Phenotype-based and Self-learning Inter-individual Sleep Apnea Screening with a Level IV Monitoring System

Purpose: We propose a phenotype-based artificial intelligence system that can self-learn and is accurate for screening purposes, and test it on a Level IV monitoring system. Methods: Based on the physiological knowledge, we hypothesize that the phenotype information will allow us to find subjects from a well-annotated database that share similar sleep apnea patterns. Therefore, for a new-arriving subject, we can establish a prediction model from the existing database that is adaptive to the subject. We test the proposed algorithm on a database consisting of 62 subjects with the signals recorded from a Level IV wearable device measuring the thoracic and abdominal movements and the SpO2. Results: With the leave-one cross validation, the accuracy of the proposed algorithm to screen subjects with an apnea-hypopnea index greater or equal to 15 is 93.6%, the positive likelihood ratio is 6.8, and the negative likelihood ratio is 0.03. Conclusion: The results confirm the hypothesis and show that the proposed algorithm has great potential to screen patients with SAS

Simultaneous Amplitude and Phase Measurement for Periodic Optical Signals Using Time-Resolved Optical Filtering

Time-resolved optical filtering (TROF) measures the spectrogram or sonogram by a fast photodiode followed a tunable narrowband optical filter. For periodic signal and to match the sonogram, numerical TROF algorithm is used to find the original complex electric field or equivalently both the amplitude and phase. For phase-modulated optical signals, the TROF algorithm is initiated using the craters and ridges of the sonogram.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figure

Facility Location Games with Ordinal Preferences

We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over the facilities. Our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit truthful information (preferences and/or locations) from the agents and locate the facilities to minimize both maximum and total cost objectives as well as to maximize both minimum and total utility objectives. For the four possible objectives, we consider the 2-facility settings in which only preferences are private, or locations are private. For each possible combination of the objectives and settings, we provide lower and upper bounds on the approximation ratios of strategyproof mechanisms, which are asymptotically tight up to a constant. Finally, we discuss the generalization of our results beyond two facilities and when the agents can misreport both locations and preferences

Phase and Amplitude Responses of Narrow-Band Optical Filter Measured by Microwave Network Analyzer

The phase and amplitude responses of a narrow-band optical filter are measured simultaneously using a microwave network analyzer. The measurement is based on an interferometric arrangement to split light into two paths and then combine them. In one of the two paths, a Mach-Zehnder modulator generates two tones without carrier and the narrow-band optical filter just passes through one of the tones. The temperature and environmental variations are removed by separated phase and amplitude averaging. The amplitude and phase responses of the optical filter are measured to the resolution and accuracy of the network analyzer

Game-theoretic Analysis of Effort Allocation of Contributors to Public Projects

Public projects can succeed or fail for many reasons such as the feasibility of the original goal and coordination among contributors. One major reason for failure is that insufficient work leaves the project partially completed. For certain types of projects anything short of full completion is a failure (e.g., feature request on software projects in GitHub). Therefore, project success relies heavily on individuals allocating sufficient effort. When there are multiple public projects, each contributor needs to make decisions to best allocate his/her limited effort (e.g., time) to projects while considering the effort allocation decisions of other strategic contributors and his/her parameterized utilities based on values and costs for the projects. In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretic effort allocation model of contributors to public projects for modeling effort allocation of strategic contributors. We study the related Nash equilibrium (NE) computational problems and provide NP-hardness results for the existence of NE and polynomial-time algorithms for finding NE in restricted settings. Finally, we investigate the inefficiency of NE measured by the price of anarchy and price of stability. [Includes Supplementary Material.

Nanogenerator comprising piezoelectric semiconducting nanostructures and Schottky conductive contacts

A semiconducting device includes a substrate, a piezoelectric wire, a structure, a first electrode and a second electrode. The piezoelectric wire has a first end and an opposite second end and is disposed on the substrate. The structure causes the piezoelectric wire to bend in a predetermined manner between the first end and the second end so that the piezoelectric wire enters a first semiconducting state. The first electrode is coupled to the first end and the second electrode is coupled to the second end so that when the piezoelectric wire is in the first semiconducting state, an electrical characteristic will be exhibited between the first electrode and the second electrode