Extending the Ehresmann-Schein-Nambooripad Theorem

We extend the `join-premorphisms' part of the Ehresmann-Schein-Nambooripad Theorem to the case of two-sided restriction semigroups and inductive categories, following on from a result of Lawson (1991) for the `morphisms' part. However, it is so-called `meet-premorphisms' which have proved useful in recent years in the study of partial actions. We therefore obtain an Ehresmann-Schein-Nambooripad-type theorem for meet-premorphisms in the case of two-sided restriction semigroups and inductive categories. As a corollary, we obtain such a theorem in the inverse case.Comment: 23 pages; final section on Szendrei expansions removed; further reordering of materia

The Hand of Cercopithecoides williamsi (Mammalia, Primates): Earliest Evidence for Thumb Reduction among Colobine Monkeys

Thumb reduction is among the most important features distinguishing the African and Asian colobines from each other and from other Old World monkeys. In this study we demonstrate that the partial skeleton KNM-ER 4420 from Koobi Fora, Kenya, dated to 1.9 Ma and assigned to the Plio-Pleistocene colobine species Cercopithecoides williamsi, shows marked reduction of its first metacarpal relative to the medial metacarpals. Thus, KNM-ER 4420 is the first documented occurrence of cercopithecid pollical reduction in the fossil record. In the size of its first metacarpal relative to the medial metacarpals, C. williamsi is similar to extant African colobines, but different from cercopithecines, extant Asian colobines and the Late Miocene colobines Microcolobus and Mesopithecus. This feature clearly links the genus Cercopithecoides with the extant African colobine clade and makes it the first definitive African colobine in the fossil record. The postcranial adaptations to terrestriality in Cercopithecoides are most likely secondary, while ancestral colobinans (and colobines) were arboreal. Finally, the absence of any evidence for pollical reduction in Mesopithecus implies either independent thumb reduction in African and Asian colobines or multiple colobine dispersal events out of Africa. Based on the available evidence, we consider the first scenario more likely

Case 3847 - Simopithecus oswaldi Andrews, 1916 (currently Theropithecus oswaldi; Mammalia, Primates, Cercopithecidae), proposed conservation by reversal of precedence with Cynocephalus atlanticus Thomas, 1884

The purpose of this application, under Articles 23.9.3 and 81.1 of the Code, is to conserve the usage of the species-group name Simopithecus oswaldi Andrews, 1916 by giving it precedence over its senior subjective synonym Cynocephalus atlanticus Thomas, 1884. Theropithecus is a common to dominant member of the extinct primate community across Africa after 4 million years ago (Jablonski & Frost, 2010) and often co-occurred with extinct humans (Hominini); fossils are also known rarely across Eurasia (Roberts et al., 2014). Most fossil samples are currently included in Theropithecus oswaldi (Andrews, 1916), which is often divided into chrono-geographic subspecies. Cynocephalus atlanticus Thomas, 1884 was not recognized as a member of Theropithecus until 1973, and this nomen has seldom been used, but if it were shown (as seems likely) to be conspecific with Simopithecus oswaldi Andrews, 1916, widespread paleontological usage would be upset. It is thus proposed to give conditional precedence to the later name, which would still permit the use of Theropithecus atlanticus as a distinct species or subspecies of Theropithecus oswaldi. Lectotypes are designated for Simopithecus oswaldi olduvaiensis Leakey & Whitworth, 1958 and Simopithecus oswaldi hopefieldensis Singer, 1962

Personal and sub-personal: a defence of Dennett's early distinction

Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub‐personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used ‘sub‐personal’ very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit‐’ ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory anti‐physicalistic, anti‐dualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of sub‐personal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level. People lose sight of Dennett’s personal/sub-personal distinction because they free it from its philosophical moorings. A distinction that serves a philosophical purpose is typically rooted in doctrine; it cannot be lifted out of context and continue to do its work. So I shall start from Dennett’s distinction as I read it in its original context. And when I speak of ‘the distinction’, I mean to point not only towards the terms that Dennett first used to define it but also towards the philosophical setting within which its work was cut out

An Archaeological Survey of a Pipeline Right-of-way along Loop 1604 from IH-37 to the San Antonio River, Southeast Bexar County, Texas

In February 1997, the Center for Archaeological Research (CAR) of The University of Texas at San Antonio was contracted by the San Antonio Water Systems (SAWS) to conduct an intensive archaeological survey and geomorphological study along a proposed 5 .5-km water main right-of-way, from the junction of ill -3 7 and Loop 1604 to the San Antonio River in southeast Bexar County. Upon completion of a 1 DO-percent pedestrian survey, 10 backhoe trenches, and 152 shovel tests, CAR concluded that no significant cultural remains would be impacted by excavations for the proposed water main, and recommends that no further archaeological work is required prior to construction.