78 research outputs found
Supply Chain Control: A Theory of Vertical Integration
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integrate with suppliers. This paper expands on that view in building a new theory of vertical integration. In my model firms integrate to gain bargaining power against other suppliers in the production process. The cost of integration is a loss of flexibility in choosing the most suitable suppliers for a particular final product. I show that the firms who make the most specific investments in the production process have the greatest incentive to integrate. The theory provides novel insights to the understanding of numerous stylized facts such as the effect of financial development on the vertical structure of firms, the observed pattern from FDI to outsourcing in international trade, the effect of technological obsolescence on organizations, etc.vertical integration, supply chain, bargaining, outside options
Supply Chain Control: A Theory of Vertical Integration
Improving a company's bargaining position is often cited as a chief motivation to vertically integrate with suppliers. This paper expands on that view in building a new theory of vertical integration. In my model firms integrate to gain bargaining power against other suppliers in the production process. The cost of integration is a loss of flexibility in choosing the most suitable suppliers for a particular final product. I show that the firms who make the most specific investments in the production process have the greatest incentive to integrate. The theory provides novel insights to the understanding of numerous stylized facts such as the effect of financial development on the vertical structure of firms, the observed pattern from FDI to outsourcing in international trade, the effect of technological obsolescence on organizations, etc.vertical integration, supply chain, bargaining, outside options
Effective Retrieval of Resources in Folksonomies Using a New Tag Similarity Measure
Social (or folksonomic) tagging has become a very popular way to describe
content within Web 2.0 websites. However, as tags are informally defined,
continually changing, and ungoverned, it has often been criticised for
lowering, rather than increasing, the efficiency of searching. To address this
issue, a variety of approaches have been proposed that recommend users what
tags to use, both when labeling and when looking for resources. These
techniques work well in dense folksonomies, but they fail to do so when tag
usage exhibits a power law distribution, as it often happens in real-life
folksonomies. To tackle this issue, we propose an approach that induces the
creation of a dense folksonomy, in a fully automatic and transparent way: when
users label resources, an innovative tag similarity metric is deployed, so to
enrich the chosen tag set with related tags already present in the folksonomy.
The proposed metric, which represents the core of our approach, is based on the
mutual reinforcement principle. Our experimental evaluation proves that the
accuracy and coverage of searches guaranteed by our metric are higher than
those achieved by applying classical metrics.Comment: 6 pages, 2 figures, CIKM 2011: 20th ACM Conference on Information and
Knowledge Managemen
Underweighting rare events in experience based decisions: Beyond sample error
Recent research has focused on the \u201cdescription-experience gap\u201d: while rare events are overweighted in description based decisions, people tend to behave as if they underweight rare events in decisions based on experience. Barron and Erev (2003) and Hertwig, Barron, Weber and Elke (2004) argue that such findings are substantive and call for a theory of decision making under risk other than Prospect Theory for decisions from experience. Fox and Hadar (2006) suggest that the discrepancy is due to sampling error: people are likely to sample rare events less often than objective probability implies, especially if their samples are small. A strand of papers has responded examining the necessity of sample error in the underweighting of rare events. The current paper extends the results of such contributions and further strengthens the evidence on underweighting. The first experiment shows that the discrepancy persists even when people sample the entire population of outcomes and make a decision under risk rather than under uncertainty. A reanalysis of Barron and Erev (2003) further reveals that the gap persists even when subjects observe the expected frequency of rare events. The second experiment shows that the gap exists in a repeated decision making paradigm that controls for sample biases and the \u201chot stove\u201d effect. Moreover, while underweighting persists in actual choices, overweighting is observed in judged probabilities. The results of the two experiments strengthen the suggestion that descriptive theories of choice that assume overweighting of small probabilities are not useful in describing decisions from experience. This is true even when there is no sample error, for both decisions under risk and for repeated choices
Deceptive advertising with rational buyers
We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive probability, the buyer (expected) utility can be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium. It is also argued that low quality sellers invest more in deceptive advertising the better is their reputation vis-à -vis potential clients — i.e., firms that are better trusted by customers, have greater incentives to invest in deceptive advertising when they produce a low quality product. Finally, we characterize the optimal monitoring effort exerted by a regulatory agency who seeks to identify and punish deceptive practices. When the objective of this agency is to maximize consumer surplus, its monitoring effort is larger than under social welfare maximization
Deceptive advertising with rational buyers
We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive probability, the buyer (expected) utility can be higher than in a fully separating equilibrium. It is also argued that low quality sellers invest more in deceptive advertising the better is their reputation vis-à -vis potential clients — i.e., firms that are better trusted by customers, have greater incentives to invest in deceptive advertising when they produce a low quality product. Finally, we characterize the optimal monitoring effort exerted by a regulatory agency who seeks to identify and punish deceptive practices. When the objective of this agency is to maximize consumer surplus, its monitoring effort is larger than under social welfare maximization
Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium behavior, making it easier to sustain truth-telling
- …