Game Battle of Artificial Intelligence Berbasis Android

Dengan berkembangnya permainan dan artificial intelligence saat ini, maka dibuat sebuah permainan Battle of Artificial Intelligence. Game ini merupakan game berbasis Android dan merupakan permainan pertarungan antar robot, tetapi robot yang dijalankan berdasarkan pada sistem artificial intelligence yang dibuat oleh pemain. Dalam konsep ini pemain dapat membuat sebuah sistem Artificial Intelligence yang digunakan pada sebuah robot, dan robot tersebut akan digunakan untuk bertarung dengan robot musuh. Permainan ini merupakan permainan strategi dimana pemain diajak untuk memikirkan cara memenangkan pertempuran, yaitu dengan memilih prioritas dan membuat sistem AI yang berbeda. Pemain dapat mengembangkan, mengubah sebuah sistem Artificial Intelligence sesuai dengan yang pemain inginkan. Tidak hanya itu, pengguna juga dapat mengembangkan sistem AI yang dibuat dengan cara melakukan pertempuran dengan pemain lain secara online. Pemain dapat mengetahui sejauh mana sistem Artificial Intelligence yang dibuat mampu bertahan. Dari 22 pengguna yang sudah melakukan uji coba permainan dan mengisi kuisioner diperoleh bahwa konsep permainan ini menarik. Berdasarkan pemahaman tutorial, pengguna dapat menambah pengetahuan pengguna mengenai bagaimana artificial intelligence bekerja. Hampir 60% pengguna menyukai interface yang dibuat di dalam game. Pengguna juga dapat menambah pengetahuan mengenai pembuatan sistem artificial intelligence pada permainan ini berdasarkan hasil pemahaman sistem artifcial intelligence. Dengan adanya multiplayer, pengguna termotivasi untuk mengembangkan sistem artificial intelligence dengan bertanding dengan pemain lain secara online. Rating rata-rata yang diperoleh dari 22 pengguna yang telah melakukan uji coba adalah 3.45

Political economy of Indonesia's decentralisation

The thesis comprises three empirical papers on the political economy of decentralisation in Indonesia. The first paper examines the effect of local majority (political party) coalitions on district fiscal and service outcomes. Applying a regression discontinuity approach, the paper finds that districts with majority coalitions raise more own-revenues and spend more, especially on health functions, than districts with minority coalitions. The analysis also determines that majority coalition districts improve access to health services. The findings suggest that majority coalition governments can, in part, mitigate the negative effects of political fragmentation at the district level. The second paper examines the incumbency advantage of mayors running for re-election. The paper investigates individual candidate (as opposed to political party) incumbency across elections from 2005 to 2017. The study applies regression discontinuity methods to a newly developed dataset on mayoral elections. The analysis finds very strong (unconditional) incumbency effects: incumbents are slightly less than 50 percent more likely to run in the next election than non-incumbents and they are also around 50 percent more likely to run and win the election than their non-incumbent counterparts. Furthermore, the study determines that these effects are stronger in districts with better access to basic services, broadly supporting arguments on behalf of political accountability. The third paper assesses the determinants of corruption across districts between 2001 and 2016 and analyses the effect of corruption on fiscal, service access, and financial audit outcomes. Similar to other developing countries, corruption has been a major problem in Indonesia. Largely ignored during the Soeharto era, the advent of democracy and decentralisation in the past two decades has led to widespread recognition of the severity of corruption, and stimulated a massive anti-corruption agenda, particularly through the establishment of the corruption eradication commission (KPK). Applying Poisson regressions, the paper finds that district location is a strong determinant of corruption. Districts that are farther from Jakarta and closer to provincial capitals are significantly more corrupt. Using geographic proximity as an instrument in two-stage least square regressions, the paper finds that more corruption leads to higher personnel spending, lower capital spending, and worse external financial audits. Corruption also reduces health spending and leads to slower improvement of access to health services. Utilising a newly developed database of corruption cases, this paper substantially extends the research on corruption in developing countries

The impact of public sector accounting reform on corruption: Causal evidence from subnational Indonesia

It is widely believed that the adoption of quality public sector accounting practices can assist in reducing corruption. In theory, accounting reform, especially the shift from cash‐to accrual‐based methods, leads to the production of much improved financial information, which ultimately can be used by citizens to hold government more accountable and limit corruption. Empirical evidence from cross‐country analyses appears to support the theoretical predictions. We investigate the impact of accounting practices on corruption among districts in Indonesia. We use external financial audits to measure the adoption of reforms and the number of corruption case court convictions as our proxy for corruption. We estimate Poisson regression models using instrumental variable techniques to identify the causal effects of adopting accrual‐based accounting procedures on corruption. We show that the employment of improved accounting methods is strongly associated with declining corruption. However, after accommodating the endogeneity of accounting practices, we determine that reform adoption has no effect on corruption

