Asymmetric Governance and the Transformation of Employment Relations in the Eurozone: The Contingent Influence of the Ideas of Policy-Makers

The governance of the Eurozone debt crisis has been characterised by the asymmetric distribution of the costs of adjustment, namely the imposition of austerity measures and the liberalisation of institutions of industrial relations in debtor countries that were awarded a bailout package coupled with the protection of banks from creditor countries. By presenting an ideational perspective, this article highlights the role of ideas in explaining these policy outcomes. The importance of ideas is contingent upon the manner in which they are framed. The process of framing enables policy-makers to build support for policies by presenting them in a manner that links an issue with a specific understanding of important economic and political developments. Equally, if not more important in the current context of the Eurozone debt crisis, the importance of ideas is also contingent upon their influence over the maintenance of extant institutional arrangements of Eurozone governance that distribute costs of adjustment in an asymmetrical manner. In particular, we illustrate the role of German Ordoliberalism in heightening the credibility of the threat of withholding financial assistance, in the event of non-compliance with strict conditionality criteria, in the current institutional architecture of Eurozone governance

Workplace discrimination against LGBT employees in Mauritius: A sociological perspective

This article focuses on workplace discrimination against LGBT employees in Mauritius – a multi-ethnic society in the Indian Ocean. Drawing from the insights of sociological studies that highlight how the manifestation of practices across settings is shaped by the process by which it is framed, the analysis illustrates the importance of the local context in accounting for the specific forms taken by LGBT workplace discrimination in Mauritius. Reflecting the importance of respect for different ethnic groups in the stability of the Mauritian democracy, the empirical results highlight how instances of workplace discrimination against LGBT employees are pervasive but framed to avoid inter-ethnic conflicts whilst stigmatising LGBT identities as problematic

The management of the Eurozone in crisis times: Actors, institutions and the case of bailout packages

The adjustment to the financial crisis was particularly brutal for Eurozone countries targeted by private bondholders. Financial assistance through the newly created Eurozone governance system was conditional on the implementation of austerity measures and the introduction of structural reforms in industrial relations (decentralization of collective bargaining and liberalization of employment protection). Our analysis focuses on the formation process and the structural features of Eurozone supranational institutions. Building from the insights of actor-centred institutionalism, we illustrate the importance of coalitions among some, but not all, important actors based on the overlapping of their non-monolithic preferences in the process of institutional innovation. The structural features of Eurozone institutions curtailed member states’ ability to effectively resist the imposition of internal devaluation policies. A contested outcome, these institutional features were secured by a specific coalition of important actors – most notably, the German government and the European Central Bank – based on their overlapping interests around internal devaluation policies

Protection of Domestic bank Ownership in France and Germany: The Functional Equivalency of Institutional Diversity in Takeovers

We investigate the character of the market for corporate control (i.e. takeovers) in French and German banking. The key feature of this character is the marked ability of French and German banks to resist unsolicited takeover bids, especially – although not exclusively– those from foreign competitors. We present an institutional perspective to account for the restrained character of takeovers in French and German banking. Our perspective is composed of two elements. First, institutional arrangements are important since they structure power relations among firm stakeholders by providing opportunities, as well as imposing constraints, to influence the decision-making process in which takeover transactions take place. Second, institutional arrangements provide firm stakeholders with several potential opportunities, not just one, to block unsolicited bids since takeover contests are composed of sequences of decisions for which approval is needed at each stage. French and German banks have used different mixes of institutional arrangements, themselves located at different stages of takeover transactions, to secure restrained markets for corporate control. Our institutional analysis, in turn, also illustrates an important shortcoming of banking sector protectionism, namely the contribution of protection from unsolicited takeover bids to the building of banks carrying systemic risks

Institutional Investors in French and German Corporate Governance: The Transformation of Corporate Governance and the Stability of Coordination. CES Germany & Europe Working Paper, no.07.2, 2008

This paper examines the transformation of the system of corporate governance of France and Germany from the mid-1990s to early 2007. I focus on the rise of foreign ownership as a key in-dicator of shifts in corporate governance. The empirical data presented in this paper on the in-vestment portfolios of short-term institutional investors, namely actively managed mutual funds, shows a marked preference for the French market over that of Germany. The case of American and British-based hedge funds serves as a supporting comparative case study. I argue that the firm-level institutional arrangements of workplace organization constitute the most significant variable to account for this difference – the concentration of power in top executives in France fitting better with the preferences and investment strategies of short-term oriented institutional investors. I do not want to suggest that the institutional characteristics of workplace organization constitute the only investment driver of actively managed mutual funds. I also analyze the shortcomings of three alternative co-varying explanations – degree of internationalization, own-ership structure of companies, and background of corporate executives. I demonstrate how key notions of the Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective – institutional interaction, institu-tional latency, and the distinction between institutional framework and the mode of coordination that follows from these institutions – provide important theoretical insights to assess the impli-cations of causal complexity phenomenon. In particular, this mid-range level theoretical perspec-tive illuminates how necessary and/or sufficient conditions operate and vary across advanced capitalist economies

Contingent capital : short-term investors and the evolution of corporate governance in France and Germany

Will the pressures of financial market globalization force companies to converge on a shareholder-based model of corporate governance? In 'Contingent Capital', Michel Goyer highlights the importance of the institutional context, in which companies are embedde

Institutional Hybridization and Economic Performance: The State of France, the State in France

Does the presence of institutional hybridization invariably lead to lower rates of economic growth? The absence of tight complementarities between the different spheres of the economy makes it harder for companies to secure market-based or strategic- inspired modes of coordination. I investigate this issue with the case of France - an institutionally hybrid economy whose relative economic performance has declined in the last decade. I highlight that the prominence of state intervention in the first four postwar decades lessened the weaknesses of institutional hybridization. Nonetheless, state dirigisme did not eliminate the shortcomings associated with a hybrid model. If anything, state intervention in France significantly contributed to stifle the development of institutional capacities of actors, most notably labour organisations, which are crucial in coordinated market economies