Comparison of two sampling protocols and four home-range estimators using radio-tracking data from urban badgers Meles meles

Radio-telemetry is often the method of choice for studies of species whose behaviour is difficult to observe directly. However, considerable debate has ensued about the best way of deriving home-range estimates. In recent years, kernel estimators have become the most widely used method, together with the oldest and simplest method, the minimum convex polygon (MCP). More recently, it has been suggested that the local convex hull (LCH) might be more appropriate than kernel methods in cases where an animal’s home range includes a priori inaccessible areas. Yet another method, the Brownian bridge (BB), explicitly uses autocorrelated data to determine movement paths and, ultimately, home ranges or migration routes of animals. Whereas several studies have used simulation techniques to compare these different methods, few have used data from real animals. We used radio-telemetric data from urban badgers Meles meles to compare two sampling protocols (10-minute vs at least 30-minute inter-fix intervals) and four home-range estimators (MCP, fixed kernels (FK), LCH and BB). We used a multi-response permutation procedure and randomisation tests to compare overall patterns of fixes and degree of overlap of home ranges estimated using data from different sampling protocols, and a general linear model to compare the influence of sampling protocols and home-range estimator on the size of habitat patches. The shape of the estimated home ranges was influenced by sampling protocol in some cases. By contrast, the sizes and proportions of different habitats within home ranges were influenced by estimator type but not by sampling protocol. LCH performed consistently better than FK, and is especially appropriate for patchy study areas containing frequent no-go zones. However, we recommend using LCH in combination with other methods to estimate total range size, because LCH tended to produce smaller estimates than any other method. Results relating to BB are preliminary but suggest that this method is unsuitable for species in which range size is small compared to average travel speed.Marie-Curie Intra-European Fellowship (BSSUB - 24007); Defra WSC contract WM0304; Wildlife Biology granted the permit to upload the article to this repositor

Deferred compensation and gift exchange: an experimental investigation into multi-period labor markets

This paper examines the relationship between firms’ wage offers and workers’ supply of effort using a three-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while third period productivity is zero and wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred compensation increases worker effort; in about 70 percent of cases subjects supplied the optimal effort given the wage offer, and there was a strong effort response to future-period wages. We also find some evidence of gift exchange; worker players increased the effort levels in response to above equilibrium wage offers by a human, but not in response to similar offers by a computer. Finally, we find that firm players who are initially hesitant to defer compensation learn over time that it is beneficial to do so

Pricing and trust

We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive (monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated intermediate price above the oligopoly price and below the monopoly price. In monopolies volume increases and so does quality, such that overall efficiency is raised by 50%. Somewhat surprisingly, the same pattern emerges in oligopolies. In fact, across all market forms transaction volume and traded quality are maximal in regulated oligopolies

Competition fosters trust

We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency quadruples but is still at only a third of the first best. Adding more information by granting buyers access to all sellers’ complete history has, somewhat surprisingly, no effect. On the other hand, we find that competition, coupled with some minimal information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely

Learning trust

We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. As orthodox theory would predict, we find that providing buyers with information about sellers' trading history boosts market performance. More surprisingly, this beneficial effect of incentives for reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers' trading history. This suggests that two-sided market transparency is an important ingredient for the design of well-functioning markets that are prone to moral hazard

The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: On Clustering in the Four-Player Hotelling Game

We study experimentally a standard four-player Hotelling game, with a uniform density of consumers and inelastic demand. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium configuration consists of two firms located at one quarter of the ``linear city'', and the other two at three quarters. We do not observe convergence to such an equilibrium. In our experimental data we find three clusters. Besides the direct proximity of the two equilibrium locations this concerns the focal mid-point. Moreover, we observe that whereas this mid-point appears to become more notable over time, other focal points fade away. We explain how these observations are related to best-response dynamics, and to the fact that the players rely on best-responses in particular when they are close to the equilibrium configuration.Location model, Nonconvergence, Focal point, Best-response dynamics

Performance and evaluation of the Viking lander camera performance prediction program

A computer program is described for predicting the performance of the Viking lander cameras. The predictions are primarily concerned with two objectives: (1) the picture quality of a reference test chart (of which there are three on each lander) to aid in diagnosing camera performance; and (2) the picture quality of cones with surface properties of a natural terrain to aid in predicting favorable illumination and viewing geometries and operational camera commands. Predictions made with this program are verified by experimental data obtained with a Viking-like laboratory facsimile camera

Handbook for Computerized Reliability Analysis Method /CRAM/

Method for analyzing reliability by use of computer

An analysis of the facsimile-camera response to radiant point sources

In addition to imaging the surrounding terrain, planetary lander cameras may also be used to survey the stars to aid in locating the lander site. The response of the facsimile camera, which was selected for the Viking lander missions to Mars, to a radiant point source is formulated and shown to result in a statistical rather than deterministic signal. The signal statistics are derived and magnitudes are evaluated for the brighter visual and red stars. The probability of detecting the resultant statistical signals in photosensor and preamplifier noise and the associated probability of false alarms are also determined