Global Militarisation Index 2014

The Global Militarisation Index (gmi) depicts the relative weight and importance of the military apparatus of one state in relation to its society as a whole. The update of the GMI 2014 is based on data from the year 2013 (i. e. the most recent year for which data has been available) and comprises 152 states. BICC’s GMI is supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (bmz). In the 2014 GMI, Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Syria, Russia, Cyprus, South Korea, Jordan, Greece and Azerbaijan (position 1 to 10) are amongst the ten countries with the highest levels of militarisation—three of which are situated in the Middle East, two in East Asia and the remaining five in Western and Eastern Europe. The high levels of militarisation in these countries are mostly the result of comprehensive arms purchases. The causes for the generally high levels of militarisation in the Middle East are manifold. They range from the defence of existing authoritarian regimes against possible internal adversaries to external conflicts and potential threats from the outside. All in all, one will have to assume that the level of militarisation in the region will remain high or will even increase. The neighbouring states Armenia (position 3) and Azerbaijan (position 10), both belonging to Europe, show very high levels of militarisation and have initiated major increases in their military expenditures over the past years. The high levels of militarisation in these two countries must, however, be seen in the overall context. Russia (position 5) delivers arms to both South Caucasian republics and has been pursuing a comprehensive military reform since 2008. Between 2009 and 2013, expenditures for equipment and procurement in European NATO states fell by more than US $9 billion. Still, some states show high levels of militarisation (Greece: 9, Estonia: 21, Turkey: 24, Bulgaria: 27, Portugal: 28). Singapore (position 2) and South Korea (position 7) are the two countries within East Asia that are amongst the most militarised countries. Singapore’s procurement efforts are a reaction to its many unresolved territorial issues, the importance of strategic waterways in the region and the Chinese anti-access / area denial strategy. South Korea’s high level of militarisation can be understood in the context of the ongoing state of war with North Korea, but also with unresolved territorial issues with Japan and China in the Yellow Sea

Transparent reporting for a successful Arms Trade Treaty

The ATT needs a reporting mechanism that increases transparency of the international arms trade. Transparency is a precondition to monitoring the adherence of signatory states to the criteria of the ATT and pro vides the basis for the further development of international norms for arms transfers. At a minimum, states parties to the ATT should aim to report on authorised and actual exports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) of the ATT. information provided should include the numbers and description of transferred weapons, the financial value of the licence, transit countries and the recipient country. A standardised reporting template should provide the opportunity to offer additional information, such as more details on the end­users and on the condition of the weapons. Such a voluntary segment should further include the exports of ammunition/munitions, parts and components, production licences, technologies and equipment for the manufacturing of conventional arms. Creating incentives is vital for such an approach. A commitment to voluntary reporting should have a positive effect on the level of assistance that states receive in the framework of the ATT. furthermore, participation in the reporting system should be taken as an indicator for the trustworthiness of states as partners on the international arms market. States parties to the ATT should discuss how a system of denial reporting could look like. States could start to pro vide information on denials of arms export licences confidentially and on a voluntary, rather informal, basis, possibly leading to a more standardised process in the future. later on stage, this might be complemented by an aggregated report on denials that would be made public

Global Militarisation Index 2015

Compiled by BICC, the Global Militarisation Index (gmi) presents on an annual basis the relative weight and importance of a country’s military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The 2015 GMI covers 152 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2014). The index project is financially supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (bmz). There are numerous sources of conflict around the world that are driving militarisation in many regions and inducing states to modernise their armed forces or increase defence budgets. Among the ten countries with the highest level of militarisation—namely Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Jordan, South Korea, Russia, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Kuwait and Greece—three are in the Middle East, two in Asia and five in Europe. The United States and China are absent from the GMI Top 10, despite being global leaders in military spending. This is because when their military expenditures are measured as a proportion of gross domestic product (gdp), and their military headcount and heavy weapon system numbers are measured per 1,000 inhabitants, the situation looks rather different. Nevertheless, they are following the trend towards restructuring and modernisation of the armed forces. The region with the highest level of militarisation is again the Middle East. This upward trend must be seen in connection with the violent conflicts across the region—the Israel–Palestine conflict, the war in Yemen, the civil war in Syria and the regional threat posed by so-called Islamic State (is). In Europe, too, we find high levels of militarisation. Current crises, not least the war in eastern Ukraine, could become the factor that will push up defence budgets in the future. There is also a local arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan triggered by the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict. Included for the first time in the 2015 GMI report is an examination of the relationships between militarisation and human development by considering the Human Development Index (hdi). For stronger economies, we find that a high GMI ranking is often accompanied by a high HDI value (Israel, Singapore). The relationship between militarisation and human development may again differ in countries where a high GMI is combined with a low HDI, such as Chad, or Mauretania. Here, disproportionately high spending on the armed forces may be taking critical resources away from development

