189 research outputs found
Gricean Rational Reconstructions And The Semantics/pragmatics Distinction
This paper discusses the proper taxonomy of the semantics-pragmatics divide.
Debates about taxonomy are not always pointless. In interesting cases taxonomic
proposals involve theoretical assumptions about the studied field, which might be judged
correct or incorrect. Here I want to contrast an approach to the semantics-pragmatics dichotomy,
motivated by a broadly Gricean perspective I take to be correct, with a contemporary
version of an opposing âWittgensteinianâ view. I will focus mostly on a well-known example:
the treatment of referential uses of descriptions and descriptive uses of indexicals.
The paper is structured as follows. I will start by characterizing in the first section the version
of the Gricean approach I favor; in the second section, I will illustrate the differences
between the two views by focussing on the example, and in the third section I will object
to what I take to be the main Wittgensteinian consideration
Contexts as Shared Commitments
Contemporary semantics assumes two influential notions of context: one coming from Kaplan (1989), on which contexts are sets of predetermined parameters, and another originating in Stalnaker (1978), on which contexts are sets of propositions that are "common ground." The latter is deservedly more popular, given its flexibility in accounting for context-dependent aspects of language beyond manifest indexicals, such as epistemic modals, predicates of taste, and so on and so forth; in fact, properly dealing with demonstratives (perhaps ultimately all indexicals) requires that further flexibility. Even if we acknowledge Lewis (1980)'s point that, in a sense, Kaplanian contexts already include common ground contexts, it is better to be clear and explicit about what contexts constitutively are. Now, Stalnaker (1978, 2002, 2014) defines context-as-common-ground as a set of propositions, but recent work shows that this is not an accurate conception. The paper explains why, and provides an alternative. The main reason is that several phenomena (presuppositional treatments of pejoratives and predicates of taste, forces other than assertion) require that the common ground includes non-doxastic attitudes such as appraisals, emotions, etc. Hence the common ground should not be taken to include merely contents (propositions), but those together with attitudes concerning them: shared commitments, as I will defend
Magidor, Ofra, Category Mistakes, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013
The toolkit of most philosophers features the notion of category mistakes. We can recognize clear cases (the three in "green ideas sleep furiously") with quasi-perceptual alacrity. But I, for one, usually feel a tinge of self-conscious awkwardness when I deploy it. This has to do, I think, with the fact that we do not professionally acquire the notion together with a minimally adequate account - of the kind that usually comes, for instance, with introductions to the use/mention distinction: a philosophical explication that helps to make the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. If you are like me, this excellent short, clearly focused monograph will help you fill this gap in a few hours of engaging reading
Sneaky Assertions
Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and others. This paper confronts and rejects three considerations that have been made: arguments based on the distinction between lying and misleading; arguments based on the ordinary concept of assertion; and arguments based on the testimonial knowledge that assertions provide
The Real Distinction between Descriptions and Indexicals
Some contemporary semantic views defend an asymmetry thesis concerning definite descriptions and indexicals. Semantically, indexicals are devices of singular reference; they contribute objects to the contents of the speech acts made with utterances including them. Definite descriptions, on the other hand, are generalized quantifiers, behaving roughly the way Russell envisaged in âOn Denotingâ. The asymmetry thesis depends on the existence of a sufficiently clear-cut distinction between semantics and pragmatics, because indexicals and descriptions are often used in ways that apparently contradict the asymmetry thesis; the semantics/pragmatics distinction is invoked to see behind the appearances. The paper critically examines arguments by Schiffer against the asymmetry thesis, based on referential uses of incomplete descriptions
Lying versus misleading, with language and pictures: The adverbial account
We intuitively make a distinction between lying and misleading. On the explanation of this phenomenon favored hereâthe adverbial accountâthe distinction tracks whether the content and its truth-committing force are literally conveyed. On an alternative commitment account, the difference between lying and misleading is predicated instead on the strength of assertoric commitment. One lies when one presents with full assertoric commitment what one believes to be false; one merely misleads when one presents it without full assertoric commitment, by merely hinting or otherwise implying it. Now, as predicted by the well-supported assumption that we can also assert with pictures, the lying/misleading distinction appears to intuitively show up there too. Here Iâll explain how the debate confronting the two accounts plays out both in general and in that case, aiming to provide support for the adverbial account
Assertions in Fictions. An Indirect Speech Act Account
The author of this paper contrasts the account he favor for how fictions can convey knowledge with Green's views on the topic. On the author's account, fictions can convey knowledge because fictional works make assertions and other acts such as conjectures, suppositions, or acts of putting forward contents for our consideration; and the mechanism through which they do it is that of speech act indirection, of which conversational implicatures are a particular case. There are two potential points of disagreement with Green in this proposal. First, it requires that assertions can be made indirectly. Second, it requires that verbal fiction-making doesn't consist merely in 'acts of speech', but in sui generis speech acts
Conventions and Constitutive Norms
The paper addresses a popular argument that accounts of assertion in terms of constitutive norms are incompatible with conventionalism about assertion. The argument appeals to an alleged modal asymmetry: constitutive rules are essential to the acts they characterize, and therefore the obligations they impose necessarily apply to every instance; conventions are arbitrary, and thus can only contingently regulate the practices they establish. The paper argues that this line of reasoning fails to establish any modal asymmetry, by invoking the distinction between the non-discriminating existence across possible worlds of types ('blueprints', as Rawls called them) of practices and institutions defined by constitutive rules, and the discriminating existence of those among them that are actually in force, and hence truly normative. The necessity of practices defined by constitutive rules that the argument relies on concerns the former, while conventionalist claims are only about the latter. The paper should thus contribute to get a better understanding of what social constructs conceived as defined by constitutive norms are. It concludes by suggesting considerations that are relevant to deciding whether assertion is in fact conventional
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification âsubstantiveâ is meant to contrast with âminimalâ or âdeflationaryâ â roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanksâ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanatiâs (2019) recent elaboration of Hanksâ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, Iâll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense
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