37 research outputs found
Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience
Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or âIâ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such âego dissolutionâ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. Combining recent work on the âintegrative self' and the phenomenon of self-binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist
La lecture de pensée pour débutants
Certains psychologues Ă©volutionnistes (PE) adoptent un nativisme fort Ă propos de la thĂ©orie de lâesprit (TDE). Ils soutiennent que le dĂ©veloppement de la compĂ©tence cognitive spĂ©cialisĂ©e nĂ©cessaire Ă la TDE requiert une spĂ©cification gĂ©nĂ©tique de la trajectoire dĂ©veloppementale dâun systĂšme cognitif spĂ©cialisĂ©. La PE arrive Ă cette conclusion en se basant sur des arguments conceptuels qui concernent lâinadĂ©quation du neuroconstructivisme tabula rasa (neuroconstructivisme fort) et sur les donnĂ©es empiriques fournies par la psychologie du dĂ©veloppement et la neuropsychologie. Je soutiens quâune comprĂ©hension correcte de lâargument conceptuel, appliquĂ© au cas de la TDE, supporte une forme modĂ©rĂ©e de neuroconstructivisme. Celle-ci limite lâĂ©tendue de la prĂ©spĂ©cification gĂ©nĂ©tique aux capacitĂ©s et aux routines comportementales strictement nĂ©cessaires pour forcer le dĂ©veloppement de cette compĂ©tence qui, elle, ne requiert pas de prĂ©spĂ©cification gĂ©nĂ©tique. Ă cet Ă©gard, il nây a pas dâanalogie utile Ă faire avec les arguments qui supportent un nativisme fort quant Ă la compĂ©tence linguistique. Comprendre ce dĂ©bat a des consĂ©quences pour la comprĂ©hension de la modularitĂ©, de lâautisme, des troubles du dĂ©veloppement et du nativisme quant Ă la cognition de haut niveau.Some evolutionary psychologists (EP) are strong nativists about Theory of Mind (TOM). They argue that the development of specialised cognitive competence required for TOM requires genetic specification of the developmental trajectory of a specialised cognitive system. EP arrives at this conclusion via conceptual arguments concerning the inadequacy of blank slate neuroconstructivism (strong neuroconstructivism) and empirical evidence from developmental and neuropsychology. I argue that the correct understanding of the conceptual argument applied to the case of TOM supports a moderate form of neuroconstructivism which does not itself require genetic prespecification. In this respect there is no useful analogy with arguments which support stron nativism about linguistic competence. Understanding this debate has consequences for our understanding of modularity, autism, developmental disorders and nativism about high level cognition
All the self we need
I use evidence from psychiatric disorders involving the experience of depersonalisation to decompose the causal and cognitive structure of experiences reported as self-awareness. I combine insights from predictive coding theory and the appraisal theory of emotion to explain the association between hypoactivity in the Anterior Insular Cortex and depersonalization. This resolves a puzzle for some theories raised by the fact that reduced affective response in depersonalization is associated with normal interoception and activity in Posterior Insular Cortex. It also elegantly accounts for the role of anxiety in depersonalisation via the role of attention in predictive coding theories
Metamisery and bodily inexistence : a reply to Ying-Tung Lin
The difference between the Cotard Depersonalisation and Depersonalisation Disorder may consist, not only in the fact that the Cotard delusion is a response  to prediction error affective/bodily information, but the level in the predictive processing hierarchy at which predictions about bodily information are violated
Feeling the future: prospects for a theory of implicit prospection
Mental time travel refers to the ability of an organism to project herself backward and forward in time, using episodic memory and imagination to simulate past and future experiences. The evolution of mental time travel gives humans a unique capacity for prospection: the ability to pre-experience the future. Discussions of mental time travel treat it as an instance of explicit prospection. We argue that implicit simulations of past and future experience can also be used as a way of gaining information about the future to shape preferences and guide behaviour
When at rest: "Event-freeâ active inference may give rise to implicit self-models of coping potential
Kalisch and colleagues highlight coping potential (CP) as a principle resilience mechanism during event engagement. We complement this discussion by exploring generative implicit CP self-models, arguably emerging during "resting-state,â subsequent and prior to events. Resting-state affords a propitious environment for Bayesian learning, wherein appraisals/reappraisals may update active inferential CP self-models, which then mediate appraisal style organization and resilience factor valuatio
From Computation to the First-Person : Auditory-Verbal Hallucinations and Delusions of Thought Interference in Schizophrenia-Spectrum Psychoses
Schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses are highly complex and heterogeneous disorders that necessitate multiple lines of scientific inquiry and levels of explanation. In recent years, both computational and phenomenological approaches to the understanding of mental illness have received much interest, and significant progress has been made in both fields. However, there has been relatively little progress bridging investigations in these seemingly disparate fields. In this conceptual review and collaborative project from the 4th Meeting of the International Consortium on Hallucination Research, we aim to facilitate the beginning of such dialogue between fields and put forward the argument that computational psychiatry and phenomenology can in fact inform each other, rather than being viewed as isolated or even incompatible approaches. We begin with an overview of phenomenological observations on the interrelationships between auditory-verbal hallucinations (AVH) and delusional thoughts in general, before moving on to review several theoretical frameworks and empirical findings in the computational modeling of AVH. We then relate the computational models to the phenomenological accounts, with a special focus on AVH and delusions that involve the senses of agency and ownership of thought (delusions of thought interference). Finally, we offer some tentative directions for future research, emphasizing the importance of a mutual understanding between separate lines of inquiry