The impact of majority coalitions on local government spending, service delivery, and corruption in Indonesia

This study examines the impact of majority coalitions on local government spending, service delivery, and corruption in Indonesia. The investigation finds that majority coalitions, i.e. those coalitions for which participating political parties control greater than half of council seats, cause a shift in local government spending towards health sector activities and induce improvements in citizen health service access—but only for a year or two, after which the positive effects disappear. The study shows that budget fraud starts to become problematic in the last two years of the coalition's life. Majority coalition support for the local health spending and service agenda dissipates quickly as attention turns to corrupting the budget, via increased infrastructure outlays and associated rent-seeking. We hypothesize that budget fraud serves, in part, to finance subsequent rounds of local parliamentary and executive elections

Parties as pay-off seekers: Pre-electoral coalitions in a patronage democracy

The study of party coalitions largely focuses on national elections in western democracies. How are coalitions formed in political systems in which competition occurs on a clientelistic rather than programmatic foundation? To examine coalition formation outside the context of western party systems, we study pre-electoral coalitions formed in subnational executive government elections in Indonesia. Using a unique dataset of 5048 such coalitions in combination with fieldwork conducted in several provinces, we analyze coalition patterns. In contrast to conventional ideological and office-seeking explanations we find that, at least until recently, in forming coalitions parties regularly prioritized immediate pay-offs from candidates – which mostly come in the form of cash payments – over longer-term office and patronage benefits. Attributing this finding to the limited influence that parties exert over politicians once they are elected in regional Indonesia, we highlight the interaction between coalition formation and the incentives that politicians have once in office.the Dutch Research Council(NWO, grant number 451-12-013

Political accountability and public service delivery in decentralized Indonesia: Incumbency advantage and the performance of second term mayors

To what extent do voters hold local elected leaders accountable for public service delivery in fiscally and politically decentralized environments, as theory suggests should be the case? We examine political accountability and service delivery in subnational Indonesia, through the lens of mayoral incumbency advantage. We apply regression discontinuity methods to a unique data set on local elections to identify the causal impact of incumbency on election outcomes and relate those effects to changes in citizen access to local public services. We find that voters in Indonesia are, in general, very willing to return incumbents to office compared to their counterparts in other countries. We also determine that the incumbent advantage is conditional on advances in local service provision: as service access expands more quickly, voters are more likely to vote incumbents back into office. Finally, we find that electorally successful incumbents—second term mayors—spend substantially less on education and health and more on infrastructure, manage their budgets less prudently, and deliver public services neither more nor less effectively than their first term equivalents. We conjecture that term limits and the attendant lack of electoral incentives leads to the disappointing second-term mayor performance

Game Battle of Artificial Intelligence Berbasis Android

Dengan berkembangnya permainan dan artificial intelligence saat ini, maka dibuat sebuah permainan Battle of Artificial Intelligence. Game ini merupakan game berbasis Android dan merupakan permainan pertarungan antar robot, tetapi robot yang dijalankan berdasarkan pada sistem artificial intelligence yang dibuat oleh pemain. Dalam konsep ini pemain dapat membuat sebuah sistem Artificial Intelligence yang digunakan pada sebuah robot, dan robot tersebut akan digunakan untuk bertarung dengan robot musuh. Permainan ini merupakan permainan strategi dimana pemain diajak untuk memikirkan cara memenangkan pertempuran, yaitu dengan memilih prioritas dan membuat sistem AI yang berbeda. Pemain dapat mengembangkan, mengubah sebuah sistem Artificial Intelligence sesuai dengan yang pemain inginkan. Tidak hanya itu, pengguna juga dapat mengembangkan sistem AI yang dibuat dengan cara melakukan pertempuran dengan pemain lain secara online. Pemain dapat mengetahui sejauh mana sistem Artificial Intelligence yang dibuat mampu bertahan. Dari 22 pengguna yang sudah melakukan uji coba permainan dan mengisi kuisioner diperoleh bahwa konsep permainan ini menarik. Berdasarkan pemahaman tutorial, pengguna dapat menambah pengetahuan pengguna mengenai bagaimana artificial intelligence bekerja. Hampir 60% pengguna menyukai interface yang dibuat di dalam game. Pengguna juga dapat menambah pengetahuan mengenai pembuatan sistem artificial intelligence pada permainan ini berdasarkan hasil pemahaman sistem artifcial intelligence. Dengan adanya multiplayer, pengguna termotivasi untuk mengembangkan sistem artificial intelligence dengan bertanding dengan pemain lain secara online. Rating rata-rata yang diperoleh dari 22 pengguna yang telah melakukan uji coba adalah 3.45