Intergenerational Value Change and Transitions to Democracy: Toward the Consolidation of a Third Wave Generation?

The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events which transformed industrialized societies, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al., 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor did it help consolidate a “3W Generation”, since post-honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations after regime change. To test these claims, I identify intergenerational differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger and established democracies among the same age groups. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 ?the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change? and 2005-2007 ?the last wave that was available?. Finally, I test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses.The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events which transformed industrialized societies, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al., 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor did it help consolidate a “3W Generation”, since post-honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations after regime change. To test these claims, I identify intergenerational differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger and established democracies among the same age groups. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 ?the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change? and 2005-2007 ?the last wave that was available?. Finally, I test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses

Intergenerational Value Change and Transitions to Democracy: Toward the Consolidation of a Third Wave Generation?

The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events which transformed industrialized societies, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al., 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor did it help consolidate a “3W Generation”, since post-honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations after regime change. To test these claims, I identify intergenerational differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger and established democracies among the same age groups. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 ?the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change? and 2005-2007 ?the last wave that was available?. Finally, I test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses.The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events which transformed industrialized societies, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al., 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor did it help consolidate a “3W Generation”, since post-honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations after regime change. To test these claims, I identify intergenerational differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger and established democracies among the same age groups. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 ?the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change? and 2005-2007 ?the last wave that was available?. Finally, I test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses

Transitions to democracy: The post -honeymoon decline of participation.

More than two decades ago, the authors of Political Action (Barnes et al., 1979) predicted that what was then called 'unconventional political participation' would become more widespread throughout advanced industrial societies, because it was part of a deep-rooted intergenerational change. Time series data from the 1974 Political Action survey, together with data from four waves of the World Values Surveys demonstrates that this change has indeed taken place---to such an extent that petitions, boycotts, and other forms of direct action are no longer unconventional but have become more or less normal actions for a large part of the citizenry of post-industrial societies. This type of elite-challenging actions also played an important part in the Third Wave of democratization---but after the transition to democracy, most of the new democracies subsequently experienced a post-honeymoon phase of disillusionment with democracy, in which direct political action declined. This dissertation analyzes data from more than 30 nations during the period 1981--2001, interpreting the long-term dynamics of elite-challenging political participation in both established democracies and new democracies.Ph.D.Political scienceSocial SciencesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/123359/2/3079421.pd

Aportes para el desarrollo humano en Argentina / 2011: Afrodescendientes y africanos en Argentina; 5

1a ed. Series: Aportes para el desarrollo humano en Argentina; 5 Contents: Los afroargentinos: formas de comunalización, creación de identidades colectivas y resistencia cultural y política /Alejandro Frigerio y Eva Lamborghini -- La migración subsahariana hacia Argentina: desde los caboverdianos hasta los nuevos migrantes del siglo XXI / Marta Maffia

¿Qué miden las encuestas sobre corrupción en América Latina? Evidencias de Argentina, México y Uruguay

Reliable survey data may be an effective tool to assist anti-corruption policies. But, how reliable are survey efforts to measure attitudes towards corruption and corrupt behavior? In this paper we demonstrate that responses to survey questions on corruption are infl uenced by the levels of awareness and conceptualization of corruption (what individuals and societies believe corruption is and is not), and by the differentiated social desirability bias created by such beliefs. An attachment to the law index based on survey data shows that societies like Argentina and Mexico, where corruption tends to be high, respondents express higher levels of attachment to the law and are more favorable to punishment of acts of transgression, whereas in Uruguay, where corruption is low, respondents are more tolerant of such acts and less likely to consider them as forms of corruption. This paradox is explained by the different concepts of corruption that these societies have and the consequent corresponding effect of social desirability bias. The paper relies on original survey data designed and conducted by the authors.Los datos de encuestas pueden ser una herramienta efi caz para ayudar a las políticas en la lucha contra la corrupción. Pero, ¿qué tan confi ables son las encuestas para medir actitudes hacia la corrupción y comportamiento corrupto? En este trabajo se demuestra que las respuestas a preguntas sobre la corrupción son infl uidas por la conceptualización de la corrupción (lo que los individuos y las sociedades creen que es la corrupción y lo que no es), y consecuentemente, por el sesgo de deseabilidad social relacionado a esas creencias. El Índice de Apego a la Ley, especialmente construido para este estudio, muestra que en sociedades como la argentina y mexicana, donde la corrupción tiende a ser alta, los encuestados expresan mayores niveles de apego a la ley y son más favorables al castigo de los actos de transgresión. Por el contrario, en Uruguay, donde la corrupción es baja, los encuestados son más tolerantes con dichos actos y menos propensos a considerarlos como formas de corrupción. Esta paradoja se explica por los diferentes conceptos de corrupción que tienen estas sociedades y el efecto consecuente en el sesgo de deseabilidad social. Esta investigación se basa en datos de encuestas originales diseñadas y dirigidas por los autores