The effect of CEO incentives on deviations from institutional norms in foreign market expansion decisions: Behavioral agency and cross-border acquisitions

CEO incentives have been the subject of great interest for human resource scholars. We explore the institutional context within which the CEO makes sense of their incentives. Our theory suggests that CEO equity incentives interact with institutional norms to influence foreign market entry choices. Specifically, we argue that CEOs will weigh the risk bearing created by equity incentives, along with the consequences of legitimacy loss, when deciding whether to deviate from institutional norms when internationalizing. In doing so, we advance human resource literature by demonstrating that CEO responses to incentives are influenced by institutional norms and that CEOs' decisions to deviate from institutional norms are shaped by their incentives. We find support for our framework in the analysis of the stake taken by acquirers in 4,184 cross-border acquisitions

The efficacy of high performance work practices in the Middle East: evidence from Algerian firms

Although there is developing evidence on the effectiveness of global HRM best practices in emerging and developing economies, little is known about the efficacy of those practices in the Middle East. This study examines the impact of high performance work practices (HPWP) on both employee and organisational outcomes in Algerian firms. The results of a firm-level survey show that while HPWP are positively associated with employee work attitudes and motivations, this effect is not converted into organisational-level outcomes. The results are discussed and implications for future research are offered. © 2014 © 2013 Taylor & Francis

Caring about firm stakeholders: towards a theory of proactive stakeholder management

Firms differ in the level of engagement with their stakeholders, and while some firms care more broadly and actively about their constituencies, others fail to be receptive to societal demands. To date, however, theoretical insights explaining these differences are fragile and inconsistent. In this paper, we present a theoretical model that, focusing on the primary role of executives as decision-makers, outline the conditions at the organizational level facilitating or inhibiting the intensity of Proactive Stakeholder Engagement (PSE). We argue that managers’ ability to explore different practices in an attempt to learn about and meet stakeholders’ needs depends on the level of explorative capacity, managerial empowerment, and the salience of PSE related criteria in the incentive alignment system. We further postulate the presence of factors within the firm (resource slack), competitive environment (environment dynamism), and manager level (individual values) that moderate these dynamics. Finally, we propose several scenarios that consider the combined or interactive effect of the three predictors on the firm’s PS

An Analysis of the Association Between Firm Risk, Executive Share Options and Accounting Performance: Some Australian Evidence

This paper examines whether the financial performance of the firm is associated with the risk-taking propensity of executives, which is inferred from the structure of their share option portfolio. The objective of this paper is to determine if executives have greater risk bearing preferences when they have more share options than shares in their firm. In turn, executives\u27 risk-taking preferences suggest that these decision-makers adopt value-increasing strategies. The results of this study support this notion. The results of the study of 182 Australian firms demonstrate that the negative relationship between firm risk and firm performance is weaker when executives hold a higher proportion of share options than shares in their investment in the firm. These results hold implications for executives\u27 compensation contracts. That is, executives who share in their firms\u27 risk via share options are more likely to undertake risky activities with high-expected performance outcome.<br /