The governance of the Eurozone debt crisis has been characterised by the asymmetric distribution of the costs of adjustment, namely the imposition of austerity measures and the liberalisation of institutions of industrial relations in debtor countries that were awarded a bailout package coupled with the protection of banks from creditor countries. By presenting an ideational perspective, this article highlights the role of ideas in explaining these policy outcomes. The importance of ideas is contingent upon the manner in which they are framed. The process of framing enables policy-makers to build support for policies by presenting them in a manner that links an issue with a specific understanding of important economic and political developments. Equally, if not more important in the current context of the Eurozone debt crisis, the importance of ideas is also contingent upon their influence over the maintenance of extant institutional arrangements of Eurozone governance that distribute costs of adjustment in an asymmetrical manner. In particular, we illustrate the role of German Ordoliberalism in heightening the credibility of the threat of withholding financial assistance, in the event of non-compliance with strict conditionality criteria, in the current institutional architecture of Eurozone governance
