Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model

The literature on the rational political business cycle suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chance of gaining reelection. Most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre- election distortions in fiscal policy. We propose a new test that, instead, explores the implied two-way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory. The test is implemented using a panel of 278 Portuguese municipalities (from 1979 to 2005). The results show that (1) opportunism pays off, leading to a larger win-margin for the incumbent; (2) incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win-margin is small. These results are consistent with the theoretical model

A two factor long memory stochastic volatility model

In this paper we fit the main features of financial returns by means of a two factor long memory stochastic volatility model (2FLMSV). Volatility, which is not observable, is explained by both a short-run and a long-run factor. The first factor follows a stationary AR(1) process whereas the second one, whose purpose is to fit the persistence of volatility observable in data, is a fractional integrated process as proposed by Breidt et al. (1998) and Harvey (1998). We show formally that this model (1) creates more kurtosis than the long memory stochastic volatility (LMSV) of Breidt et al. (1998) and Harvey (1998), (2) deals with volatility persistence and (3) produces small first order autocorrelations of squared observations. In the empirical analysis, we use the estimation procedure of Gallant and Tauchen (1996), the Efficient Method of Moments (EMM), and we provide evidence that our specification performs better than the LMSV model in capturing the empirical facts of data

The sign of asymmetry and the Taylor Effect in stochastic volatility models

According to the Taylor-Effect the autocorrelations of absolute financial returns are higher than the ones of squared returns. In this work, we analyze this empirical property for three different asymmetric stochastic volatility models, with short and/or long memory. Specially, we investigate how the Taylor-Effect relates to the most important model characteristics: its asymmetry and its capacity to generate volatility persistence and kurtosis. Finally, we realize Monte Carlo experiments to infer about possible biases of the sample Taylor-Effect and fit the models to the return series of the Dow Jones

Does Opportunism Pay Off?

This article tests the hypothesis that the opportunistic manipulation of financial accounts by mayors increases their chances of re-election. Working with a large and detailed dataset comprising all Portuguese mainland municipalities, which covers the municipal elections that took place from 1979 to 2001, we clearly show that increases in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favouring highly visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking re-election. Our results also indicate that the political payoff to opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-established in the country.Voting functions, opportunism, local governments, elections, Portugal.

Are feedback factors important in modelling financial data?

This paper provides empirical evidence that continuous time models with one factor of volatility are, in some circumstances, able to fit the main characteristics of financial data and reports insights about the importance of introducing feedback factors for capturing the strong persistence caused by the presence of changes in the variance. We use the Efficient Method of Moments (EMM) by Gallant and Tauchen (1996) to estimate and to select among logarithmic models with one and two stochastic volatility factors (with and without feedback)

Political Business Cycles at the Municipal Level

This article tests for the existence of rational political business cycles models using a large and unexplored data set of Portuguese municipalities. The data set is well-suited for this purpose because it provides a high level of detail on expenditure items, because Portuguese municipalities are homogeneous with respect to policy instruments and institutions and follow an exogenously determined election schedule. Estimation results clearly reveal the existence of opportunistic behaviour by local governments. Expenditures increase in pre-election periods, especially on items that are highly visible to the electorate (e.g., highways and streets). This suggests an effort to signal competence and improve chances of re-election.Political business cycles, public finance, local governments.

Popularity functions, partisan effects and support in Parliament

This paper analyzes the popularity of the main political entities in Portugal. After describing the recent evolution and structure of the Portuguese political system, we present estimations of popularity functions for the Assembly, Government, Prime Minister, and President using several estimation techniques to incorporate the timeseries and cross-equation aspects of the models. The results strongly favor the responsibility hypothesis, with unemployment, and to a lesser extent inflation, affecting popularity levels. There is also evidence that voters’ evaluations of incumbents’ economic performance depends on the ideology and support in Parliament of the latter. Finally, there is evidence of popularity erosion over consecutive terms and of honeymoon effects.

Volatility forecasts: a continuous time model versus discrete time models

This paper compares empirically the forecasting performance of a continuous time stochastic volatility model with two volatility factors (SV2F) to a set of alternative models (GARCH, FIGARCH, HYGARCH, FIEGARCH and Component GARCH). We use two loss functions and two out-of-sample periods in the forecasting evaluation. The two out-of-sample periods are characterized by different patterns of volatility. The volatility is rather low and constant over the first period but shows a significant increase over the second out-of-sample period. The empirical results evidence that the performance of the alternative models depends on the characteristics of the out-ofsample periods and on the forecasting horizons. Contrarily, the SV2F forecasting performance seems to be unaffected by these two facts, since the model provides the most accurate volatility forecasts according to the loss functions we consider

The determinants of vote intentions in Portugal

This paper offers additional insights on the interactions between economics and politics in Portugal. We use an unexplored data set consisting of monthly polls on vote intentions for the main political parties in Portugal, since 1986. Results indicate that: (1) socialist governments had less electoral support than social democratic governments; (2) social democratic governments enjoyed a honeymoon period with the electorate while socialist governments did not; (3) vote intentions for incumbent parties tend to decrease with time in office; (4) voters hold incumbents responsible for the evolution of the economy; (5) the socialists are more penalized for rises in unemployment than are the social democrats.voting functions, responsibility hypothesis, Portugal, vote intentions.