Globaler Militarisierungsindex 2014

Der Globale Militarisierungsindex des BICC bildet alljährlich das relative Gewicht und die Bedeutung des Militärapparats von Staaten im jeweiligen Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft als Ganzes ab. Das vorliegende Update des GMI 2014 basiert auf Daten des Jahres 2013 (d. h. den aktuellsten vorliegenden Zahlen) und umfasst 152 Staaten. Der GMI des BICC wird durch das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (bmz) gefördert. Unter den zehn Ländern mit den höchsten Militarisierungsgraden befinden sich mit Israel, Singapur, Armenien, Syrien, Russland, Zypern, Südkorea, Jordanien, Griechenland und Aserbaidschan (Reihenfolge 1 bis 10) drei Staaten aus dem Nahen und Mittleren Osten, zwei aus Ostasien sowie fünf aus West- und Ost europa. Die hohe Militarisierung in diesen Ländern findet insbesondere in umfassenden Rüstungsbeschaffungen Ausdruck. Die Ursachen für die allgemein hohe Militarisierung im Nahen und Mittleren Osten sind vielfältig. Die Verteidigung bestehender autoritärer Regime vor möglichen internen Gegnern gehört ebenso dazu wie externe Konflikte und potenzielle äußere Bedrohungen. Insgesamt ist davon auszugehen, dass die Militarisierung in der Region auf einem hohen Niveau verbleiben wird oder noch weiter ansteigt. Die beiden in den Nagorny Karabach-Konflikt involvierten, zu Europa gehörenden Nachbarstaaten Armenien (platz 3) und Aserbaidschan (platz 10) haben sehr hohe Militarisierungsgrade und steigerten in den vergangenen Jahren ihre Militärausgaben erheblich. Diese Militarisierung ist jedoch nicht isoliert zu sehen ist. Russland (platz 5) liefert Rüstungsgüter an beide Konfliktparteien im Südkaukasus und verfolgt seit 2008 selbst eine umfassende Militärreform. Zwischen 2009 und 2013 sind innerhalb der europäischen NATO-Staaten die Ausgaben für Ausrüstung und Beschaffung um mehr als neun Milliarden Euro gefallen. Dennoch zeigen einige hohe Militarisierungsgrade (Griechenland: 9, Estland: 21, Türkei: 24, Bulgarien: 27, Portugal: 28). Mit Singapur (platz 2) und Südkorea (platz 7) befinden sich zwei Staaten aus Ostasien unter den zehn höchst militarisierten Ländern der Welt. Singa pur reagiert mit Beschaffungen auf ungelöste Territorialfragen und die chinesische anti-access/area-denial Strategie. Südkoreas hohe Militarisie rung muss im Kontext des anhaltenden Kriegszustandes mit Nordkorea aber auch mit unge lösten Territorialfragen mit Japan und China im Gelben Meer gesehen werden

Rosmarie Barwinski: Resilienz in der Psychotherapie. Entwicklungsblockaden bei Trauma, Neurosen und frühen Störungen auflösen

BuchbesprechungErschienen im Verlag Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2016

