Merleau-Ponty and the Measuring Body

In recent years a growing number of scholars in science studies and related fields are developing new ontologies to displace entrenched dualisms. These efforts often go together with a renewed interest in the roles played by symbolisms and tools in knowledge and being. This article brings Maurice Merleau-Ponty into these conversations, positioning him as a precursor of today’s innovative recastings of technoscience. While Merleau-Ponty is often invoked in relation to his early work on the body and embodiment, this article focuses on his later work, where the investigation of perception is integrated with an ontological exploration. The resulting approach revolves around the highly original idea of the body as a standard of measurement. We further develop this idea by coining the term ‘the measuring body’, which to a greater extent than did Merleau-Ponty accentuates the relative autonomy of symbolisms and tools and their capacity to decentre the perceiving body

Differential Effects of Attention-, Compassion-, and Socio-Cognitively Based Mental Practices on Self-Reports of Mindfulness and Compassion

Research on the effects of mindfulness- and compassion-based interventions is flourishing along with self-report scales to assess facets of these broad concepts. However, debates remain as to which mental practices are most appropriate to develop the attentional, cognitive, and socio-affective facets of mindfulness and compassion. One crucial question is whether present-moment, attention-focused mindfulness practices are sufficient to induce a cascade of changes across the different proposed facets of mindfulness, including nonjudgmental acceptance, as well as compassion or whether explicit socio-affective training is required. Here, we address these questions in the context of a 9-month longitudinal study (the ReSource Project) by examining the differential effects of three different 3-month mental training modules on subscales of mindfulness and compassion questionnaires. The “Presence” module, which aimed at cultivating present-moment-focused attention and body awareness, led to increases in the observing, nonreacting, and presence subscales, but not to increases in acceptance or nonjudging. These latter facets benefitted from specific cultivation through the socio-cognitive “Perspective” module and socio-affective, compassion-based “Affect” module, respectively. These modules also led to further increases in scores on the subscales affected by the Presence module. Moreover, scores on the compassion scales were uniquely influenced by the Affect module. Thus, whereas a present-moment attention-focused training, as implemented in many mindfulness-based programs, was indeed able to increase attentional facets of mindfulness, only socio-cognitive and compassion-based practices led to broad changes in ethical-motivational qualities like a nonjudgmental attitude, compassion, and self-compassion

The Influence of Number and Timing of Pregnancies on Breast Cancer Risk for Women With BRCA1 or BRCA2 Mutations

International audienceBACKGROUND:Full-term pregnancy (FTP) is associated with a reduced breast cancer (BC) risk over time, but women are at increased BC risk in the immediate years following an FTP. No large prospective studies, however, have examined whether the number and timing of pregnancies are associated with BC risk for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutation carriers.METHODS:Using weighted and time-varying Cox proportional hazards models, we investigated whether reproductive events are associated with BC risk for mutation carriers using a retrospective cohort (5707 BRCA1 and 3525 BRCA2 mutation carriers) and a prospective cohort (2276 BRCA1 and 1610 BRCA2 mutation carriers), separately for each cohort and the combined prospective and retrospective cohort.RESULTS:For BRCA1 mutation carriers, there was no overall association with parity compared with nulliparity (combined hazard ratio [HRc] = 0.99, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.83 to 1.18). Relative to being uniparous, an increased number of FTPs was associated with decreased BC risk (HRc = 0.79, 95% CI = 0.69 to 0.91; HRc = 0.70, 95% CI = 0.59 to 0.82; HRc = 0.50, 95% CI = 0.40 to 0.63, for 2, 3, and ≥4 FTPs, respectively, P trend < .0001) and increasing duration of breastfeeding was associated with decreased BC risk (combined cohort P trend = .0003). Relative to being nulliparous, uniparous BRCA1 mutation carriers were at increased BC risk in the prospective analysis (prospective hazard ration [HRp] = 1.69, 95% CI = 1.09 to 2.62). For BRCA2 mutation carriers, being parous was associated with a 30% increase in BC risk (HRc = 1.33, 95% CI = 1.05 to 1.69), and there was no apparent decrease in risk associated with multiparity except for having at least 4 FTPs vs. 1 FTP (HRc = 0.72, 95% CI = 0.54 to 0.98).CONCLUSIONS:These findings suggest differential associations with parity between BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutation carriers with higher risk for uniparous BRCA1 carriers and parous BRCA2 carriers

