Eudaimonistic Argumentation

Virtue theories have lately enjoyed a modest vogue in the study of argumentation, echoing the success of more far-reaching programmes in ethics and epistemology. Virtue theories of argumentation (VTA) comprise several conceptually distinct projects, including the provision of normative foundations for argument evaluation and a renewed focus on the character of good arguers. Perhaps the boldest of these is the pursuit of the fully satisfying argument, the argument that contributes to human flourishing. This project has an independently developed epistemic analogue: eudaimonistic virtue epistemology. Both projects stress the importance of widening the range of cognitive goals beyond, respectively, cogency and knowledge; both projects emphasize social factors, the right sort of community being indispensable for the cultivation of the intellectual virtues necessary to each project. This paper proposes a unification of the two projects by arguing that the intellectual good life sought by eudaimonistic virtue epistemologists is best realized through the articulation of an account of argumentation that contributes to human flourishing

What’s so bad about scientism?

In their attempt to defend philosophy from accusations of uselessness made by prominent scientists, such as Stephen Hawking, some philosophers respond with the charge of ‘scientism.’ This charge makes endorsing a scientistic stance, a mistake by definition. For this reason, it begs the question against these critics of philosophy, or anyone who is inclined to endorse a scientistic stance, and turns the scientism debate into a verbal dispute. In this paper, I propose a different definition of scientism, and thus a new way of looking at the scientism debate. Those philosophers who seek to defend philosophy against accusations of uselessness would do philosophy a much better service, I submit, if they were to engage with the definition of scientism put forth in this paper, rather than simply make it analytic that scientism is a mistake

Intergroup struggles over victimhood in violent conflict: The victim-perpetrator paradigm

Most groups in violent, intergroup conflict perceive themselves to be the primary or sole victims of that conflict. This often results in contention over who may claim victim status and complicates a central aim of post-conflict processes, which is to acknowledge and address harms experienced by the victims. Drawing from victimology scholarship and intergroup relations theory, this article proposes the victim-perpetrator paradigm as a framework to analyse how, why and to what end groups in conflict construct and maintain their claims to the moral status of victim. This interdisciplinary paradigm builds on the knowledge that groups utilise the ‘ideal victim’ construction to exemplify their own innocence and blamelessness in contrast to the wickedness of the perpetrator, setting the two categories as separate and mutually exclusive even where experiences of violence have been complex. Additionally, this construction provides for a core intergroup need to achieve positive social identity, which groups may enhance by demonstrating a maximum differentiation between the in-group as victims and those out-groups identified as perpetrators. The paradigm contributes greater knowledge on the social roots of victim contention in conflict, as well as how groups legitimise their violence against out-groups during and after conflict

Is There a Role for Adversariality in Teaching Critical Thinking?

Although there has been considerable recent debate on the topic of adversariality in argumentation, this debate has rarely found its way into work on critical thinking theory and instruction. This paper focuses on the implications of the adversariality debate for teaching critical thinking. Is there a role for adversarial argumentation in critical thinking instruction? Is there a way to incorporate the benefits of adversarial argumentation while mitigating the problems

Indirect comparison of interventions using published randomised trials: systematic review of PDE-5 inhibitors for erectile dysfunction

BACKGROUND: There are no randomised and properly blinded trials directly comparing one PDE-5 inhibitor with another in a normal home setting. Valid indirect comparisons with a common comparator must examine equivalent doses, similar duration, similar populations, with the same outcomes reported in the same way. METHODS: Published randomised, double-blind trials of oral PDE-5 inhibitors for erectile dysfunction were sought from reference lists in previous reviews and electronic searching. Analyses of efficacy and harm were carried out for each treatment, and results compared where there was a common comparator and consistency of outcome reporting, using equivalent doses. RESULTS: Analysis was limited by differential reporting of outcomes. Sildenafil trials were clinically and geographically more diverse. Tadalafil and vardenafil trials tended to use enriched enrolment. Using all trials, the three interventions were similar for consistently reported efficacy outcomes. Rates of successful intercourse for sildenafil, tadalafil and vardenafil were 65%, 62%, and 59%, with placebo rates of 23–28%. The rates of improved erections were 76%, 75% and 71%, respectively, with placebo rates of 22–24%, and NNTs of 1.9 or 2.0. Reporting of withdrawals was less consistent, but all-cause withdrawals for sildenafil, tadalafil and vardenafil were 8% 13% and 20%. All three drugs were well tolerated, with headache being the most commonly reported event at 13–17%. There were few serious adverse events. CONCLUSION: There were differences between trials in outcomes reported, limiting comparisons, and the most useful outcomes were not reported. For common outcomes there was similar efficacy between PDE-5 inhibitors

Settler state apologies and the elusiveness of forgiveness : The purification ritual that does not purify

Peer reviewedPostprin

Arguments from parallel reasoning

Argumentation is a co-production by a proponent and an opponent who engage in a critical examination of their difference of opinion, aiming to resolve it on the merits of both sides, or so I assume in this paper. I shall investigate the consequences of this view for a particular type of argument from analogy, called argument from parallel reasoning, that has been discussed in some detail by Woods and Hudak in 1989. Suppose, a proponent contends that we should allow camera surveillance with drones by the Amsterdam police, on account of these drones' cost-effectiveness. Suppose further, that the opponent addressed makes it clear that she acknowledges the drones' cost-effectiveness, as well as the relevance of this consideration, but that she remains, nevertheless, critical towards the proponent's thesis for worrying about intrusions on privacy. In such a case, the proponent may consider it to be expedient to put forward an argument such as: “You would consent to cameras on satellites on account of their cost-effectiveness, and despite privacy considerations. Well, reasoning from cost-effectiveness to cameras on drones, despite privacy considerations, is comparable to reasoning from cost-effectiveness to cameras on satellites, despite privacy considerations.” How are such arguments generated in dialogue, and in which circumstances, if any, is such an indirect, and possibly even superficial way of arguing correct? I shall illustrate my findings with an atypical example of an argument from analogy, put forward by John Stuart Mill, in favour of the existence of other minds