Fast and frugal framing effects?

Three experiments examine whether simple pair-wise comparison judgments, involving the “recognition heuristic” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), are sensitive to implicit cues to the nature of the comparison required. Experiments 1 & 2 show that participants frequently choose the recognized option of a pair if asked to make “larger” judgments but are significantly less likely to choose the unrecognized option when asked to make “smaller” judgments. Experiment 3 demonstrates that, overall, participants consider recognition to be a more reliable guide to judgments of a magnitude criterion than lack of recognition and that this intuition drives the framing effect. These results support the idea that, when making pair-wise comparison judgments, inferring that the recognized item is large is simpler than inferring that the unrecognized item is small

Less-is-more effects without the recognition heuristic

Inferences consistent with “recognition-based” decision-making may be drawn for various reasons other than recognition alone. We demonstrate that, for 2-alternative forced-choice decision tasks, less-is-more effects (reduced performance with additional learning) are not restricted to recognition-based inference but can also be seen in circumstances where inference is knowledge-based but item knowledge is limited. One reason why such effects may not be observed more widely is the dependence of the effect on specific values for the validity of recognition and knowledge cues. We show that both recognition and knowledge validity may vary as a function of the number of items recognized. The implications of these findings for the special nature of recognition information, and for the investigation of recognition-based inference, are discusse

Time to decide? Simplicity and congruity in comparative judgment

What is the relationship between magnitude judgments relying on directly available characteristics versus probabilistic cues? Question frame was manipulated in a comparative judgment task previously assumed to involve inference across a probabilistic mental model (e.g., “which city is largest” – the “larger” question – versus “which city is smallest” – the “smaller” question). Participants identified either the largest or smallest city (Experiments 1a, 2) or the richest or poorest person (Experiment 1b) in a three-alternative forced choice (3-AFC) task (Experiment 1) or 2-AFC task (Experiment 2). Response times revealed an interaction between question frame and the number of options recognized. When asked the smaller question, response times were shorter when none of the options were recognized. The opposite pattern was found when asked the larger question: response time was shorter when all options were recognized. These task-stimuli congruity results in judgment under uncertainty are consistent with, and predicted by, theories of magnitude comparison which make use of deductive inferences from declarative knowledge

Alternatives or syntactic negation? Adults’ and children’s preferences for constructing counterfactual possibilities

Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Granada / CBUA This research was funded by grants from the Spanish Government, Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (PGC2018- 095868-B-I00) to SM and the Education, Culture and Sport Ministry (FPU15/05899) to JG.Reasoning with counterfactuals such as “if his sister had entered silently, the child would have been awake”, requires considering what is conjectured (“his sister entered silently”) and what is the counterfactual possibility (“his sister did not enter silently”). In two experiments, we test how both adults (Study 1) and children from 8 to 12 years (Study 2) construct counterfactual possibilities about the cause of an effect (“the child was awake because…”). We test specifically whether people construct the counterfactual possibility by recovering alternatives, for example, “the alarm clock sounded” or by using the syntactic negation using propositional symbols (“his sister did not enter silently”). Moreover, as children show difficulty in thinking with abstract contents, we test whether they construct the counterfactual possibility more readily by recovering concrete alternatives (“the alarm clock sounded”) rather than abstract alternatives (“he had trouble sleeping”). Results showed that children, as well as adults, recovered the alternative as the cause of the effect rather than the negation. Moreover, children, unlike adults, created the counterfactual possibility more frequently by recovering concrete situations rather than abstract situations.CBUASpanish GovernmentMinisterio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte FPU15/05899Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad PGC2018- 095868-B-I00Universidad de Granad