The Settlement of Industrial Disputes in Great Britain

The external phosphorus (P) loading has been halved, but the P content in the water column and the area of anoxic bottoms in Baltic proper has increased during the last 30 years. This can be explained by a temporary internal source of dissolved inorganic phosphorus (DIP) that is turned on when the water above the bottom sediment becomes anoxic. A load-response model, explaining the evolution from 1980 to 2005, suggests that the average specific DIP flux from anoxic bottoms in the Baltic proper is about 2.3 g P m(-2) year(-1). This is commensurable with fluxes estimated in situ from anoxic bottoms in the open Baltic proper and from hydrographic data in the deep part of Bornholm Basin. Oxygenation of anoxic bottoms, natural or manmade, may quickly turn off the internal P source from anoxic bottoms. This new P-paradigm should have far-reaching implications for abatement of eutrophication in the Baltic proper.Funding Agencies|Swedish EPA [NV 08/302 F-255-08]</p

The Non-Existence of Risk Attitude

This is the final published version of: Chater, N., Johansson, P., &amp; Hall, L. (2011). The non-existence of risk attitude. Frontiers in psychology, 2, 303. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00303 Opening Paragraph: Where do risk preferences come from? How do we decide if it is safe to eat unpasteurized cheese, whether to take up paragliding or mini-golf as a new hobby, whether to save in government bonds or place our money in a new technology hedge fund? Asking about the origin of risk preference in this general form requires two presuppositions, both of which may be challenged. The first presupposition is that there is some unitary basis to decisions about risk, where the nature of such risks (whether food poisoning, instant death, social embarrassment, or financial disaster) may vary substantially. The second presupposition is this unitary basis determines stable risk preferences, which help determining our choices when faced with ris

Memory distorions resulting from a choice blindness task

Using a choice blindness paradigm, it is possible to switch decisions and outcomes in simple choice tasks. Such switches have been found to carry over into later choices, hypothesized to be mediated by beliefs about earlier decisions. Here we investigated participants’ memories for stimuli in a simple choice blindness task involving preferential choices between pairs of faces. We probed participants’ recognition and source memory following a round of choices where on some trials participants were presented with the opposite face to the one they actually selected. We found no effect on recognition memory accuracy. Source memory was impaired such that participants failing to detect the manipulation later misremembered recognized non-chosen faces as being previously chosen. The findings are discussed in the light of self-perception theory and previous work on how beliefs affect memories for choices

Lifting the Veil of Morality: Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals on a Self-Transforming Survey

Every day, thousands of polls, surveys, and rating scales are employed to elicit the attitudes of humankind. Given the ubiquitous use of these instruments, it seems we ought to have firm answers to what is measured by them, but unfortunately we do not. To help remedy this situation, we present a novel approach to investigate the nature of attitudes. We created a self-transforming paper survey of moral opinions, covering both foundational principles, and current dilemmas hotly debated in the media. This survey used a magic trick to expose participants to a reversal of their previously stated attitudes, allowing us to record whether they were prepared to endorse and argue for the opposite view of what they had stated only moments ago. The result showed that the majority of the reversals remained undetected, and a full 69% of the participants failed to detect at least one of two changes. In addition, participants often constructed coherent and unequivocal arguments supporting the opposite of their original position. These results suggest a dramatic potential for flexibility in our moral attitudes, and indicates a clear role for self-attribution and post-hoc rationalization in attitude formation and change

Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task

A fundamental assumption of theories of decision-making is that we detect mismatches between intention and outcome, adjust our behavior in the face of error, and adapt to changing circumstances. Is this always the case? We investigated the relation between intention, choice, and introspection. Participants made choices between presented face pairs on the basis of attractiveness, while we covertly manipulated the relationship between choice and outcome that they experienced. Participants failed to notice conspicuous mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they were presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. We call this effect choice blindness

What is the value of an observable between pre- and postselection?

Hall's recent derivation of an exact uncertainty relation [Phys. Rev. A64, 052103 (2001)] is revisited. It is found that the Bayes estimator of an observable between pre- and postselection equals the real part of the weak value. The quadratic loss function equals the expectation of the squared imaginary part of the weak value.Comment: 5 pages, accepted in Phys. Lett.

The right face at the wrong place: How motor intentions can override outcome monitoring

The concept of intentions is often taken for granted in the cognitive and neural sciences, and comparing outcomes with internal goals is seen as critical for our sense of agency. We created an experiment where participants decided which face they preferred, and we either created outcome errors by covertly switch- ing the position of the chosen face or induced motor errors by deviating the mouse cursor, or we did both at the same time. In the final case, participants experienced a motor error, but the outcome ended up cor- rect. The result showed that when they received the right face, but at the wrong place, participants re- jected the outcome they actually wanted in a majority of the trials. Thus, contrary to common belief, higher-order outcomes do not always regulate our actions. Instead, motor ‘‘wrongness’’ might sometimes override goal ‘‘rightness’’ and lead us to reject the outcome we actually want

Activated Gαq family members induce Rho GTPase activation and Rho-dependent actin filament assembly

AbstractRho GTPase is required for actin filament assembly and serum response element (SRE)-dependent gene transcription. Certain G protein-coupled receptors (GPCRs) induce Rho-dependent responses, but the intermediary signaling steps are poorly understood. The heterotrimeric Gα12 family can induce Rho-dependent responses. In contrast, there are conflicting reports on the role of the Gαq family in Rho signaling. We report that expression of activated Gαq members, or activation of endogenous Gαq via GPCR stimulation, induces SRE reporter activation via Rho, and increased GTP-Rho levels. Moreover, microinjection of activated Gαq in fibroblasts induces actin stress fiber formation via Rho. Gαq functionally cooperates with Lbc Rho guanine nucleotide exchange factor. Overall, these findings indicate that Gαq family signals are sufficient to induce Rho-dependent cellular responses