623 research outputs found
Competitive Environments and Protective Behaviour
The class of two-person competition games is introduced and analyzed.For any game in this class the set of Nash equilibria is convex, equilibrium strategies are exchangeable, and all Nash equilibria lead to the same payoff vector. Competition games are compared to other competitive environments such as unilaterally competitive games and rivalry games.Moreover, protective behaviour within competitive environments is analyzed.For matrix games it is known that protective strategies pro¯les exactly correspond to proper equilibria.It is shown that this result can be extended to the class of unilaterally competitive games.competitive environments;unilaterally competitive games;rivalry games;competition games;protective strategies
Cost allocation and communication
Game Theory;Cost Accounting;business economics
Characterizing Cautious Choice
The class of maximin actions in general decision problems is characterized.Maximin actions;Decision problems
Transfers, Contracts and Strategic Games
This paper analyses the role of transfer payments and strategic con- tracting within two-person strategic form games with monetary pay- offs. First, it introduces the notion of transfer equilibrium as a strat- egy combination for which individual stability can be supported by allowing the possibility of transfers of the induced payoffs. Clearly, Nash equilibria are transfer equilibria, but under common regularity conditions the reverse is also true. This result typically does not hold for finite games without the possibility of randomisation, and transfer equilibria for this particular class are studied in some detail. The second part of the paper introduces, also within the setting of finite games, contracting on monetary transfers as an explicit strategic option, resulting in an associated two-stage contract game. In the first stage of the contract game each player has the option of proposing transfer schemes for an arbitrary collection of outcomes. Only if the players fully agree on the entire set of transfer proposals, the payoffs of the game to be played in the second stage are modified accordingly. The main results provide explicit characterisations of the sets of payoff vectors that are supported by Nash equilibrium and virtual subgame perfect equilibrium, respectively.monetary transfer scheme;transfer equilibrium;contract game;virtual subgame perfect equilibrium;Folk theorems
A UV flux constraint on the formation of direct collapse black holes
The ability of metal free gas to cool by molecular hydrogen in primordial
halos is strongly associated with the strength of ultraviolet (UV) flux
produced by the stellar populations in the first galaxies. Depending on the
stellar spectrum, these UV photons can either dissociate molecules
directly or indirectly by photo-detachment of as the latter
provides the main pathway for formation in the early universe. In
this study, we aim to determine the critical strength of the UV flux above
which the formation of molecular hydrogen remains suppressed for a sample of
five distinct halos at by employing a higher order chemical solver and a
Jeans resolution of 32 cells. We presume that such flux is emitted by PopII
stars implying atmospheric temperatures of ~K. We performed
three-dimensional cosmological simulations and varied the strength of the UV
flux below the Lyman limit in units of . Our findings show that the
value of varies from halo to halo and is sensitive to the
local thermal conditions of the gas. For the simulated halos it varies from
400-700 with the exception of one halo where .
This has important implications for the formation of direct collapse black
holes and their estimated population at z > 6. It reduces the number density of
direct collapse black holes by almost three orders of magnitude compared to the
previous estimates.Comment: 10 pages, 6 figures, matches the accepted version to ber published in
MNRAS, higher resolution version is available at
http://www.astro.physik.uni-goettingen.de/~mlatif/Jcrit.pd
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