Notes on the 'Freezing Hypothesis'

It is now 40 years since Lipset and Rokkans heavily influential ‘Cleavage Structures…’ was first published. Current research has still made little effort to explain why the ‘freezing’ of party systems these authors observed actually took place. The purpose here is to contribute to this field by elucidating the individual-level mechanisms that make party system stability more intelligible. The argument put forward here is that three interrelated factors give us deeper insights into the mechanics of the so called ‘freezing process’. Firstly, the ‘problem of collective action among potential party-entrepreneurs’ makes it puzzling that new political parties emerge at all. Secondly, even if the original collective-action problem somehow is overcome, the ‘principal-agent problem’ and the ‘problem of voter coordination’ make it hard for new parties to attract voters. Finally, well-established and powerful competitors have the incentives and instruments to fight newcomers and steer them away from the political arena. I reach the conclusion that it is not surprising at all that Lipset and Rokkan made their empirical observations. Instead, what is really puzzling is why new political parties emerge and gain support at all.Party systems; 'freezing hypothesis'; party formation

Explaining Party Emergence in Swedish Local Politics 1973–2002

Since individuals demanding formations of new parties face a collective action problem, I inquire why people form new parties, and why this political strategy became increasingly popular between 1973 and 2002 in Swedish municipalities. Case-studies indicate that ‘strong emotions’ – i.e. anger, frustration and indignation – mobilize rational actors to start up new parties. However, ‘strong emotions’ only explain why individuals form parties in the first place, not why party formation has become a popular strategy. Hence, I hypothesize that entrepreneurs forming parties at t inspire potential entrepreneurs in neighbouring municipalities at t + 1. Since previous attempts to explain the increasing number of new parties in Sweden have failed, I maintain that the support the hypothesis gains adds important knowledge to this field.Party entrepreneurs; new parties; emotional arousal; rational imitation; local politics; Sweden

Vad vet vi om kommunal korruption?

Since the mid 90´s there has been an increased focus in media on public scandals in Swedish municipalities. This essay sets out to eludicate if there are reasons to believe that public corruption in Swedish municipalities is in fact increasing. By applying instruments from the institutional rational-choice genre, and by illustrating the main argument with empirical illustrations, the author draws the conclusion that there are compelling reasons to believe that organizational reforms during the last two decades – i.e. new public management – have shaped an incentive-structure which favours corrupt actitivies, hence increasing their frequency. The author concludes with a discussion on reform-strategies to counteract increasing corruption, and calls for extensive research on this under-researched topic.Corruption; public scandals; institutional rational-choice; Swedish municipalities; New Public Management

Resilience through Restructuring: Swedish Policy-Making Style and the Consensus on Liberalizations 1980–2000

In 1980, Sweden was a highly regulated economy with several state monopolies and low levels of economic freedom. Less than 20 years later, liberal reforms have turned Sweden into one of the worlds most open economies with a remarkable increase in economic freedom. While taxes and expenditure shares of GDP remain high, there has been a profound restructuring of Sweden’s economy in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, the degree of political consensus is striking, both regarding the policies that characterized Sweden up to 1980, as well as the subsequent liberalizations. Since established theories have difficulties explaining institutional change in heavily institutionalized settings, we seek to understand how the Swedish style of policy-making produced this surprising political consensus on liberal reforms. Building on previous research, we underscore the importance of three complementary factors: (i) Policy-making in Sweden has always been influenced by, and intimately connected to, social science. (ii) Government commissions have functioned as ‘early warning systems’, pointing out future challenges and creating a common way to perceive problems. (iii) As a consequence from social science influence and the role of public investigations, political consensus has evolved as a specific feature of Swedish style of policy-making. The approach to policy-making has been rationalistic, technocratic and pragmatic. Thus, the political consensus in Sweden on substantial liberalizations is no more surprising than the political consensus on the development of the welfare state.Sweden; Welfare state; institutional change; globalization; policy-making; policy-style

Supply Equals Success? The Sweden Democrats’ Breakthrough in the 2006 Local Elections