The Influence of Number and Timing of Pregnancies on Breast Cancer Risk for Women With BRCA1 or BRCA2 Mutations

Background: Full-term pregnancy (FTP) is associated with a reduced breast cancer (BC) risk over time, but women are at increased BC risk in the immediate years following an FTP. No large prospective studies, however, have examined whether the number and timing of pregnancies are associated with BC risk for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutation carriers. Methods: Using weighted and time-varying Cox proportional hazards models, we investigated whether reproductive events are associated with BC risk for mutation carriers using a retrospective cohort (5707 BRCA1 and 3525 BRCA2 mutation carriers) and a prospective cohort (2276 BRCA1 and 1610 BRCA2 mutation carriers), separately for each cohort and the combined prospective and retrospective cohort. Results: For BRCA1 mutation carriers, there was no overall association with parity compared with nulliparity (combined hazard ratio [HRc] ¼ 0.99, 95% confidence interval [CI] ¼ 0.83 to 1.18). Relative to being uniparous, an increased number of FTPs was associated with decreased BC risk (HRc¼ 0.79, 95% CI ¼ 0.69 to 0.91; HRc¼ 0.70, 95% CI ¼ 0.59 to 0.82; HRc¼ 0.50, 95% CI ¼ 0.40 to 0.63, for 2, 3, and 4 FTPs, respectively, Ptrend < .0001) and increasing duration of breastfeeding was associated with decreased BC risk (combined cohort Ptrend ¼ .0003). Relative to being nulliparous, uniparous BRCA1 mutation carriers were at increased BC risk in the prospective analysis (prospective hazard ration [HRp] ¼ 1.69, 95% CI ¼ 1.09 to 2.62). For BRCA2 mutation carriers, being parous was associated with a 30% increase in BC risk (HRc ¼ 1.33, 95% CI ¼ 1.05 to 1.69), and there was no apparent decrease in risk associated with multiparity except for having at least 4 FTPs vs. 1 FTP (HRc¼ 0.72, 95% CI ¼ 0.54 to 0.98). Conclusions: These findings suggest differential associations with parity between BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutation carriers with higher risk for uniparous BRCA1 carriers and parous BRCA2 carriers

Tacit knowledge, rule following and Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy of social science

Copyright © 2005 SAGE PublicationsPierre Bourdieu has developed a philosophy of social science, grounded in the phenomenological tradition, which treats knowledge as a practical ability embodied in skilful behaviour, rather than an intellectual capacity for the representation and manipulation of propositional knowledge. He invokes Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following as one way of explicating the idea that knowledge is a skill. Bourdieu’s conception of tacit knowledge is a dispositional one, adopted to avoid a perceived dilemma for methodological individualism. That dilemma requires either the explanation of regularities in social behaviour as the result of the tacit representation of procedural rules (‘legalism’) or the self-conscious representation of behavioural goals (‘voluntarism’) by individuals. After explaining the apparent dilemma, I then argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule following actually undermine, rather than support, a dispositional solution. Nonetheless, the philosophy of social science can survive without a dispositional account of knowledge. Such a social science needs, firstly, to embrace one horn of the dilemma, voluntarism, provided that the relevant regularities can be explained as unintended consequences of agents’ self-represented intentions. Secondly, such a social science should treat theorists’ interpretations as unifying generalizations, not hypotheses about the acquisition of tacit knowledge. Finally, where appeal to cognitive psychology can distinguish otherwise equivalent theories in social science, social science should incorporate the data of cognitive psychology concerning tacit mental processes.Philip Gerran