Ambiguity attitudes, framing, and consistency

We use probability-matching variations on Ellsberg’s single-urn experiment to assess three questions: (1) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to changes from a gain to a loss frame? (2) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to making ambiguity easier to recognize? (3) What is the relation between subjects’ consistency of choice and the ambiguity attitudes their choices display? Contrary to most other studies, we find that a switch from a gain to a loss frame does not lead to a switch from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity neutrality and/or ambiguity seeking. We also find that making ambiguity easier to recognize has little effect. Finally, we find that while ambiguity aversion does not depend on consistency, other attitudes do: consistent choosers are much more likely to be ambiguity neutral, while ambiguity seeking is much more frequent among highly inconsistent choosers

Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

We consider a game in which "meta-players" choose finite automata to play a repeated stage game. Meta-players' utilities are lexicographic, first increasing in the (limit-of-the-means) payoffs of the repeated game and second decreasing in the number of states in their automaton. We examine the outcomes in this game which satisfy a version of evolutionary stability that has been modified to permit existence. We find that such automata must be efficient, in that they must maximize the sum of the (limit-of-the-means) payoffs from the repeated game.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/29923/1/0000280.pd

Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games

Cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies represents a most intriguing puzzle to scientists in various disciplines. Here we present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to rock--scissors--paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies cooperate, defect and loner i.e. those unwilling to participate in the public enterprise. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice this results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatio-temporal patterns. In particular, variations of the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two- and three-strategy states which are either in the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior and enables cooperators to persist at substantial levels.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figure

Spatial patterns and scale freedom in a Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata with Pavlovian strategies

A cellular automaton in which cells represent agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game following the simple "win-stay, loose-shift" strategy is studied. Individuals with binary behavior, such as they can either cooperate (C) or defect (D), play repeatedly with their neighbors (Von Neumann's and Moore's neighborhoods). Their utilities in each round of the game are given by a rescaled payoff matrix described by a single parameter Tau, which measures the ratio of 'temptation to defect' to 'reward for cooperation'. Depending on the region of the parameter space Tau, the system self-organizes - after a transient - into dynamical equilibrium states characterized by different definite fractions of C agents (2 states for the Von Neumann neighborhood and 4 for Moore neighborhood). For some ranges of Tau the cluster size distributions, the power spectrums P(f) and the perimeter-area curves follow power-law scalings. Percolation below threshold is also found for D agent clusters. We also analyze the asynchronous dynamics version of this model and compare results.Comment: Accepted for publication in JSTA

The resurrection of group selection as a theory of human cooperation

Two books edited by members of the MacArthur Norms and Preferences Network (an interdisciplinary group, mainly anthropologists and economists) are reviewed here. These books in large part reflect a renewed interest in group selection that has occurred among these researchers: they promote the theory that human cooperative behavior evolved via selective processes which favored biological and/or cultural group-level adaptations as opposed to individual-level adaptations. In support of this theory, an impressive collection of cross-cultural data are presented which suggest that participants in experimental economic games often do not behave as self-interested income maximizers; this lack of self-interest is regarded as evidence of group selection. In this review, problems with these data and with the theory are discussed. On the data side, it is argued that even if a behavior seems individually-maladaptive in a game context, there is no reason to believe that it would have been that way in ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games do not at all resemble those in which ancestral humans would have interacted cooperatively. And on the theory side, it is argued that it is premature to invoke group selection in order to explain human cooperation, because more parsimonious individual-level theories have not yet been exhausted. In summary, these books represent ambitious interdisciplinary contributions on an important topic, and they include unique and useful data; however, they do not make a convincing case that the evolution of human cooperation required group selection

Global Development and Climate Change: A Game Theory Approach

The increasing concern with climate change is one of the main issues of our time, and thus we aim to theoretically and mathematically analyse its causes. However our approach follows a different stream of thought, presenting the reasoning and decision-making processes between technical and moral solutions. We have resorted to game theory models in order to demonstrate cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, ranging from the traditional to the evolutionary within game theory. In doing so we are able to glimpse the development of modern society and a paradigm shift regarding human control over nature and to what extent it is harmful to the sustainability of our environment and the survival of future generations. Merging different fields of knowledge, we present a theoretical-philosophical approach, combined with empirical-mathematical solutions taking into account the agent-based behaviour guided blindly by instrumental rationality

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau:an experiment on voting and redistribution

We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothingWe thank Iris Bohnet, Tim Cason, David Cooper, John Duffy, Maia Guell, John Van Huyck and Robin Mason for helpful conversations and encouragement. The comments of the Editor and two referees helped improve the paper. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Spain’s Ministry of Science and Innovation under grants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2006-0016 (all authors), ECO2009-10531 (Cabrales), ECO2008-01768 (Nagel) and the Comunidad de Madrid under grant Excelecon (Cabrales), the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CREA program (Nagel), and project SEJ2007-64340 of Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Rodríguez Mora).Publicad

Hilbert Spaces from Path Integrals

It is shown that a Hilbert space can be constructed for a quantum system starting from a framework in which histories are fundamental. The Decoherence Functional provides the inner product on this "History Hilbert space". It is also shown that the History Hilbert space is the standard Hilbert space in the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics.Comment: 22 pages. Minor updates to match published versio