Globaler Militarisierungsindex 2015

Der Globale Militarisierungsindex des BICC bildet alljährlich das relative Gewicht und die Bedeutung des Militärapparats von Staaten im jeweiligen Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft als Ganzes ab. Der GMI 2015 umfasst 152 Staaten und basiert auf den aktuellsten vorliegenden Zahlen, in der Regel sind das die Daten des Jahres 2014. Der Index wird durch das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (bmz) gefördert. Zahlreiche Konfliktherde in der Welt treiben weiterhin die Aufrüstung in vielen Regionen an und veranlassen Staaten zur Modernisierung ihrer Streitkräfte oder zur Erhöhung der Verteidigungshaushalte. Unter den zehn Ländern mit dem höchsten Militarisierungsgrad befinden sich mit Israel, Singapur, Armenien, Jordanien, Südkorea, Russland, Zypern, Aserbaidschan, Kuwait und Griechenland drei Staaten aus dem Nahen und Mittleren Osten, zwei aus Asien sowie fünf aus Europa. Dass die USA und China als die Länder, die weltweit führend in den Militärausgaben sind, in den TOP 10 fehlen, liegt am niedrigeren Verhältnis der Militärausgaben zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt (bip) sowie der Anzahl des Militärpersonals bzw. der schweren Waffensysteme zur Gesamtbevölkerung dort. Gleichwohl teilen sie mit vielen anderen Ländern die Tendenz, Umstrukturierungen und Modernisierungen der Streitkräfte anzustreben. Der Nahe und Mittlere Osten bleibt die Region mit den höchsten Militarisierungsgraden. Dieser Trend muss auch im Zusammenhang mit den dortigen Gewaltkonflikten – Nahost- und Jemenkonflikt, Auswirkungen des Bürgerkriegs in Syrien und die regionale Bedrohung durch IS – betrachtet werden. Auch in Europa finden sich hohe Militarisierungsgrade. Aktuelle Krisen, besonders der Krieg in der Ukraine, könnten sich zur Triebfeder für zukünftige Erhöhungen der Verteidigungsausgaben entwickeln. Der Nagorny Karabach Konflikt heizt weiterhin ein Wettrüsten zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidschan an. Erstmals untersucht der GMI 2015 unter Einbeziehung des Human Development Index (hdi) den Zusammenhang zwischen Militarisierung und menschlicher Entwicklung. In starken Volkswirtschaften fallen oft hohes GMIRanking und hoher HDI-Wert zusammen (z. B. Israel, Singapur). Ist jedoch ein hoher GMI- mit einem niedrigen HDI-Wert kombiniert (z. B. Tschad, Mauretanien) könnte dies darauf hindeuten, dass durch überproportionale Zuwendung an die Streitkräfte wichtige Ressourcen für die Entwicklung fehlen

Anarchy's anatomy : two-tiered security systems and Libya’s civil wars

No issue deserves more scrutiny than the mechanisms whereby popular unrest unleashes civil wars. We argue that one institution — two-tiered security systems — is particularly pernicious in terms of the accompanying civil war risk. These systems’ defining characteristic is the juxtaposition of small communally stacked units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger regular armed forces that deter external opponents. These systems aggravate civil war risks because stacked security units lack the size to repress widespread dissent, but inhibit rapid regime change through coup d’état. Regular militaries, meanwhile, fracture when ordered to employ force against populations from which they were recruited.PostprintPeer reviewe

Differential effects of human and plant N-acetylglucosaminyltransferase I (GnTI) in plants

In plants and animals, the first step in complex type N-glycan formation on glycoproteins is catalyzed by N-acetylglucosaminyltransferase I (GnTI). We show that the cgl1-1 mutant of Arabidopsis, which lacks GnTI activity, is fully complemented by YFP-labeled plant AtGnTI, but only partially complemented by YFP-labeled human HuGnTI and that this is due to post-transcriptional events. In contrast to AtGnTI-YFP, only low levels of HuGnTI-YFP protein was detected in transgenic plants. In protoplast co-transfection experiments all GnTI-YFP fusion proteins co-localized with a Golgi marker protein, but only limited co-localization of AtGnTI and HuGnTI in the same plant protoplast. The partial alternative targeting of HuGnTI in plant protoplasts was alleviated by exchanging the membrane-anchor domain with that of AtGnTI, but in stably transformed cgl1-1 plants this chimeric GnTI still did not lead to full complementation of the cgl1-1 phenotype. Combined, the results indicate that activity of HuGnTI in plants is limited by a combination of reduced protein stability, alternative protein targeting and possibly to some extend to lower enzymatic performance of the catalytic domain in the plant biochemical environment

