Modularity and the impact of buyer-supplier relationships on the survival of suppliers

Modularity in product design and flexible supply chains is increasingly common in buyer-supplier relationships. Although the benefits of supply chain flexibility and component modularity for end-product manufacturers are accepted, little is known about their impact on suppliers. We advance the literature on modularity by exploring how three aspects of a supplier's relationships with its customers affect the supplier's survival: duration of buyer-supplier relationships, autonomy from customers, and links to prominent buyers. We compared the effects of these aspects of buyer-supplier relationships for low- and high-modularity components. Using data on U.S. carburetor and clutch manufacturers from 1918 to 1942, we found that suppliers of high-modularity components benefited more from autonomy provided by potential customers, whereas suppliers of low-modularity components benefited more from ties to higher status customers. Both benefited from autonomy generated by existing customers. Thus, relationships that require trust and extensive sets of interfirm routines, as do those for low-modularity components, led to both greater relationship benefits and greater constraints

What lies between market and hierarchy? Insights from internalization theory and global value chain theory

In this paper, we suggest that internalization theory might be extended by incorporating complementary insights from GVC theory. More specifically, we argue that internalization theory can explain why lead firms might wish to externalize selected activities, but that it is largely silent on the mechanisms by which those lead firms might exercise control over the resultant externalized relationships with their GVC partners. We advance an explanation linking the choice of control mechanism to two factors: power asymmetries between the lead firms and their GVC partners, and the degree of codifiability of the information to be exchanged in the relationship

Heterogeneity and Strategic Choices: The Case of Stock Repurchases

Strategic decisions are fundamentally tough choices. Theory suggests that managers are likely to display bounded rationality. Empirics on the other hand assume rationality in choice behavior. Recognizing this inherent disconnect between theory and empirics, we try to account for behavioral biases using a theoretically consistent choice model. The traditional approach to modeling strategic choice has been to use discrete choice models and make inference on the conditional mean effects. We argue that the conditional mean effect does not capture behavioral biases. The focus should be on the conditional variance. Explicitly modeling the conditional variance (in the discrete choice framework) provides us with valuable information on individual level variation in decision-making. We demonstrate the effect of ignoring the role of variance in choice modeling in the context of firm’s decisions to conduct open market repurchases. We show that when taking into account the heterogeneity in choices, manager’s choices of conducting open market repurchases displays considerable heterogeneity and that not accounting for such heterogeneity might lead to wrong conclusions on the mean effects

Family involvement and firms’ establishment mode choice in foreign markets

Extant literature on foreign entry increasingly recognizes firms’ heterogeneity as a potential reason for inconsistency in results on the establishment mode choice, i.e. whether and under which conditions firms should choose to enter a new country through a greenfield investment or an acquisition. Our study contributes to this debate by identifying family ownership and family involvement in management as potential powerful sources of such heterogeneity. Integrating international business studies with both corporate finance literature on family firms and recent contributions from the Socio Emotional Wealth perspective on family ownership, we claim that, due to greater risk aversion and lower access to information, the family involvement either in the firm ownership and management leads to a higher propensity towards greenfield initiatives (vs. acquisitions). However, we also find that such a propensity decreases with international experience especially in family-owned firms given the greater ability of professionalized management to overcome family-related concerns on making acquisitions. Our analysis on 1,045 foreign initiatives undertaken by 311 Italian family and non-family firms between 2003 and 2013 confirms our expectations – indicating family ownership as a significant driver of international business choices

Exchange hazards, relational reliability, and contracts in China: The contingent role of legal enforceability

Building on institutional and transaction cost economics, this article proposes that legal enforceability increases the use of contract over relational reliability (e.g., beliefs that the other party acts in a non-opportunistic manner) to safeguard market exchanges characterized by non-trivial hazards. The results of 399 buyer-supplier exchanges in China show that: (1) when managers perceive that the legal system can protect their firm's interests, they tend to use explicit contracts rather than relational reliability to safeguard transactions involving risks (i.e., asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty); and (2) when managers do not perceive the legal system as credible, they are less likely to use contracts, and instead rely on relational reliability to safeguard transactions associated with specialized assets and environmental uncertainty, but not those involving behavioral uncertainty. We further find that legal enforceability does not moderate the effect of relational reliability on contracts, but does weaken the effect of contracts on relational reliability. These results endorse the importance of prior experience (e.g., relational reliability) in supporting the use of explicit contracts, and alternatively suggest that, under conditions of greater legal enforceability, the contract signals less regarding one's intention to be trustworthy but more about the efficacy of sanctions. © 2010 Academy of International Business All rights reserved.postprin

Risk propensity in the foreign direct investment location decision of emerging multinationals

A distinguishing feature of emerging economy multinationals is their apparent tolerance for host country institutional risk. Employing behavioral decision theory and quasi-experimental data, we find that managers’ domestic experience satisfaction increases their relative risk propensity regarding controllable risk (legally protectable loss), but decreases their tendency to accept non-controllable risk (e.g., political instability). In contrast, firms’ potential slack reduces relative risk propensity regarding controllable risk, yet amplifies the tendency to take non-controllable risk. We suggest that these counterbalancing effects might help explain observation that risk-taking in FDI location decisions is influenced by firm experience and context. The study provides a new understanding of why firms exhibit heterogeneous responses to host country risks, and the varying effects of institutions