Short- and long-term growth effects of special interest groups in the U.S. states: A dynamic panel error-correction approach

The perception of special interest groups as a serious threat to economic growth has strengthened over the years; however, the vast empirical literature surrounding this claim has produced mixed and inconclusive results. This study re-examines the issue incorporating a potentially important aspect that has generally been ignored by previous studies, namely, the implicit suggestion by some of the theoretical works that the extent and the intensity of the growth effects of special interest groups may differ significantly over different time frames. Specifically, this study uses dynamic panel error-correction methods (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999)) to properly determine whether these effects, if they exist, occur mostly in the short run or the long run based on data from a panel of 48 U.S. states for the years 1975 – 2004. The joint Hausman-type test selected the preferred model, which controls for human capital achievement, initial income, income inequality, and the tax burden. This model produced results which are in sharp contrast to the simple linearly negative or positive findings reported in much of the literature by indicating that special interest groups have significant non-linearly inverted U-shaped long-run effects on growth, and that it takes time (about 8 years) for the full effects to become evident. The results provide evidence that U.S. states face a threshold point below which special interest groups’ lobbying and rent-seeking activities boost long-run growth performance but above which they have damaging effects on long-run growth effort. This is confirmed by the Lind and Mehlum (2010) u-test which also suggests that the threshold point is reached when the activities and strength of special interest groups (measured by the percentage of each state’s public and private non-agricultural wage and salary employees who are union members, and which varies from 3.8% to 38.7%)) is at the 15.8% level

Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?

We study the short-run effect of elections on monetary aggregates in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies (1975-2009). We find an increase in the growth rate of M1 during election months of about one tenth of a standard deviation. A similar effect can neither be detected in established OECD democracies nor in other months. The effect is larger in democracies with many poor and uneducated voters, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and in East-Asia and the Pacific. We argue that the election month monetary expansion is related to systemic vote buying which requires significant amounts of cash to be disbursed right before elections. The finely timed increase in M1 is consistent with this; is inconsistent with a monetary cycle aimed at creating an election time boom; and it cannot be, fully, accounted for by alternative explanations

Corruption in Privatization and Governance Regimes

(ISSN 1827-3580

Fiscal redistribution around elections when democracy is not "the only game in town"

This paper seeks to examine the implications of policy intervention around elections on income inequality and fiscal redistribution. We first develop a simplified theoretical framework that allows us to examine election-cycle fiscal redistribution programs in the presence of a revolutionary threat from some groups of agents, i.e., when democracy is not “the only game in town”. According to our theoretical analysis, when democracy is not “the only game in town”, incumbents implement redistributive policies not only as a means of improving their reelection prospects, but also in order to signal that “democracy works”, thereby preventing a reversion to an autocratic status quo ante at a time of the current regime’s extreme vulnerability. Subsequently, focusing on 65 developed and developing countries over the 1975–2010 period, we report robust empirical evidence of pre-electoral budgetary manipulation in new democracies. Consistent with our theory, this finding is driven by political instability that induces incumbents to redistribute income—through tax and spending policies—in a relatively broader coalition of voters with the aim of consolidating the vulnerable newly established democratic regime