The Swedish party system has been one of the world’s most stable, and anti-immigrant parties have been largely absent from the centre-stage of Swedish politics. It is thus peculiar that an anti-immigrant party, the Sweden Democrats (SD), made a dramatic breakthrough in the 2006 local elections, gaining representation in 144 out of 290 municipalities. The purpose of this article is to explain why the SD gained representation in almost half of the Swedish municipalities. Results indicate support for a supply-oriented argument: whether the SD ran with a formal ballot or not has a substantial and statistically significant effect on their probability of receiving representation even when a series of variables, suggested by previous research, is controlled for. The result has important ramifications, since it implies that no obvious socioeconomic factors, e.g. local ‘fertile grounds’, brought SDs success about. Rather, what decided its fate was whether or not the party had an organizational presence and actual candidates running for seats.Anti-immigrant parties; elections; Sweden

Дослідження шляхів і резервів зниження собівартості продукції приладобудівної галузі

Hur står det egentligen till med den svenska representativa demokratin? Sett över en längre tidsperiod har valdeltagandet sjunkit samtidigt som  politikermisstron har ökat. Partierna dräneras på medlemmar och många lokalorganisationer har problem med att rekrytera folk till förtroendeuppdrag. Dessutom är det vanligt att de som trots allt tar på sig uppdrag väljer att hoppa av i förtid. Nästan var sjätte kommunpolitiker lämnar sitt uppdrag innan mandatperiodens slut. Då avhopp är särskilt vanligt bland unga tas avhopp ofta till intäkt för att något är fel på det politiska systemet. Avhopp beskrivs inte sällan som en konsekvens av maktfullkomlighet, toppstyre, gubbvälde eller till och med mobbning. Men stämmer denna dystra bild av avhoppen? Vårt huvudsakliga syfte med den här rapporten är att beskriva de personer som i förtid lämnar sina politiska förtroendeuppdrag och att ta reda på varför de har valt att göra det. Vi vill även besvara frågor om varför personer väljer att engagera sig i politiska partier, och med avstamp i våra resultat föra en mer allmän diskussion om huruvida förtida avhopp bör betraktas som ett demokratiproblem. Slutligen reflekterar vi över vad partier och kommuner kan göra för att minimera avhopp i framtiden samt rekrytera fler medlemmar. Så, vilka är då rapportens viktigaste resultat? Våra data antyder att det är synnerligen ovanligt med egennytta som drivkraft för engagemang i lokalpolitiken. Det märks inte minst när respondenterna fått svara på hur de hamnade på valsedeln och om hur angelägna de var att bli invalda. Mycket få säger sig själva ha tagit initiativ till att bli placerade på valsedeln, och fyra av tio instämmer inte i påståendet att de gärna ville hamna i fullmäktige. Det märks också när ledamöterna anger skälen till att de trots allt kandiderat. Att främja den egna situationen har, för den stora majoriteten, ingen betydelse alls. Istället dominerar motiv av typen ”bidra till utvecklingen till ett bättre samhälle” samt att man är ”generellt engagerad i politik och samhällsfrågor”. Dessutom uppger de flesta att de, innan de kom in i fullmäktige, inte hade några höga förväntningar om att kunna få ett politiskt inflytande. Vi tolkar dessa data som att många kommunalt folkvalda är något ljumt, eller till och med lite motvilligt, engagerade. Man kan argumentera för att det är negativt för demokratin ifall den stora majoriteten av kommunpolitiker sitter på sina uppdrag med ett ljumt eller motvilligt engagemang

