Evaluation of the performance of the IQ-Check kits and the USDA Microbiology Laboratory Guidebook methods for detection of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) and STEC and Salmonella simultaneously in ground beef

To evaluate the performance of the IQ-Check kits and the USDA Microbiology Laboratory Guidebook (MLG) methods for detection of the top seven Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) (O157:H7, O26, O45, O103, O111, O121 and O145) in ground beef and both STEC and Salmonella in co-inoculated samples

APPLICAZIONE DEI PREREQUISITI NEI PIANI DI AUTOCONTROLLO AZIENDALI TRA NORMATIVA COGENTE E VOLONTARIA - PREREQUISITE PROGRAMMES IN OWN CHECKS IN STATUTORY AND VOLUNTARY LEGISLATION

Prerequisite Programmes approach is a requirement for implementing a correct own check plan. This new approach, born according to the European Legislation, is completely recognized by third Nation Authorities and private Inspection and Accreditation Bodies. This method is the basis to verify if an own check system is under control and to verify if corrective actions are built up to warrant hygienic production standards. The present work demonstrate that a correct own check plan is built up only by a Pre Requisites Program approach. The new UNI EN ISO 22000:2005 standard describe this concept specifying the difference between PRP and CCP

Dynamic strategic interaction between an innovating and a non-innovating incumbent

Dawid H, Kopel M, Kort PM. Dynamic strategic interaction between an innovating and a non-innovating incumbent. Central European Journal of Operations Research. 2010;18(4):453-463.This paper analyzes the effects of product innovation on the firms' investment behavior in a dynamic duopoly framework. A differential game setting is considered where initially two firms are active on a homogeneous product market. One of the firms has an option to introduce a new product that is horizontally and vertically differentiated from the established product. The resulting differential game has three states corresponding to three capital stocks: one for each firm to produce the established product, and one for the innovating firm to produce the new product. We numerically derive Markov perfect equilibria. One of the most remarkable results is that in most cases the non-innovating firm benefits when the other firm carries out the innovation option. The intuition is that, to increase demand for the innovative product, the innovative firm reduces capacity on the established market, which increases the price of the established product and thus the payoff of the non-innovating firm