Potential of FX06 to prevent disease progression in hospitalized non-intubated COVID-19 patients — the randomized, EU-wide, placebo-controlled, phase II study design of IXION

Background: More than 2.7 million hospitalizations of COVID-19-infected patients have occurred in Europe alone since the outbreak of the coronavirus in 2020. Interventions against SARS-CoV-2 are still in high need to prevent admissions to ICUs worldwide. FX06, a naturally occurring peptide in humans and other mammals, has the potential to reduce capillary leak by improving endothelial dysfunction and thus preventing the deterioration of patients. With IXION, we want to investigate the potential of FX06 to prevent disease progression in hospitalized, non-intubated COVID-19 patients. Methods: IXION is an EU-wide, multicentre, placebo-controlled, double-blinded, parallel, randomized (2:1) phase II clinical study. Patient recruitment will start in September 2022 (to Q2/2023) in Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Spain, Romania, Portugal, and France. A total of 306 hospitalized patients (>= 18 years and < 75 years) with a positive SARS-CoV-2 PCR test and a COVID-19 severity of 4-6 according to the WHO scale will be enrolled. After randomization to FX06 or placebo, patients will be assessed until day 28 (and followed up until day 60). FX06 (2 x 200 mg per day) or placebo will be administered intravenously for 5 consecutive days. The primary endpoint is to demonstrate a difference in the proportion of patients with progressed/worsened disease state in patients receiving FX06 compared to patients receiving placebo. Secondary endpoints are lung function, oxygen saturation and breathing rate, systemic inflammation, survival, capillary refill time, duration of hospital stay, and drug accountability. Discussion: With IXION, the multidisciplinary consortium aims to deliver a new therapy in addition to standard care against SARS-CoV-2 for the clinical management of COVID-19 during mild and moderate stages. Potential limitations might refer to a lack of recruiting and drop-out due to various possible protocol violations. While we controlled for drop-outs in the same size estimation, recruitment problems may be subject to external problems difficult to control for

Measures of infection prevention and incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infections in cancer patients undergoing radiotherapy in Germany, Austria and Switzerland

Abstract Purpose COVID-19 infection has manifested as a major threat to both patients and healthcare providers around the world. Radiation oncology institutions (ROI) deliver a major component of cancer treatment, with protocols that might span over several weeks, with the result of increasing susceptibility to COVID-19 infection and presenting with a more severe clinical course when compared with the general population. The aim of this manuscript is to investigate the impact of ROI protocols and performance on daily practice in the high-risk cancer patients during this pandemic. Methods We addressed the incidence of positive COVID-19 cases in both patients and health care workers (HCW), in addition to the protective measures adopted in ROIs in Germany, Austria and Switzerland using a specific questionnaire. Results The results of the questionnaire showed that a noteworthy number of ROIs were able to complete treatment in SARS-CoV‑2 positive cancer patients, with only a short interruption. The ROIs reported a significant decrease in patient volume that was not impacted by the circumambient disease incidence, the type of ROI or the occurrence of positive cases. Of the ROIs 16.5% also reported infected HCWs. About half of the ROIs (50.5%) adopted a screening program for patients whereas only 23.3% also screened their HCWs. The range of protective measures included the creation of working groups, instituting home office work and protection with face masks. Regarding the therapeutic options offered, curative procedures were performed with either unchanged or moderately decreased schedules, whereas palliative or benign radiotherapy procedures were more often shortened. Most ROIs postponed or cancelled radiation treatment for benign indications (88.1%). The occurrence of SARS-CoV‑2 infections did not affect the treatment options for curative procedures. Non-university-based ROIs seemed to be more willing to change their treatment options for curative and palliative cases than university-based ROIs. Conclusion Most ROIs reported a deep impact of SARS-CoV‑2 infections on their work routine. Modification and prioritization of treatment regimens and the application of protective measures preserved a well-functioning radiation oncology service and patient care