Fichte and Hegel on Recognition

In this paper I provide an interpretation of Hegel’s account of ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) in the 1802-3 System of Ethical Life as a critique of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. In the first three sections of the paper I argue that Fichte’s account of recognition in the domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. I then turn, in section four, to a discussion of Hegel’s critique and transformation of Fichte’s conception of recognition. Hegel’s transformation consists, I argue, in the claim that a comprehensive account of recognition in the domain of right must be concerned with recognition as a moral attitude

APIE FILOSOFINĖS KRITIKOS ESMĘ IR JOS SANTYKĮ SU ŠIUOLAIKINĖS FILOSOFIJOS SITUACIJA

Versta iš: Hegel, G. W. F. Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritiküberhaupt und ihr Verhältnis zum gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophieinsbesondere. In Sämtliche Werke, Bd 2. Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807.Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970.Vertė Brigita Gelžinyt

Textos selecionados de Preleções sobre a filosofia da religião

Tradução de Textos selecionados de Preleções sobre a filosofia da religiãoTranslation to Portuguese:  Textos selecionados de Preleções sobre a filosofia da religiã

Social Freedom and Self-Actualization: “Normative Reconstruction” as a Theory of Justice

In Freedom's Right Axel Honneth seeks to provide a theory of justice by appropriatingHegel's account of ethical substance in the Philosophy of Right, but hewants to do sowithout endorsingHegel'smore robust idealist commitments. I argue that this project can only succeed if Honneth can offer an alternative, comparatively robust demonstration of the rationality and normative coherence of existing social institutions. I contend that the grounds Honneth provides for this claimare insufficient for his purposes. In particular, I argue that Honneth's claim that "justice and individual self-determination are mutually referential," even were it to be accepted, would be insufficient to underwrite hismore robust identification between the normative foundations of justice, autonomy and reciprocal self-realization. In the final section of the paper, I turn to Honneth's analysis of the "social institution" of friendship,which he, followingHegel, holds up as a paradigmatic instantiation of social freedom understood as, in Hegel's words, "being with oneself in another" (Beisichselbstsein in einem Anderen). I argue that an analysis of the normative import of friendship wholly in terms of mutual recognition misses an important aspect of the kind of self-realization that friendship makes possible