Integrating a QPSK Quantum Key Distribution Link

We present the integration of the optical and electronic subsystems of a BB84-QKD fiber link. A highspeed FPGA MODEM generates the random QPSK sequences for a fiber-optic delayed self-homodyne scheme using APD detectors.Comment: 2 pages, 4 figures, European Conference on Optical Communication 200

Hardware Trojan Detection by Delay and Electromagnetic Measurements

International audience—Hardware Trojans (HT) inserted in integrated circuits have received special attention of researchers. In this paper, we present firstly a novel HT detection technique based on path delays measurements. A delay model, which considers intra-die process variations, is established for a net. Secondly, we show how to detect HT using ElectroMagnetic (EM) measurements. We study the HT detection probability according to its size taking into account the inter-die process variations with a set of FPGA. The results show, for instance, that there is a probability greater than 95% with a false negative rate of 5% to detect a HT larger than 1.7% of the original circuit. I. Introduction The trust and security of Integrated Circuits (IC) design and fabrication is critical for sensitive fields like finance, health, and governmental communications. Due to the complexity and the high cost of IC fabrication cycle, more and more firms outsource their production. This trend gives a possibility for an adversary to introduce malicious circuit, called Hardware Trojan horse (HT), in any IC. It can either perform a Denial Of Service (DOS), deteriorate circuit performance [8], or steal sensitive information. Therefore, the HTs are considered a real threat which has gained attention from researchers. HT can be inserted at any point during the design or fabrication process from Register Transfer Level (RTL) to layout and circuit fabrication. For example in [11], authors show some techniques to insert malicious circuitry at RTL level. These HTs, which are activated with a specific pattern inputs, can leak secret key via RS232 channels. The HT, unlike a software trojan, cannot be removed once it is fabricated. So, it is better to proactively prevent the insertion of a HT: few methods have been proposed. One seminal work is known as " private circuits II " [9]. This paper describes a proof-of-concept, too costly to be implemented. A more reasonable option has been recently proposed in [5]: it uses two codes to encode the state and mix it with encoded randomness, which allows to prevent an easy triggering and has a detection capability. Otherwise it is important to detect it before it becomes effective. Previous works classify detection methods into two wide categories: destructive and non-destructive. Invasive methods destroy the chip to reconstruct successfully the GDSII an

Horizontal Side-Channel Attacks and Countermeasures on the ISW Masking Scheme

International audienceA common countermeasure against side-channel attacks consists in using the masking scheme originally introduced by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner (ISW) at Crypto 2003, and further generalized by Rivain and Prouff at CHES 2010. The countermeasure is provably secure in the probing model, and it was showed by Duc, Dziembowski and Faust at Eurocrypt 2014 that the proof can be extended to the more realistic noisy leakage model. However the extension only applies if the leakage noise σ increases at least linearly with the masking order n, which is not necessarily possible in practice. In this paper we investigate the security of an implementation when the previous condition is not satisfied, for example when the masking order n increases for a constant noise σ. We exhibit two (template) horizontal side-channel attacks against the Rivain-Prouff's secure multiplication scheme and we analyze their efficiency thanks to several simulations and experiments. Eventually, we describe a variant of Rivain-Prouff's multiplication that is still provably secure in the original ISW model, and also heuristically secure against our new attacks

Sichere IT ohne Schwachstellen und Hintertüren

Unsere zunehmende Abhängigkeit von Informationstechnik erhöht kontinuierlich die Safety- und Security-Anforderungen bei deren Einsatz. Ein zentrales Problem hierbei sind Schwachstellen von Hard- und Software. Marktkräfte konnten diese Situation bislang nicht grundsätzlich beheben. Eine Gegenstrategie sollte deshalb folgende Optionen erwägen: (1) private und staatliche Förderung offener und sicherer IT‑Produktion, (2) Verbesserung der souveränen Kontrolle bei der Produktion aller kritischen IT‑Komponenten innerhalb eines Wirtschaftsraumes sowie (3) verbesserte und durchgesetzte Regulierung. Dieser Beitrag analysiert Vor- und Nachteile dieser Optionen. Es wird vorgeschlagen, die Sicherheit der Schlüsselkomponenten einer Lieferkette durch weltweit verteilte, offene und ggf. mathematisch bewiesene Komponenten zu gewährleisten. Der beschriebene Ansatz erlaubt die Nutzung existierender und neuer proprietärer Komponenten

Hip fractures in a city in Northern Norway over 15 years: time trends, seasonal variation and mortality: The Harstad Injury Prevention Study

Introduction The aim of the present population-based study was to describe age- and sex-specific incidence of hip fractures in a Northern Norwegian city, compare rates with the Norwegian capital Oslo, describe time trends in hip fracture incidence, place of injury, seasonal variation and compare mortality after hip fracture between women and men. Methods Data on hip fractures from 1994 to 2008 in women and men aged 50 years and above were obtained from the Harstad Injury Registry. Results There were altogether 603 hip fractures in Harstad between 1994 and 2008. The annual incidenc rose exponentially from 5.8 to 349.2 per 10,000 in men, and from 8.7 to 582.2 per 10,000 in women from the age group 50–54 to 90+ years. The age-adjusted incidence rates were 101.0 and 37.4 in women and men, respectively, compared to 118.0 in women (p=0.005) and 44.0 in men (p=0.09) in Oslo. The age-adjusted incidence rates did not increase between 1994–1996 and 2006–2008. The majority of hip fractures occurred indoors and seasonal variation was significant in fractures occurring outdoors only. After adjusting for age at hip fracture, mortality after fracture was higher in men than in women 3, 6 and 12 months (p≤0.002) after fracture. Conclusions There are regional differences in hip fracture incidence that cannot be explained by a north–south gradient in Norway. Preventive strategies must be targeted to indoor areas throughout the year and to outdoor areas in winter