Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries in Social Choice

A large amount of literature in social choice theory deals with quantifying the probability of certain election outcomes. One way of computing the probability of a specific voting situation under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption is via counting integral points in polyhedra. Here, Ehrhart theory can help, but unfortunately the dimension and complexity of the involved polyhedra grows rapidly with the number of candidates. However, if we exploit available polyhedral symmetries, some computations become possible that previously were infeasible. We show this in three well known examples: Condorcet's paradox, Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting and in Plurality voting vs Plurality Runoff.Comment: 14 pages; with minor improvements; to be published in Social Choice and Welfar

The effects of closeness on the election of a pairwise majority rule winner

Some studies have recently examined the effect of closeness on the probability of observing the monotonicity paradox in three-candidate elections under Scoring Elimination Rules. It has been shown that the frequency of such paradox significantly increases as elections become more closely contested. In this paper we consider the effect of closeness on one of the most studied notions in Social Choice Theory: The election of the Condorcet winner, i.e., the candidate who defeats any other opponent in pairwise majority comparisons, when she exists. To be more concrete, we use the well known concept of the Condorcet efficiency, that is, the conditional probability that a voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given that such a candidate exists. Our results, based on the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption, show that closeness has also a significant effect on the Condorcet efficiency of different voting rules in the class of Scoring and Scoring Elimination Rules

Leptogenesis in an SU(5)×A5 golden ratio flavour model

In this paper we discuss a minor modification of a previous SU(5)×A5 flavour model which exhibits at leading order golden ratio mixing and sum rules for the heavy and the light neutrino masses. Although this model could predict all mixing angles well it fails in generating a sufficient large baryon asymmetry via the leptogenesis mechanism. We repair this deficit here, discuss model building aspects and give analytical estimates for the generated baryon asymmetry before we perform a numerical parameter scan. Our setup has only a few parameters in the lepton sector. This leads to specific constraints and correlations between the neutrino observables. For instance, we find that in the model considered only the neutrino mass spectrum with normal mass ordering and values of the lightest neutrino mass in the interval 10–18 meV are compatible with the current data on the neutrino oscillation parameters. With the introduction of only one NLO operator, the model can accommodate successfully simultaneously even at 1 σ level the current data on neutrino masses, on neutrino mixing and the observed value of the baryon asymmetry

An SU(5)×A5 golden ratio flavour model

In this paper we study an SU(5)×A5 flavour model which exhibits a neutrino mass sum rule and golden ratio mixing in the neutrino sector which is corrected from the charged lepton Yukawa couplings. We give the full renormalisable superpotential for the model which breaks SU(5) and A5 after integrating out heavy messenger fields and minimising the scalar potential. The mass sum rule allows for both mass orderings but we will show that inverted ordering is not valid in this setup. For normal ordering we find the lightest neutrino to have a mass of about 10-50 meV, and all leptonic mixing angles in agreement with experiment

Renormalisation group corrections to neutrino mixing sum rules

Neutrino mixing sum rules are common to a large class of models based on the (discrete) symmetry approach to lepton flavour. In this approach the neutrino mixing matrix $U$ is assumed to have an underlying approximate symmetry form \tildeU_\nu, which is dictated by, or associated with, the employed (discrete) symmetry. In such a setup the cosine of the Dirac CP-violating phase $\delta$ can be related to the three neutrino mixing angles in terms of a sum rule which depends on the symmetry form of \tildeU_\nu. We consider five extensively discussed possible symmetry forms of \tildeU_\nu: i) bimaximal (BM) and ii) tri-bimaximal (TBM) forms, the forms corresponding to iii) golden ratio type A (GRA) mixing, iv) golden ratio type B (GRB) mixing, and v) hexagonal (HG) mixing. For each of these forms we investigate the renormalisation group corrections to the sum rule predictions for $\delta$ in the cases of neutrino Majorana mass term generated by the Weinberg (dimension 5) operator added to i) the Standard Model, and ii) the minimal SUSY extension of the Standard Model

Exact Scale Invariance in Mixing of Binary Candidates in Voting Model

We introduce a voting model and discuss the scale invariance in the mixing of candidates. The Candidates are classified into two categories $\mu\in \{0,1\}$ and are called as `binary' candidates. There are in total $N=N_{0}+N_{1}$ candidates, and voters vote for them one by one. The probability that a candidate gets a vote is proportional to the number of votes. The initial number of votes (`seed') of a candidate $\mu$ is set to be $s_{\mu}$. After infinite counts of voting, the probability function of the share of votes of the candidate $\mu$ obeys gamma distributions with the shape exponent $s_{\mu}$ in the thermodynamic limit $Z_{0}=N_{1}s_{1}+N_{0}s_{0}\to \infty$. Between the cumulative functions $\{x_{\mu}\}$ of binary candidates, the power-law relation $1-x_{1} \sim (1-x_{0})^{\alpha}$ with the critical exponent $\alpha=s_{1}/s_{0}$ holds in the region $1-x_{0},1-x_{1}<<1$. In the double scaling limit $(s_{1},s_{0})\to (0,0)$ and $Z_{0} \to \infty$ with $s_{1}/s_{0}=\alpha$ fixed, the relation $1-x_{1}=(1-x_{0})^{\alpha}$ holds exactly over the entire range $0\le x_{0},x_{1} \le 1$. We study the data on horse races obtained from the Japan Racing Association for the period 1986 to 2006 and confirm scale invariance.Comment: 19 pages, 8 figures, 2 table

Statistical mechanics of voting

Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system from the agents' preferences and a voting rule. The dynamics form a one dimensional statistical mechanics model; this suggests the use of the topological entropy to quantify the complexity of the system. We formulate natural political/social questions about the expected complexity of a voting rule and degree of cohesion/diversity among agents in terms of random matrix models---ensembles of statistical mechanics models---and compute quantitative answers in some representative cases.Comment: 9 pages, plain TeX, 2 PostScript figures included with epsf.tex (ignore the under/overfull \vbox error messages