The Heartbleed bug : insecurity repackaged, rebranded and resold

The emergence of a post-industrial information economy shaped by and around networked communication technology has presented new opportunities for identity theft. In particular, the accidental leakage or deliberate harvesting of information, via either hacking or social engineering, is an omnipresent threat to a large number of commercial organisations and state agencies who manage digital databases and sociotechnical forms of data. Throughout the twenty-first century the global media have reported on a series of data breaches fuelling amongst the public an anxiety concerning the safety and security of their personal and financial data. With concern outpacing reliable information a reassurance gap has emerged between the public's expectations and the state's ability to provide safety and security online. This disparity presents a significant opportunity for a commercial computer crime control industry who has sought to position itself as being able to offer consumer citizens the antidotes for such ills. This paper considers how neoliberal discourses of cybercrime control are packaged, branded and sold, through an examination of the social construction of the Heartbleed bug. It demonstrates how security company Codenomicon masterfully communicated the vulnerability, the product of a simple coding error, through its name, a logo and an accompanying website, in turn, shaping news coverage across the mainstream media and beyond

Corporate environmental responsibility and criminology

This article addresses corporate environmental responsibility (CER) and aims to present a criminological analysis of it. We studied the opinion of a number of principle actors involved in CER in Europe in order to determine how they perceive it in terms of its definition, aetiology and approaches. For each of these dimensions we relate back to a criminological framework to ascertain how it is positioned in the green criminological debate. We start out by providing information on what corporate environmental responsibility is and how it relates to corporate social responsibility and sustainable development. Then we outline the theoretical framework in accordance with the three central themes for the criminological analysis of CER: definition, aetiology and approaches. We also explain the method that was used (semi-structured interviews). Next, we present the results according to the same threefold structure. Finally we discuss these results in a last part, which is divided in two. First, we look at the challenges that the criminological perspective poses for CER in terms of definition, aetiology and approaches. The second part of the discussion turns the question around and wonders how CER could contribute to greening criminology

RSPCA and the criminology of social control

This paper contributes to a rethinking of animal abuse control and animal welfare protection in criminology, specifically, and in the social sciences more broadly. We do this, first, through a broad mapping of the institutional control complex around animal abuse in contemporary Britain. Second, we focus on the institutional strategies and practices, past and present, of the main agency of animal protection, and the policing thereof, in this society, namely the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). In looking back to this charity’s growth since the first decades of the nineteenth century at the time of the birth of modern industrial capitalism and also to its current rationale and practices as a late-modern, corporate organisation, we explore the seeming paradox of a private body taking a lead on the regulation and prosecution of illegalities associated with animal-human relationships. Finally, the ideology and strategy of the RSPCA are explored in the context of the often visceral and culturally influential ‘morality war’ associated with proponents, respectively, of animal rights (‘abolition’) and ‘anthropic’ welfare proponents (‘regulation’ and ‘protection’)

Watched over or over-watched? Open street CCTV in Australia

Most developed countries, Australia included, are witnessing increased government and public concerns about crime and security. Amid these anxieties, closed circuit television (CCTV) systems to monitor public spaces are increasingly being touted as a solution to problems of crime and disorder. The city of Perth established Australia’s first open street closed circuit television system in July 1991. Subsequently, there has been significant expansion. At the end of 2002 Australia had 33 “open street” CCTV schemes. Based on site inspections, extensive reviews of documentation and interviews with 22 Australian administrators, this article discusses issues relating to system implementation, management and accountability.We also suggest ways relevant authorities might ensure that current and future schemes are appropriately audited and evaluated. We argue that rigorous independent assessment of both the intended and unintended consequences of open street CCTV is essential to ensure this measure is not deployed inappropriately. Finally, this article suggests any potential crime prevention benefits must be carefully weighed against the potential of CCTV to exacerbate social division and exclusion

Hybrids: on the crime-terror nexus

Terrorist organizations may complement their military capability with functioning infrastructures and profitable activity in economic ventures as well as in crime. This leads many commentators to focus on the increasing overlap between terrorism and crime, including and particularly organized crime. The present paper is devoted to the analysis of this controversial overlap, and after providing a concise outline of definitions of organized crime and terrorism found in criminology, highlights similarities and differences between the two forms of criminality, along with the ambiguity of the very notion of ‘crime-terror nexus’

The Multilateralization of Policing: The Case of Illicit Synthetic Drug Control

Many security-related roles that were customarily the responsibility of governments and public police agencies have become commercialized, devolved, or otherwise dispersed. This phenomenon has been described as 'multilateralization.' The paper sets out to analyse the multilateralization of policing as it applies to strategies of supply reduction in the area of illicit synthetic drugs, focusing in particular upon amphetamine type substances. Supply reduction can constitute interventions not ordinarily thought of as drug law enforcement and entail a range of technologies underpinned by regulatory theory. Various strategies of engaging external institutions in furtherance of reducing the supply of illicit synthetic drugs are canvassed. The authors provide an analytical framework for understanding how illicit synthetic drugs can be governed through strategies of co-production and the possible barriers and issues that need to be considered when attempting to engage the crime control capacities of external institutions