Shallow landslide disposition in burnt European beech (Fagus sylvatica L.) forests

Tree roots contribute significantly to soil strength on hillslopes. In the case of wildfires, this effect may abruptly vanish and be lacking for a considerable period of time depending on the resistance and resilience of the forest. Despite its importance, quantitative data on the impact and dynamics of wildfires on slope stabilization is still lacking. We use the study case of the Fagus sylvatica L. to quantify the medium-term evolution of root reinforcement and its effect on slope stability in fire-injured forests. In the study, we upscale root reinforcement using field data for the calibration of the Root Bundle Model and detailed information on forest structure in 244 plots, and calculate the spatio-temporal dynamics of forest protective capacity using a three-dimensional probabilistic slope stability model (slideforNET) for different site types. In unburnt and low-burn forests, the protective capacity was found to remain constant over time. Forests hit by moderate burns continue to provide adequate protection for shallow (depth < 0.5 m) and cohesive soils only, whereas in the case of high severity fires, the protective capacity vanishes for 15 years and an increased shallow landslide probability remains for at least 40 years. These conditions call for appropriate sylvicultural post-fire measures

To whom does the law speak? Canvassing a neglected picture of law’s interpretive field

Among the most common strategies underlying the so-called indeterminacy thesis is the following two-step argument: (1) that law is an interpretive practice, and that evidently legal actors more generally hold different (and competing) theories of meaning, which lead to disagreements as to what the law says (that is, as to what the law is); (2) and that, as there is no way to establish the prevalence of one particular theory of meaning over the other, indeterminacy is pervasive in law. In this paper I offer some reflections to resist this trend. In particular I claim that a proper understanding of law as an authoritative communicative enterprise sheds new light on the relation between the functioning of the law and our theories of interpretation, leading to what can be considered a neglected conclusion: the centrality of the linguistic criterion of meaning in our juridical interpretive practices. In the first part of the chapter I discuss speech-act theory in the study of law, assessing its relevance between alternative options. Then I tackle the ‘to whom does the law speak?’ question, highlighting the centrality of lay-people for our juridical practices. Lastly, I examine the consequences of this neglected fact for our interpretive theories