98 research outputs found
Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure
This paper responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only a weak sense, and this weak sort of unawareness of a sensation does not preclude its being an object of oneâs attitudes
Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure
This paper responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only a weak sense, and this weak sort of unawareness of a sensation does not preclude its being an object of oneâs attitudes
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Irreducibly Normative Properties
Metaethical non-naturalists maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be reduced to, or otherwise explained in terms of, natural properties. They thus have difficulty explaining what these irreducibly normative properties are supposed to be, other than by saying what they are not. I offer a partial, positive characterization of irreducible normativity in naturalistic terms. At a first pass, it is this: that to attribute a normative property to something is necessarily to commend or condemn that thing, due to the nature of the property attributed. This theory characterizes normativity in terms of the natural phenomenon of performing certain familiar speech acts. The hypothesis does other explanatory work as well: it provides for an account of the âqueernessâ of normative properties, one superior to other accounts; it explains why metaethical reductionism is bound to fail, in a way friendly to non-naturalism (as opposed to non-cognitivism); and it can help deflect arguments against non-naturalism from the âessential practicalityâ of normativity
From the Perspective of Prudence, Is It Just as Reasonable to Change Your Desires to Fit the World as It Is to Change the World to Fit Your Desires?
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Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare
One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only oneâs desires provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories about two other phenomena: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either pleasure or welfare commits one to recognizing that desires do provide reasons for action â i.e., commits one to abandoning the value-based theory of reasons. The purpose of this paper is to show that this is not so. All of the following can be true: pleasure and welfare provide reasons; pleasure and welfare are to be understood in terms of desire; desires never provide reasons, in the relevant way
MultiâComponent Theories of Wellâbeing and Their Structure
The âadjustment strategyâ currently seems to be the most common approach to incorporating objective elements into one's theory of wellâbeing. These theories face a certain problem, however, which can be avoided by a different approach â namely, that employed by âpartially objective multiâcomponent theories.â Several such theories have recently been proposed, but the question of how to understand their mathematical structure has not been adequately addressed. I argue that the most mathematically simple of these multiâcomponent theories fails, so I proceed to investigate more sophisticated ways to formulate such a theory. I conclude that one of these â the D iscount/ I nflation T heory â is particularly promising.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/95094/1/papq1434.pd
Asymmetries in the Value of Existence
According to asymmetric comparativism, it is worse for a person to exist with a miserable life than not to exist, but it is not better for a person to exist with a happy life than not to exist. My aim in this paper is to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. My account of asymmetric comparativism begins with a different asymmetry, regarding the (dis)value of early death. I offer an account of this early death asymmetry, appealing to the idea of conditional goods, and generalize it to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. I also address the objection that asymmetric comparativism has unacceptably antinatalist implications
The Growing Blockâs past problems
The Growing-Block view of time has some problems with the past. It is committed to the existence of the past, but needs to say something about the difference between the past and present. I argue that we should resist Correia and Rosenkranzâ (Oxford studies in metaphysics, vol 8, pp 333â350, 2013) response to Braddon-Mitchellâs (Analysis 64:199â203, 2004) argument that the Growing-Block leads to scepticism about whether we are present. I consider an approach, similar to Peter Forrest (Analysis 64:358â362, 2004), and show it is not so counter-intuitive as Braddon-Mitchell suggests and further show that it requires no âsemantic and metaphysical gymnasticsâ, as Chris Heathwood (Analysis 65:249â251, 2005) has suggested. In doing these things I make the problem of the past on the Growing-Block view a problem in its history, not its present
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