Measuring corruption: whose perceptions should we rely on? Evidence from Iceland

The extent of corruption in Iceland is highly contested. International corruption measures indicate a relatively small amount of corruption while domestic public opinion suggest a serious corruption problem. Thus, uncertainty prevails about the actual extent of corruption and whose perceptions to rely on. This problem is relevant for corruption research in general. Perceptions are increasingly used as proxies for the actual levels of corruption in comparative research. But we still do not know enough about the accuracy of these proxies or the criteria they must meet in order to give dependable results. In fact, radical differences exist concerning evaluations of perceptions between those who believe in unbiased learning and those believing perceptual bias to be widespread. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to attempt to gauge which factors may influence how perceptions of corruption are shaped and why differences in corruption perceptions between different groups may be so pronounced. We present findings from original survey data from three parallel surveys – among the "public", experts, and "municipal practitioners" – conducted in Iceland in 2014. Expectations based on the perceptual bias approach are tested, indicating that perceptions may be affected by (1) information factors, (2) direct experience of corruption and (3) emotive factors. The validity of perception measures should be considered with this in mind. Domestic experts are likely to be well informed and avoid perceptual bias to a greater extent than other groups. Our examination of the Icelandic case suggests that the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) tends to underestimate corruption problems in "mature welfare states", such as Iceland, whilst the general public tends to overestimate it.Peer ReviewedRitrýnt tímari

Kommundelningseffekter: En inventering av 1990-talets nya kommuners lokaldemokratiska erfarenheter

Abstract is not availabl

Varför bildas nya partier? : Om kollektivt handlande och partientreprenörer

Since political parties are collective goods, groups of people that demand new political parties face a collective action problem. Therefore, we can speak of a ?paradox of party-emergence?. Hence, it is puzzling that new parties became increasingly common in representative bodies at the Swedish local level during 1973?2002. This development provides a unique circumstance on which to test hypotheses on how, when and why collective action problems are solved. Adhering to the principle of methodological individualism, and using rational choice as point of departure, I set out to answer two research-questions: (1) Why do people create parties in the first place? (2) Why did party-creation become an increasingly popular political strategy between 1973 and 2002 in Swedish municipalities? I begin this venture by reviewing the existing literature in the field. I criticize and reject unsatisfactory approaches of party-emergence, and conversely retain and develop valuable approaches. Ultimately, three (complementary) approaches are constructed in order to answer the research-questions: The Parametric Model, The Sequential Model and The Dynamic Model. (1) ?The Parametric Model? uses the standard economic methodology of rational choice. Actors are assumed to be motivated by money, power or prestige, and they are also assumed to possess complete information about the relevant parameters. I hypothesize that changes in the potential party-entrepreneurs? relevant environment have boosted the net-benefits of party-creation, thus explaining why party-creation became an increasingly popular strategy during 1973?2002. Empirical evidence, however, does not support this assertion. Worse still, some environmental changes point in the opposite direction, which deepens the paradox of party-emergence. Then, (2) ?The Sequential Model? is constructed in order to move the analysis closer to the individual party-entrepreneurs. By modeling the sequences preceding the entrepreneurs? decision, and using this model to process-trace six cases ? chosen through the ?method of difference? ? of party-emergence, I set out to identify mechanisms that trigger party-emergence. Results indicate that ?strong emotions? such as anger and psychological incentives such as lust for revenge, mobilize actors to overcome costs and engage in high-cost political activities. ?Strong emotions? only provide an answer to the first question, but do not explain the emergence of new parties between 1973 and 2002. Hence, (3) ?The Dynamic Model? is constructed, which sets out to answer why party-creation became an increasingly popular strategy during the period 1973?2002. I analytically construct a hypothesis built on the assumption that a mechanism called ?rational imitation? is responsible for the fact that new parties became common in Swedish municipalities. The core argument is as follows: the fact that an entrepreneur creates a political party at t ? 1 inspires potential entrepreneurs in neighboring municipalities to create parties at later points in time. Although results only reveal weak evidence to support this hypothesis, the correlations cannot be ignored. In fact, since previous attempts to explain the increasing number of new parties in Sweden have been unsuccessful, and since face-to-face contacts no longer are assumed to be significant, these results are judged as the most promising for answering the second research-question

Regional pånyttfödelse : ekonomi, demokrati och identitet i ett Europa under omvandling : en analys av ett forskningsområde

Abstract is not availabl