}}$3) upstream of the prophage repressor gene. The O$_{\rm{R}}$3 operator sequences of PY54 and ɸKO2/N15 only differ by their peripheral base pairs, which are responsible for Cro specificity. PY54 cI and cro transcription is regulated by highly active promoters initiating the synthesis of a homogenious species of leaderless mRNA. The location of the PY54 Cro binding site and of the identified promoters suggests that the lytic repressor suppresses cI transcription but not its own synthesis. The results indicate an unexpected diversity of the growth regulation mechanisms in lambda-related phages

How people know their risk preference

People differ in their willingness to take risks. Recent work found that revealed preference tasks (e.g., laboratory lotteries)—a dominant class of measures—are outperformed by survey-based stated preferences, which are more stable and predict real-world risk taking across different domains. How can stated preferences, often criticised as inconsequential “cheap talk,” be more valid and predictive than controlled, incentivized lotteries? In our multimethod study, over 3,000 respondents from population samples answered a single widely used and predictive risk-preference question. Respondents then explained the reasoning behind their answer. They tended to recount diagnostic behaviours and experiences, focusing on voluntary, consequential acts and experiences from which they seemed to infer their risk preference. We found that third-party readers of respondents’ brief memories and explanations reached similar inferences about respondents’ preferences, indicating the intersubjective validity of this information. Our results help unpack the self perception behind stated risk preferences that permits people to draw upon their own understanding of what constitutes diagnostic behaviours and experiences, as revealed in high-stakes situations in the real world