Completability vs (In)completeness

In everyday conversation, no notion of “complete sentence” is required for syntactic licensing. However, so-called “fragmentary”, “incomplete”, and abandoned utterances are problematic for standard formalisms. When contextualised, such data show that (a) non-sentential utterances are adequate to underpin agent coordination, while (b) all linguistic dependencies can be systematically distributed across participants and turns. Standard models have problems accounting for such data because their notions of ‘constituency’ and ‘syntactic domain’ are independent of performance considerations. Concomitantly, we argue that no notion of “full proposition” or encoded speech act is necessary for successful interaction: strings, contents, and joint actions emerge in conversation without any single participant having envisaged in advance the outcome of their own or their interlocutors’ actions. Nonetheless, morphosyntactic and semantic licensing mechanisms need to apply incrementally and subsententially. We argue that, while a representational level of abstract syntax, divorced from conceptual structure and physical action, impedes natural accounts of subsentential coordination phenomena, a view of grammar as a “skill” employing domain-general mechanisms, rather than fixed form-meaning mappings, is needed instead. We provide a sketch of a predictive and incremental architecture (Dynamic Syntax) within which underspecification and time-relative update of meanings and utterances constitute the sole concept of “syntax”

Feedback in Conversation as Incremental Semantic Update

Eshghi is supported by the EPSRC BABBLE project (grant number EP/M01553X/1) and Hough by the DUEL project funded by the ANR (grant number ANR-13-FRAL-0001) and the DFG (grant number SCHL 845/5-1). We thank them for their financial support. Purver is partially supported by ConCreTe: the project ConCreTe acknowledges the financial support of the Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) programme within the Seventh Framework Programme for Research of the European Commission, under FET grant number 61173

Beyond single-mindedness: A figure-ground reversal for the cognitive sciences

A fundamental fact about human minds is that they are never truly alone: all minds are steeped in situated interaction. That social interaction matters is recognised by any experimentalist who seeks to exclude its influence by studying individuals in isolation. On this view, interaction complicates cognition. Here we explore the more radical stance that interaction co-constitutes cognition: that we benefit from looking beyond single minds towards cognition as a process involving interacting minds. All around the cognitive sciences, there are approaches that put interaction centre stage. Their diverse and pluralistic origins may obscure the fact that collectively, they harbour insights and methods that can respecify foundational assumptions and fuel novel interdisciplinary work. What might the cognitive sciences gain from stronger interactional foundations? This represents, we believe, one of the key questions for the future. Writing as a multidisciplinary collective assembled from across the classic cognitive science hexagon and beyond, we highlight the opportunity for a figure-ground reversal that puts interaction at the heart of cognition. The interactive stance is a way of seeing that deserves to be a key part of the conceptual toolkit of cognitive scientists