Social information and bandwagon behaviour in voting: an economic experiment

We present an economic experiment on the impact of social information on voter behaviour and find strong support for bandwagon behaviour in voting decisions. In total, 418 subjects participated in the experiment. Bandwagon behaviour is found among both male and female subjects.C90, D72

Market-dependent production set

A country’s production possibility frontier or PPF is defined as the boundary of its economy’s production set in the net output space for a given technology and fixed quantities of primary factors of production. In general equilibrium theory, exogenous changes in technology or primary-factor supplies alter equilibrium prices; however, government-policy induced domestic relative commodity price changes do not alter the shape of an economy’s production set. We show that, under international capital mobility, which is empirically significant, the shape of a country’s production set does, in fact, depend on market forces and this shape can be manipulated by government policy.general equilibrium; production possibility frontier; production set; international capital mobility; economic policy

Experiential Learning with Experiments

This paper discusses the implementation of experiential learning techniques in a behavioural economics class. In order to deepen students' understanding of both behavioural economics and the experimental approach to research students in the course developed and conducted variants of economic experiments. We believe that the process of designing and implementing the experiments fostered a better understanding of the material than simply participating in classroom experiments would have done. Students worked in small groups to develop their versions of the experiments. Thus, the complete process promoted genuine active learning by engaging the students both individually and collectively.

Religious Entrepreneurial Communities: Solution for or Cause of Socioeconomic Injustice? A Comment

Certain religious entrepreneurial minded communities are highly successful. It is tempting to assume that the underlying social mechanism of business success can be used as a blueprint for the development of larger social entities. Recently, Javaid, Shamsi and Hyder (2020) have argued that inefficiencies of markets and bureaucracies may be avoided if religious entrepreneurial communities are considered an alternative for members’ business investment, capital- and expertise-support to businesses, and the redistribution of wealth in favor of economically vulnerable community members. Consequently, the title of their paper is “Religious entrepreneurial communities as a solution for socioeconomic injustice”. I address this problematic position by an extended comment and point out inefficiencies induced by such an approach. I apply the concepts of networks and clubs to tackle problems of religious entrepreneurial communities as sub-groups of larger social entities. Individual beliefs, individual preferences, and norms of cooperative behavior can occur among members of any community, with or without common religious beliefs. Consequently, a shift from the areligious, market-oriented form of economic organization towards specific sets of religious beliefs will not, by itself, endanger business success. These issues require considerable attention before a transfer of behavioral pattern prevalent in small communities can be applied to larger groups. I emphasize the danger of generalizations from small case study results of specific entrepreneurial communities to larger social entities, such as societies. Viewpoint  Keywords: Entrepreneurial communities; Socioeconomic justice; Community-based entrepreneurship; Entrepreneurship-based policy, Clubs, Networks Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Egbert, H. (2021). Religious Entrepreneurial Communities: Solution for or Cause of Socioeconomic Injustice? A Comment. Journal of Entrepreneurship, Business and Economics, 9(2), 113–131

Der Coupon-Handelsansatz als Modell für eine subjektbezogene Finanzierung der Kinderbetreuung

Improving child care and pre-school education is one of the challenging duties of public authorities in Germany. Given the public resources spent on nursery schools, the quantity as well as the quality of early childhood education in Germany is comparatively low. We think that inefficiency is caused by the prevalent object-based financing structure. In this article we present a model for a subject-based financing structure with tradable coupons. The model shows that by introducing tradable coupons a more efficient allocation of resources is possible. Further, the model indicates that tradable coupons also improve the quality of early childhood education.D40, D61

Bandwagon voting or false-consensus effect in voting experiments? First results and methodological limits

In an experiment designed to test for expressive voting, Tyran (JPubEc 2004) found a strong positive correlation between the participants' approval to a proposal to donate money for charity and their expected approval rate for fellow voters. This phenomenon can be due to a bandwagon effect or a false consensus effect. Both effects have been reported for voting decisions in the social science literature. Redoing Tyran's experiment and adding new treatments, we provide evidence for a false consensus effect. Following the experimental tradition in economics in not giving false feedback to participants, we are left with only weak tests for the impact of bandwagon motives and find none. --voting,experiments,bandwagon,false consensus effect

Voting experiments: Bandwagon voting or false-consensus effect?

In an experiment designed to test for expressive voting, Tyran (JPubEc 2004) found a strong positive correlation between the participants’ approval for a proposal to donate money for charity and their expected approval rate for fellow voters. This phenomenon can be due to bandwagon voting or a false consensus effect. The social science literature reports both effects for voting decisions. Replicating Tyran’s experiment and adding new treatments, we provide evidence for a false consensus effect but find no support for bandwagon voting.voting, experiments, bandwagon voting, false consensus effect

The Gift and Pay-What-You-Want Pricing

This paper addresses the participative pricing mechanism of Pay-What-You-Want pricing as related to Marcel Mauss’s concept of the Gift. Reciprocity is a behavioural pattern imminent to the Gift as well as to Pay-What-You-Want pricing. The paper refers to results from behavioural economics in order to identify factors that positively influence reciprocity. It is argued that the aspects elaborated on in the Gift are also relevant to the PWYW pricing mechanism when it comes to implementations of the latter as one of the corporate pricing strategies

The Gift and Pay-What-You-Want Pricing

This paper addresses the participative pricing mechanism of Pay-What-You-Want pricing as related to Marcel Mauss’s concept of the Gift. Reciprocity is a behavioural pattern imminent to the Gift as well as to Pay-What-You-Want pricing. The paper refers to results from behavioural economics in order to identify factors that positively influence reciprocity. It is argued that the aspects elaborated on in the Gift are also relevant to the PWYW pricing mechanism when it comes to implementations of the latter as one of the corporate pricing strategies