The Performance Correlates of Ownership Control: A Study of U.S. and European MNE Joint Ventures in India

This study reports findings from an empirical examination of the relationship between ownership control and joint venture performance. It conceptualized ownership control as a continuous variable so that the range of values of optimal equity holdings could be derived. Thus, it was possible to empirically determine both the form and strength of the relationship, aspects that prior studies have not addressed fully. The empirical examination was carried out on a longitudinal sample of joint ventures betw een U.S. and European MNEs and local firms in India. Results clearly show that the relationship between ownership control and performance is curvilinear. Contrary to the prevailing views that advocate an equal sharing of equity, performance was found to improve with increasingly unequal levels of ownership

A Study of the Determinants of CEO Compensation in India

The literature on CEO compensation is quite rich and varied given a very long research tradition. However, since most of these efforts have focused on countries such as the US and UK. Precious little is known about the determinants of CEO compensation in countries outside the developed western world. • In attempting to fill this gap, this study, set in India, examines whether factors such as the spread of family controlled conglomerates and governmental involvement in private business have an impact on the way in which top executives are compensated. It provides the first evidence of the important role of family and government ownership in corporate governance and CEO compensation. • The findings offer an useful point of reference against which results from western studies could be compared so as to develop a more holistic theory of CEO pay